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LEGAL DRUGS? NOT WITHOUT LEGAL
REFORM: THE IMPACT OF DRUG
LEGALIZATION ON EMPLOYERS UNDER
CURRENT THEORIES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Laura L. Hirschfeldt
"The good, say the mystics of muscle, is Society-a
thing which they define as an organism that possesses no
physical form, a superbeing embodied in no one in par-
ticular and everyone in general except yourself ...
Man's mind, say the mystics of muscle, must be
subordinated to the will of Society.... Man's standard
of value, say the mystics of muscle, is the pleasure of
Society, whose standards are beyond man's right of
judgment and must be obeyed as a primary absolute."
-John Galt
"The law of a business world is not made for
amusement."
-Harold J. Laski
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INTRODUCTION
For some time now, arguments have been marshaled to support le-
galization, or at least decriminalization, of the sale, possession and use of
certain drugs.' This Article is not so much an argument against drug
legalization as it is a wake-up call to American employers about enter-
prise liability generally.2 Its purpose is to discuss the negative economic
impact that drug legalization (and concomitant increase in drug use) is
likely to have on employers-an enormous population virtually ignored
by scholars and commentators involved in the debate-under current
American enterprise liability law.3 Private sector employers are already
quite concerned about the impact of drug and alcohol abuse on work-
place safety and productivity.4 Very few, however, seem to have consid-
1 For the arguments offered in favor of drug legalization, see infra Part I.A.
2 1 must confess that at the outset of the research for this article, I was overwhelmingly
opposed to the legalization or decriminalization of any of the currently illegal drugs. How-
ever, the arguments and the statistics offered by the pro-legalization writers are compelling,
and as a result, I am willing to rethink my position on legalization. For purposes of this
Article, that only serves to prove that employers in the United States cannot afford to believe
that drugs will never be legalized. If I can be persuaded, so can like-minded others.
3 In fact, an astonishingly small number of commentators address tort law in the context
of drug legalization. One of the few is Thomas Szasz, a professor in the Department of Psy-
chiatry at Syracuse University, who has been a vocal proponent of the libertarian arguments in
favor of drug legalization for many years. Dr. Szasz acknowledges that drug legalization with-
out tort reform is a prescription for disaster. See Thomas Szasz, The War on Drugs is Lost,
NAT'L REv., Feb. 12, 1996, at 34, 46 ("[B]ringing a free market in drugs into being in
America would require more than repealing criminal sanctions against selling and buying
drugs. Respect for autonomy and responsibility, supported by a rational tort system, would be
needed as well.") (emphasis added).
4 See, e.g., William C. Collins, Drug Abuse Testing in the Workplace: Avoiding Piffalls
and Problems, 19 MED. LABORATORY OBsERvER, Feb. 1987, at 30 (estimating that drug abuse
affects 5-13 percent of the American workforce and costs up to $33 billion annually); Michael
A. Verespej, Emerging Set of Rules: The Courts Are Putting Limits on Employers, INDUSTRY
WK., Feb. 9, 1987, at 20 (reporting Southern Pacific Railroad's drug policy resulted in a 71
percent reduction in accidents and injuries that were caused by human error); Lisa Westbrook,
Why You Need A Crystal-Clear Drug Policy, 7 Bus. & HEa-m, Jan. 1989, at 16 (National
Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that one in seven American workers abuses drugs, at a cost
to businesses of at least $100 billion per year in absenteeism and lost productivity); Kaye-Sung
Chon & Lynn F. Jacob, If Drug Testing is Enacted, It Must Be Done Properly, 23 NAnON'S
RESTAURA T NEws, Oct. 9, 1989, at F8 (noting that productivity studies in 1974 reported that
alcoholics and drug abusers take two-and-a-half times more absences of nearly eight days or
more, receive three times as much sick leave and accident benefits, and five times as many
workers' compensation claims. The studies also reported that alcohol and drug abusers lead
the statistics in industrial accidents.); Joseph F. Mangan, Controlling Substance Abuse in the
Workplace, 91 BEST'S REv.: PROP.-CAsuLTY INS. EDmON, Oct. 1990, at 88 (discussing a
congressional report disclosing that drug or alcohol abuse was a factor in one of every five
train accidents in 1987, and that in 1988, 13 percent of the nation's workforce was estimated to
be addicted to alcohol or drugs); James H. Coil, ImI & Charles M. Rice, State Limits on Drug-
Testing Programs After Accidents, 20 EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY, Mar. 22, 1993, at 103 (esti-
mating that illicit drug use by employees may cost businesses as much as $100 billion per year
in "absenteeism, reduced productivity, workplace accidents, increased insurance costs, and
other losses"); Paul M. Thompson, Implementing A Drug-Testing Program, 56 Am.
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ered the potential effects of drug legalization within the context of the
current law on enterprise liability. Perhaps, like many others, they are
confident that currently illicit drugs like cocaine, marijuana and heroin
will never be legalized. If that is the basis for their comfort, they can ill
afford to be so blithe.
Part II of this Article sets forth a number of the most commonly
offered arguments in favor of drug legalization. They are detailed and
compelling. Although proponents of drug legalization are not winning
the public relations war (Americans are still overwhelmingly opposed to
drug legalization), they are in no hurry. Each year they tally the costs
and the casualties of the War on Drugs and wait for the American pub-
lic's patience-or its money-to run out. When either happens, argu-
ments favoring drug legalization will be taken seriously. The danger for
employers if drug laws are repealed lies in the change in enterprise liabil-
ity law over the past thirty years. Recent interpretations of common-law
agency theories of respondeat superior,5 the creation and expansion of
strict liability theories, and newer federal and state employee protection
legislation have combined to create a climate in which employers are
nearly always held financially liable for the actions of their employees,
no matter how deliberate or how out of the control of the employers.6
Potential liability for their employees' negligence alone ought to be
enough to prompt most modem employers to oppose drug legalization.
As Part Ill of this Article sets forth, the law in this area was not
always so unsympathetic to employers. From its uncertain origins in Ro-
man or Germanic law to the early English incarnations, the theory of
respondeat superior was typically invoked to impose liability upon the
master only for those acts of his servant that were commanded by him, or
that were negligently performed by the servant in furtherance of the
master's endeavors. 7 In some exceptional cases the master would also be
liable for the servant's intentional torts, but these were typically trespass
PAPERMAKER, Sep. 1993, at 65 (estimating substance abuse costs to American businesses at
$150 billion per year); Deanna Keleman, How To Recognize Substance Abuse in the Work-
place, 56 SUPERVISION, Sep. 1995, at 3 (citing a study reporting that among 5,000 postal ser-
vice job applicants, those who tested positive for drug use and were hired anyway missed 50
percent more time from work and had a 47 percent greater chance of being fired; further,
quoting from a National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) study that estimated that 10 percent
of the workforce "suffers from a chemical dependency"); Paul Farrell, Pass or Fail: Managing
A Drug or Alcohol Testing Program for Commercial Drivers, 43 RIsK MGmr., May 1996, at
34 (citing a NIDA study that found that one or two of every ten Americans use illegal drugs).
5 Latin for "let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1312-13 (6th ed. 1990)
("The doctrine or maxim means that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of
his servant, and a principal for those of his agent.").
6 For a discussion of the development of the modem enterprise liability theories in the
United States, see infra Part III.
7 In both Roman and early English law, there were also instances where the master was
held liable by virtue of a nondelegable duty imposed by law. Traditionally, the only masters
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or battery cases, and the servant had to be acting within the "scope of his
employment;" that is, with the intent to serve the master.8
Unfortunately for employers, courts in the latter half of this century
have expanded the application of respondeat superior to cover an em-
ployee's intentional torts and criminal acts (in addition to their negligent
acts). As Part IV of the Article demonstrates, this has been a dramatic
departure from the historical understanding of respondeat superior.
When the policy arguments that traditionally supported respondeat supe-
rior are applied to the area of violent intentional torts or crimes of em-
ployees (such as theft, assault, rape or even murder) the justifications for
imposing vicarious liability on employers completely break down, espe-
cially when applied to cases involving employees under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.
This Article takes the position that the modem understanding of the
proper scope of enterprise liability is based upon early twentieth century
scholarly infatuation with communism and socialism-theories untested
at the time, but which were nevertheless the latest rage in political
thought, and which have been thoroughly debunked in the decades since.
Obvious class envy, a longing for public control over the means of pro-
duction and a visceral mistrust of the corporate form are all manifest in
the writings of the early twentieth century legal scholars, who enthusias-
tically endorsed strict vicarious liability of the enterprise. As scholars,
courts and legislators flocked to socialist legal theory, labor and employ-
ment laws saw dramatic changes, such as minimum wage laws and work-
ers' compensation statutes. In the area of tort law, "privity of contract"
was replaced by theories like strict liability, while respondeat superior
was expanded to impose vicarious liability on the employer for the inten-
tional torts of its employees. Interestingly, however, courts and com-
mentators consistently denied critics' charges that the latest incarnations
of respondeat superior were just thinly veiled attempts at pure "deep
pocket" rationales.9 Since the purely socialist justifications for ex-
panding the bases for enterprise liability were seldom expressly acknowl-
edged as such, they have yet to be explicitly rejected.
It is not just the tort theories that pose a threat to the American
enterprise's economic stability. Part V of the Article examines limits on
the enterprise's ability to shield itself from liability for an employee's
drug- or alcohol-induced negligence, intentional torts or crimes, specifi-
cally, legislation regulating drug testing in the workplace and legislation
characterizing addiction as a disability legally protected from discrimina-
affected in this way were innkeepers, common carriers and persons handling fire. See infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
8 See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
9 See infra notes 96, 119, 154 and accompanying text.
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tion. For example, the recently-enacted Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) contains provisions (and case law has provided interpretations)
that characterize addiction to alcohol or drugs as a "disability" that em-
ployers must "reasonably accommodate" under the Act.10 Although em-
ployers are still relatively free to discharge an employee who is working
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, employees frequently sue, claim-
ing that such disciplinary action is discriminatory under the ADA. The
question of whether legalization of currently illicit drugs would under-
mine an employer's existing right to test for these drugs goes unad-
dressed in the legalization literature.
Thus, even though most courts currently rule in favor of the em-
ployers in employee drug use cases, 1 the ADA still creates a counterin-
tuitive incentive for employees to claim that their drug or alcohol
problem is more serious than it otherwise may be. If an employee is
merely a casual user, high on the job, she can be terminated; if she claims
to be an addict, however, federal law protects her. Furthermore, legal
scholars are beginning to complain that the purpose of the ADA is not
fulfilled if employees can be disciplined for conduct that is "related" to
their "disability."'12 These commentators have been successful before at
persuading the courts to see things their way. If they succeed again,
employers will be saddled with addicted employees whom they can
neither trust with job duties, nor get rid of. The expenses of protracted
lawsuits, unpredictable financial losses and inevitably inflated insurance
costs associated with employee torts or crimes will become more costs of
doing business to be passed along to the hapless consumer in the form of
increased costs of goods and services.
It is the position of this Article that employers should fight vigor-
ously against legalization of drugs until such time as agency and tort law
have been substantially reformed to once again insulate employers from
liability for the violent intentional torts and criminal acts of their employ-
ees, especially those committed by persons under the influence of alco-
hol or drugs.
I. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DRUG LEGALIZATION 13
AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
A. THE ARGUMENTS THEMSELVES
If one wants to assess the likelihood of legalization of marijuana,
cocaine and/or heroin, one needs to be familiar with the arguments in
10 See infra Part II.B.1.
11 See infra Part HLI.B
12 See infra notes 352-54 and accompanying text.
13 The terms "legalization" and "decriminalization" actually have different meanings.
"Legalization" usually implies a scheme whereby it is no longer a violation of law to
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supporting legalization or decriminalization 14 (The arguments against le-
galizing these drugs should be more obvious because they are embodied
in the current drug policy, as fleshed out from time to time during polit-
ical campaigns.15).
Familiarizing oneself With the arguments in favor of legalization not
only gives one a sense of the persuasiveness (or lack thereof) of the ratio-
nales themselves, it also helps to clarify the point that many of the hidden
costs of legalization would be disproportionately borne by the private
sector. The public seems to be under the impression that those who want
drugs to be legalized believe that drug abuse is a benign activity. This is
inaccurate, and is a common misconception put forth by the anti-legali-
zation forces. By and large, the writers in favor of legalization of illegal
drugs concede that drug use is a social ill that calls for a cure. 16 How-
ever, they stress that the proper societal response is to treat drug use and/
or abuse as a public health problem, as opposed to a law enforcement
manufacture, sell and/or use drugs, subject to regulation, the content of which could vary
widely. "Decriminalization," on the other hand, usually suggests the reduction or elimination
of criminal penalties for possession of small amounts of otherwise illicit drugs for personal
use. Advocates of legalization and/or decriminalization do not agree on which is preferable, or
what scheme of government regulation would best accomplish their objectives. Since either
legalization or decriminalization would result in the ability of individuals to possess and use
drugs for individual use, there is no meaningful distinction between them for the purposes of
this Article. Therefore, I use the terms interchangeably throughout the Article.
14 See, e.g., Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HoFSTRA
L. REv. 501 (1990); Mark A. R. Kleiman & Aaron J. Saiger, Drug Legalization: The Impor-
tance of Asking the Right Question, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 527 (1990); Gregory A. Loken &
James Kennedy, Legal Cocaine and Kids: The Very Bitterness of Shame, 18 HoFSTmA L. Rlv.
567 (1990); James Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization, 18 HoF-
sTRA L. REv. 607 (1990); Henk Jan van Vliet, The Uneasy Decriminalization: A Perspective
on Dutch Drug Policy, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 717 (1990); Steven Jonas, Solving the Drug
Problem: A Public Health Approach to the Reduction of the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and
Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18 HoFsTRA L. Ray. 751 (1990); Michael Z. Letwin, Report from
the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City and the
Legalization Debate, 18 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 795 (1990); Mark H. Moore, Drugs: Getting A Fix
on the Problem and the Solution, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y Rv. 8 (1990); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons From Economics, 1994 U. Cm. LEGAL F.
207 (1994); Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. Rv.
483 (1997); Symposium, The War on Drugs is Lost, NAT'L REV., Feb. 12, 1996, at 34; Sympo-
sium, Save Money, Cut Crime, Get Real, PLAYBoY, Jan. 1, 1997, at 188.
15 For those who would like a simple statement of the arguments against legalization,
few are as succinct as John Lawn, former Administrator of the United States Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, 1985-1990. "Drugs are not bad because they are illegal; they are illegal
because they are bad." John C. Lawn, The Issue of Legalizing Illicit Drugs, 18 HoFsTPrA L.
Rv. 703 (1990).
16 As with many other aspects of this debate, however, libertarian commentator Thomas
Szasz runs counter even to unconventional views. See Szasz, supra note 3, at 45 ('William
Bennett is right: Drug use and drug control are primarily moral issues. But whereas Bennett
sees self-medication as wicked and drug criminalization as virtuous, I see self-medication as a
basic human right (with unqualified responsibility for its consequences) and drug criminaliza-
tion as sinful (hypocritical and ufienforceable).").
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problem.17 The problem, they would agree, is that our current stated
national policy of "zero tolerance," including criminalization of the use
and abuse of drugs, is not only unsuccessful in curbing the use of drugs,
but it has also created a host of social problems worse than drug use
itself. 18
The arguments in favor of drug legalization can be broken down
into nine basic points:
1) Our current policy regarding illegal drugs is hypocritical;
2) Marijuana, cocaine and heroin are neither more addictive nor
more lethal than alcohol and tobacco-two legal drugs;
3) Because humans have used psychoactive substances for millen-
nia, it is impossible and unrealistic to aspire to a completely "drug-free"
society;
4) As evidenced by alcohol Prohibition in the 1920s, previous at-
tempts to criminalize drug use have failed;
5) The ills caused by drug use and abuse are significantly less seri-
ous than those caused by criminalizing drugs, most notably the creation
of a "black market" in illegal drugs, with all that entails;
6) The War on Drugs has ended or ruined the lives of drug dealers,
drug users, law enforcement personnel and thousands of innocent parties;
7) Most people who try or use illegal drugs do not become addicts;
8) Drug addicts suffer from a disease; and
9) Decriminalization would free up literally hundreds of millions of
dollars in public funds that could be more effectively used to pay for
education and treatment of drug users, as well as negative advertising to
discourage future drug use (just as has been done with cigarette smoking
and drunk driving).
17 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 501 ("[D]rug addiction is a disease, and addicts
need medical care."); Jonas, supra note 14, at 787 ("[T]he program promoted by this Arti-
cle.., is founded on the concept that the misuse of recreational drugs is a health problem and
that only criminal behaviors resulting from the misuse of the recreational drugs should be
handled by the criminal justice system."); Luna, supra note 14, at 525 ("Drug abuse looks and
sounds like a medical, public-health problem.").
18 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 14, at 490-95 (citing, among other authorities, H. WAYNE
MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A SocIAL HISTORY, 1800-1983, 93-94 (1981):
The Near Easterner had symbolized apprehensions about the adverse personal and
social effects of cannabis use. Stereotypes of the Chinese had summarized fears
about the social dangers of opium smoking. In decades to come, the Mexican and
marijuana, and the African-American or Puerto-Rican and heroin would figure in the
debate. This imagery revealed apprehension about these ethnic groups and a desire
to control their behavior or isolate them).
DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADIsE: OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA BEFoRE 1940, 64
(1982).
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1. Legalization Rationale Number 1: The Current Policy Vis-&i-
Vis Illegal Drugs Is Hypocritical.
Pro-legalization forces point out that alcohol and tobacco, two very
powerful and very addictive drugs, are legal and are used as recreational
drugs by millions of Americans every day.19 The hypocritical policy of
legalizing some potentially dangerous drugs and not others has resulted
in at least two problems with the public perception of drugs. First, the
arbitrary policy creates the factually false idea in the public's mind that
there are meaningful pharmacological differences between legal drugs
and illegal drugs.20 Second, the policy sends the message that certain
forms of recreational drug use (smoking and drinking) are fun, glamor-
ous, and sexy, while illegal drug use is per se dangerous, degrading,
debilitating and sinful-even evil. For while there are legitimate argu-
ments to be made in favor of criminalizing the use of some drugs as
opposed to others, relying merely on the distinction between "legal" and
19 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 520 & n.114 ("[W]ith the exception of taxes and
labeling, cigarettes are sold almost without restriction. Cigarettes are cheap, widely available
and widely advertised except on television. Despite their highly addictive nature, they are not
even classified as a drug.") (citing 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1988)), which exempts tobacco from
the definition of "controlled substance" as that term is used in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended in
various sections of U.S.C. Titles 18, 19, 21, 26, 31, 40, 42, 46 and 49)); see also Kleiman &
Saiger, supra note 14, at 545 & nn.106-08.
Regulations governing alcohol, the nation's premier recreational psychoactive, are
fantastically permissive, measured against either the rules for other drugs or benefit-
cost criteria. Alcohol is a very dangerous drug. Had Congress failed to specifically
exempt it from the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, it could be placed
along with marijuana and heroin in Schedule I, as a psychoactive with no accepted
medical use and great potential for harm.
Id. (citing The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801-917 et. seq. (1988); 15 U.S.C.
§ 812(b)(1) (1988); Secretary of Health and Hum. Services., U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum.
Services, Sixth Special Report to the U.S. Congress on Alcohol and Health, S. REP. No. 101-
43, at 24 (1987) [hereinafter Sixth Special Report]).
20 See, e.g., Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 14, at 539.
Alcohol and tobacco, like marijuana and heroin, are drugs with significant costs of
abuse and costs of control. Tobacco is an important special case: addictive and
health damaging. But the rhetoric of the 'war on drugs' attempts to obscure this fact,
as if there were chemical categories of 'legal' and 'illegal' drugs.
IL; Jonas, supra note 14, at 753 n.13.
The 'good,' or at least the 'OK,' drugs are those which are currently legal, while the
'bad' drugs, those which are the sole cause of 'The Drug Problem,' are those which
are currently illegal. However, there are no scientific, epidemiological or medical
bases on which the legal distinctions among the various drugs are made.
Id. (citing E. BRECHER & T-i EDrroRs OF CONSUMER REPORTS, Licrr AND ILLIcrr DRUGS:
Tim CONSUMERS' UNION REPORT ON NARcoTIcs, STMuLANTs, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS,
HALLUCINOGENS, AND MARIJUANA - INCLUDING CAFFEINE, NicoTINE, AND ALCOHOL, 525-26
(1972), which Jonas characterizes as a "landmark of rationality in the study of the history of
American drug policy." ).
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"illegal" drugs significantly undermines the credibility of the current pol-
icy because it is factually untenable political propaganda.
2. Legalization Rationale Number 2: Marijuana, Cocaine and
Heroin Are No More Addictive or Lethal than the Two
Most Popular Legal Recreational Drugs-Alcohol and
Tobacco.
As a corollary to rationale number one, explained above, pro-legali-
zation advocates also maintain that marijuana, cocaine, and heroin are no
more lethal than alcohol or tobacco. In fact, many writers persuasively
argue that alcohol and tobacco are more dangerous than marijuana, co-
caine and heroin.21 This second rationale is advanced primarily by com-
paring the total number of annual deaths attributable to the use of alcohol
and/or cigarettes to that attributable to marijuana, cocaine or heroin.22
However, the obvious response to this argument is that a higher death
rate is attributable to alcohol and tobacco use because they are legal
drugs.
Perhaps anticipating this response, the advocates of legalization also
provide evidence that marijuana, cocaine and heroin are not as addictive
as alcohol or tobacco, even if one merely looks proportionately (as op-
21 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 520 & n.107 ("In 1985 alone, approximately
390,000 people died from tobacco related diseases.") (citing Richard Berke, U.S. Report
Raises Estimate of Smoking Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1989, at A20); Id. at 521 & n.120
("Alcohol, like tobacco, is also a drug that kills thousands of people each year. Alcohol plays
a part in approximately 25,000 automobile fatalities annually, is frequently involved in sui-
cides, non-automobile accidents, and crimes of violence.") (citing Sixth Special Report, supra
note 19, at 12; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM, INC., FACTS ON ALCOHOLISM AND ALco-
HOL RELATED PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter FACTS ON ALCOHOLISM]); Kleiman & Saiger,
supra note 14, at 546.
Heavy chronic alcohol use is associated with a wide variety of diseases, and alcohol
has been estimated to cause approximately twenty thousand excess disease deaths
per year. More than one-third of all crime leading to state prison sentences is com-
mitted under the influence of alcohol, as is an even greater proportion of domestic
assault, sexual assault and the physical and sexual abuse of children ....
Id. (citing 1986 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 39; Clare Jo Hamilton & James J. Collins, The Role of Alcohol in Wife
Beating and Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, in DRINKING AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 253-67
(James I. Collins ed., 1981)); see also Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 658-59 (citing Sixth Special
Report); Jonas, supra note 14, at 765 ("Cigarette smoking causes about 400,000 deaths per
year.") (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL, at v (1989)). Note that these writers (and others) also distinguish
between drug related deaths attributable solely to the use of the drugs themselves (so-called
"pharmacological" deaths) and those attributable to criminalization and prohibition, such as
deaths caused by tainted or adulterated drugs, or the spread of HIV/AIDS caused by sharing
dirty needles.
22 See supra note 21.
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posed to sheer numbers) among those who have "ever used" any of the
five recreational drugs. 23 Unlike raw numbers, data that compares the
percentage of those who become addicted to marijuana, cocaine or her-
oin among those who have ever used the drugs tends to buttress legaliza-
tion advocates' argument that alcohol and cigarettes are actually more
addictive because a much larger proportion of those who have "ever
used" alcohol or tobacco become addicted.
3. Legalization Rationale Number 3: The Use of Intoxicating
Substances Is So Deeply Ingrained in Human Culture that
Attempts to Completely Rid Society of These Substances
Are Destined to Fail.
The "zero tolerance" approach to recreational use of psychoactive
substances, the argument goes, is unrealistic and destined to fail. Some
scholars point out that while cultural tolerance for the use of drugs has
varied, humans have been using psychoactive substances for thousands
of years. Quoting from a text entitled "Heroin and Politicians," Dr.
Steven Jonas writes:
Throughout history man has used available psychoactive
substances ... to receive pleasure or to achieve new ex-
periences. [Furthermore,] [t]he use of mind-altering
drugs and drug-induced behavior is a common thread in
the social fabric of humanity. For thousands of years
people have taken drugs to alter mood, relax, feel better,
23 See, e.g., Jonas, supra note 14, at 764-65.
According to the Surgeon General's Report on nicotine addiction, '[t]he pharmaco-
logical and behavioral process that determine [sic] tobacco addiction are similar to
those that determine addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine.' Despite that
fact, cigarette tobacco is much more addicting than either alcohol or crack-cocaine.
While heroin is ordinarily thought of as a highly addictive drug, some authorities
state 'that a great many heroin users have developed stable, non-addictive patterns of
occasional use ... over long periods of time .... A commonly held view in the
media is that crack is a particularly addicting drug. According to the NIDA data,
however, crack is not 'highly addictive.'
Id. (citing, among other authorities, Dr. Jack Henningfield of the Addiction Research Center of
Baltimore, whose research showed that nine out of ten people who tried cigarettes became
addicted, as compared with one in six persons who tried cocaine or one in ten who tried
alcohol); see also id. at 792. Jonas breaks down the use of thirteen types of legal, prescription
and illegal drugs by number and percentage of persons in three age groups who have "ever
used" each drug, versus those in the same age groups who still use the drug. See id. at Appen-
dix L For marijuana, cocaine and heroin, fewer than half of those who "ever used" the drug
still described themselves as "current users." For alcohol and cigarettes, however, 85 and 75
percent, respectively, of the entire population reported having "ever used" the drugs, and 53
and 29 percent, respectively, of those who ever used alcohol or cigarettes still described them-
selves as "current users." Id.
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feel different, escape and avoid pain .... Records show
that narcotics have been used for at least 8,000 years.24
Therefore, given the seemingly innate human craving for mind-al-
tering substances and the desperate need at times to relieve physical pain
or emotional misery, a more practical goal than eliminating drug use al-
together is reducing the use of drugs with a dangerous potential for ad-
diction, and minimizing the possibility of harm to or by those who use
psychoactive substances (including alcohol, tobacco and prescription
medications).25
4. Legalization Rationale Number 4: Previous Attempts to
Criminalize Intoxicants in the United States-Most Notably
Alcohol Prohibition-Failed.
Legalization advocates further argue that criminalizing psychoactive
substances produces social evils far worse than the intoxication or addic-
tion itself. They point to historical precedent to bolster their argument.2 6
The first (and best known) true attempt by the federal government
to control narcotics was the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, forbidding the manufacture and sale of alco-
hol, and ushering in what has come to be known as Prohibition. 27 De-
spite broad public support for Prohibition as a policy,28 Americans grew
weary of the turmoil and upheaval associated with law enforcement ef-
forts to effectuate Prohibition, and thirteen years after its enactment, the
24 Id. at 756 (quoting from D. BELLis, HEROIN AND POLrTCIANs 3 (1981)); see also
Luna, supra note 14, at 486 ("'For most of human history,' remarked historian Stanton Peele,
'even under conditions of ready access to the most potent of drugs, people and societies have
regulated their drug use without requiring massive education, legal and interdiction cam-
paigns.'") (citing Loren Siegel, Decriminalize Drugs Now: Even Some Conservatives Agree
That It's Not as Dumb an Idea as It Sounds 57 (Jan. 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author)).
25 See, e.g., Jonas, supra note 14, at 783.
What then should the primary goal of our national drug policy be? Very simply, it
should be to reduce and control the use of all the recreational mood-altering drugs in
order to provide for their safe, pleasurable use, consistent with centuries-old human
experience, while minimizing their harmful effects on individuals, the family, and
society as a whole.
Id.
26 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 14, at 486-512; Schmoke, supra note 14, at 507-10; Os-
trowski, supra note 14, at 641, 645-46; Jonas, supra note 14, at 760-61; see also S. WISOTSKY,
BREAKING THE IMPASSE ON THE WAR ON DRUGS 9-10 (1986).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (repealed 1933).
28 See Loken & Kennedy, supra note 14, at 569 ("Sixty years ago the adherents of Prohi-
bition swept the 1928 elections, winning some 80 percent of Congressional races...") (citing
Aaron & Musto, Temperance and Prohibition in America: A Historical Overview, in ALco-
HOL AND PuBLIc POLICY: BEYOND THE SHADOW OF PROHIBITION 127, 171 (Mark Moore &
Dean R. Gerstein eds., 1981)).
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Eighteenth Amendment was repealed by the passage of the Twenty-First
Amendment.29 Prohibition was dead.
Not everything about Prohibition was a disaster. Some commenta-
tors defend Prohibition by identifying contemporaneous decreases in dis-
eases and deaths associated with alcohol abuse.30 However, drug-related
violence increased during Prohibition:
There can be little doubt that most, if not all, "drug-re-
lated murders" are the result of drug prohibition. The
same type of violence came with the eighteenth amend-
ment's ban of alcohol in 1920. The murder rate rose
with the start of Prohibition, remained high during Pro-
hibition, then declined for eleven consecutive years after
Prohibition .... In 1933, the last year of Prohibition,
there were 12,124 homicides; 7,863 resulted from as-
saults with firearms and explosives. By 1941, these
figures had declined to 8,048 and 4,525, respectively. 31
5. Legalization Rationale Number 5: Criminalization of
Marijuana, Cocaine and Heroin Has Created a "Black
Market" That Has Devastated Our Inner Cities.
This is unquestionably the most compelling of all the arguments
offered in support of legalization or decriminalization. Indeed, this ra-
tionale forms the backbone of the argument for most pro-legalization
writers. They maintain that many-if not most-of the ills that we asso-
ciate with illegal drugs are attributable not to drug use (or even abuse)
per se, but to the black market created by the War on Drugs.32 Advo-
cates of legalization take the position that a certain amount of demand for
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
30 See, e.g., Lawn, supra note 15, at 703 ("During Prohibition in the 1920's, alcohol-
related mental and physical illness declined dramatically.") (citing Legal or Not, Drugs Kill,
N.Y. TIMs, May 26, 1988, at A34).
31 Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 641-42 & nn.157-60 (citations omitted); BURFAu oF THE
CENsus, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, BIcENTENNIAL ED., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNrrED STATES, CoLmiAL Tmms To 1970, PART 1414 (1975). "The murder and assault rates
had been rising even before Prohibition. Nevertheless, during Prohibition, [v]iolence was
commonplace in establishing exclusive sales territories, in obtaining liquor, or in defending a
supply." D.E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROMBMON 27 (1979). While there is no com-
prehensive study of prohibition-era violence, it is reported that there were more than 1,000
gangland murders in New York City alone during Prohibition. See id. Another writer esti-
mates that between two and three thousand people died during law enforcement raids, auto
chases, and arrests, casualties which would not show up in murder statistics. See H. LEE, How
DRY WE WERE: PRoHmriON RvisrrED 8 (1963).
32 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 505-06; Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 647; Luna,
supra note 14, at 517; see also Ethan Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, PuB. Ibmansr,
Summer 1988, at 6 ("[Many of the drug-related evils that Americans identify as part and
parcel of the 'drug problem' are in fact caused by our drug-prohibition policies.").
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intoxicating substances will remain constant, regardless of criminaliza-
tion.33 That being the case, as with alcohol Prohibition in the 1920s, the
consistent demand and constricted supply create a black market in these
drugs, driving the prices so high that it is inevitable people will get into
the business of buying and selling illegal drugs, notwithstanding the risks
of imprisonment or death attendant with every transaction. Erik Luna
has the following to say:
So, how do you create a black market, anyway? It is
actually quite simple, as Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke
asserted before a congressional committee: "The black
market is a result of the manufacture and sale of [drugs]
being criminalized[;] profits from drug sales are enor-
mous because the substances cannot be obtained le-
gally." In general, a successful underground market
requires only a few elements. First, a heavily demanded
product must be banned by the government-narcotics
and their criminalization certainly suffice. Second, there
must be an ample supply of the product to meet the con-
sumer's demand .... Third, suppliers must be guaran-
teed a profit margin commensurate with the "costs"
accompanying prohibition .... The income from illicit
drug trafficking . . . is more than commensurate with
these costs .... [T]he gross profits are simply astonish-
ing-billions of dollars in untaxed proceeds. 34
With the black market comes the litany of social crises that we have
come to associate with illegal drug use in our inner cities (and, increas-
ingly, in suburban and rural areas as well):
(a) inflated prices caused by the black market that drive drug users
to commit crimes to support their habits;35
33 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
34 Luna, supra note 14, at 512-13 (citing SELECT Comm. ON NARCoTICS ABUSE AND
CONTROL, 101ST CONGRESS, LEGALIZATION OF ILLICIT DRUGS: IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY (A
REVIEW OF RECENT HEARINGS) 11 (Comm. Print 1989) (summary of testimony of Baltimore
Mayor Kurt Schmoke)); see also Nadelmann, supra note 32, at 13 ("As was the case during
Prohibition, the principal beneficiaries of current drug policies are the new and old organized-
crime gangs."); Schmoke, supra note 14, at 505 ("What prohibition has accomplished has been
to ignore the addicts' need for medical treatment while making the illicit drug trade a multi-
billion-dollar business.").
35 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 512-13 & n.68; Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 647
& n.195; Letwin, supra note 14, at 812 & n.103.
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(b) neighborhoods turned into war zones when armed gangs com-
pete to hold on to their "turf' (lucrative segments of the drug market),
and the resulting loss of life in these war-tom neighborhoods;36
(c) youth lured from school and low-paying, entry-level jobs to the
high-paying, high-stakes world of drug dealing (Commentators insist that
it will be impossible to keep young people from economically-impover-
ished backgrounds out of the illegal drug market, in light of the speed
with which they can make staggering profits and the status attached to
that sort of income.); 3 7
(d) overdoses and deaths from street sales of drugs tainted, "cut" or
"laced" with impurities (If drugs were legalized, advocates claim, regula-
tion and information would reduce or eliminate the number of drug over-
doses and deaths attributable to adulterated drugs, whose content and
purity would be assured by governmental standards, much as prescription
drugs are regulated today.);38
(e) hundreds of millions of public dollars annually devoted to arrest,
prosecution and imprisonment of individuals for possession, use or sale
of relatively small amounts of illegal drugs (These are dollars and man-
hours and prison cells that could be devoted to serious criminals who
commit violent crimes: kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, murder and the
like.); 39
(f) the spread of AIDS and other diseases from sharing dirty
needles;40
(g) thousands of addicted individuals who do not seek treatment for
fear of legal reprisals, or because of budget cuts affecting treatment
facilities; 4 1
(h) loss of drugs for legitimate medical purposes; 42
(i) corruption of law enforcement personnel (The promise of easy
profit often seduces police officers, detectives, federal agents and others
involved in law enforcement.); 43 and
36 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 14, at 517; Schmoke, supra note 14, at 516 & n.81; Os-
trowski, supra note 14, at 641, 649-50; Moore, supra note 14, at 8.
37 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 14, at 517; Schmoke, supra note 14, at 516 & n.82; Klei-
man & Saiger, supra note 14, at 528 & n.6; Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 649, 666; Letwin,
supra note 14, at 813-14.
38 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 14, at 539; Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 652-54; Letwin,
supra note 14, at 813 & n.109.
39 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 513 n.69, 514; Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 656-
57 & n.232, 662-63 & n.258.
40 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 14, at 523; Schmoke, supra note 14, at 516-17; Letwin,
supra note 14, at 812 & n.105; Moore, supra note 14, at 9.
41 See, e.g., Letwin, supra note 14, at 821-27.
42 See, e.g., Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 652-53.
43 See, e.g., id. at 663-64.
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(j) the continuing encroachment on our civil liberties. 44
Proponents of legalization or decriminalization insist that the play-
ing field be level. In order to meaningfully compare "legal" drugs with
"illegal" drugs, one must look only to the disease or mortality rate asso-
ciated with use of the drugs and should not look at the host of other
problems caused by criminalization of drugs, such as the creation of the
black market. Advocates argue that when the above issues are taken out
of the mix, marijuana, cocaine and heroin are neither more addictive nor
more deadly than tobacco or alcohol.
6. Legalization Rationale Number 6: The "War on Drugs" Has
Also Taken the Lives of Thousands of Innocent Bystanders.
Each week, newspapers in most of the major cities in the United
States detail the deaths of innocent bystanders who are caught in the
cross-fire. They are in the wrong place at the wrong time-a place
which often happens to be the neighborhood in which they live.45 Our
culture is forever deprived of whatever contributions these individuals
would have made had they not been drawn into the deadly netherworld
of drug dealing.
7. Legalization Rationale Number 7: Most People Who Use
Marijuana, Cocaine or Heroin Do Not Become Addicts.
Disputing the prospect of increased levels of addiction is essential to
refuting the claims of legalization opponents, since many emphasize the
public health implications of legalization.46 The position taken by advo-
cates of legalization tends to be supported by three statements:
(a) studies in places that have legalized or decriminalized drugs
demonstrate that there are no dramatic increases in addiction;
44 See, e.g., id. at 664-66; Letwin, supra note 14, at 817-19.
45 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 506 n.23.
Due to escalating drug-related crime, more than a dozen major cities in the United
States now have so-called 'war-zones,' which are: 'places where drug dealers shoot
it out to command street corners, where children grow up under a reign of 'narcoter-
ror' and civil authority has basically broken down.., where the level of concen-
trated violence has risen so high that city services barely function, not simply
because workers and administrators blatantly redline the areas as in the past or for
lack of resources, but also out of well-grounded fear for their lives.'
Id. (citing Moore, Dead Zones, U.S. Naws & WoRLD RP., Apr. 10, 1989, at 22); see also id.
at 515-16; Letwin, supra note 14, at 805-06 n.69 (citing numerous newspaper articles detailing
deaths attributable to drug-war violence).
46 See, e.g., Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 14, at 531-32 ("[Tlhe argument between advo-
cates and opponents of legalization involves different predictions about the results of alterna-
tive policies and different value weightings of those results. For example, legalizers are likely
to stress crime reduction, whereas prohibitionists would emphasize the protection of users'
health.") (citations omitted).
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(b) dramatic increases in addiction are a function of social factors
other than drug use itself, such as socioeconomic class or the absence of
one or both parents in the home; and
(c) repeated attempts to show that "soft" drugs, like marijuana and
hashish, are "gateways" to "harder" drugs like cocaine or heroin have
failed.
(a) Studies in places that have decriminalized drugs do not show
an increase in the amount of addiction.
There are, admittedly, very few places that have tried decriminaliza-
tion or legalization. Most studies therefore focus on the experiences of
the Netherlands which has experimented with limited decriminaliza-
tion.47 The Netherlands has drawn fierce criticism for its decriminaliza-
tion of so-called "soft" drugs (marijuana and hashish) in the
approximately twenty years since the Dutch government implemented
the policy.48 The country's critics have included the United States,
which protests that the Netherlands' decriminalization policy threatens
the fulfillment of its international treaty obligations. 49
In spite of the increasing pressure on the Netherlands to conform
their internal law to that of other western countries, statistics from the
Dutch experiment with decriminalization of "soft" drugs, coupled with
its public health approach to the use of harder drugs, suggest that in-
creased addiction to-indeed, increased use of-drugs is not a necessary
result of decriminalization. Author, lawyer and consultant Henk Jan van
Vliet explains:
[From about 1980 to 1990] the number of drug addicts
has stabilized at an estimated 15,000 to 20,000; the aver-
age age of addicts in Amsterdam... has increased from
twenty-six in 1981 to thirty in 1987, whereas the number
of addicts under twenty-two decreased from fourteen
47 See van Vliet, supra note 14, at 717; Lane Porter, Comparative Drug Treatment Poli-
cies and Legislation, 29 INT'L LAW. 697 (1995).
48 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 47, at 709 (discussing the Opium Act, to which the
Netherlands became a signatory in 1928); Acr oF 18 MAY 1928 (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and
Decrees) No. 167. The Netherlands revised this Act in 1976 to reduce the penalties for posses-
sion of cannabis, although trafficking in "soft" drugs still remains an offense punishable by the
Dutch government. See Act OF 1 NOVEMBER 1976, S. 425. The 1976 reform reduced the
possession of approximately one ounce of marijuana or hashish from an "offense" to a misde-
meanor, with maximum penalties of one month in prison and/or a fine of 500 DF. In addition,
the "expediency principle" of Dutch criminal law empowers its criminal prosecutors to refrain
from prosecuting crimes "on grounds derived from the public interest." As a practical matter,
this has meant that possession of small amounts of marijuana or hashish is lowest on the level
of criminal prosecution priorities, and almost never prosecuted. See van Vliet, supra note 14,
at 731.
49 See van liet, supra note 14.
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percent to five percent over the same period. The Dutch
numbers of drug-related deaths are the lowest of all Eu-
ropean countries. 50
Furthermore, with respect to marijuana use itself, a report from
1988 stated that the number of new users of marijuana had decreased
since the 1976 decriminalization, and that only approximately four per-
cent of Dutch youth between ten and eighteen years old had tried mari-
juana. Of that four percent, over fifty-five percent had ceased to use
marijuana by their nineteenth birthdays.51 Van Vliet also observes that
"the total number of soft drug users in the Netherlands [in 1989] is esti-
mated at about 300,000, which is two percent of the total population." 52
(b) Addiction and drug-related violence are more a function of
social factors, such as socioeconomic class or the absence
of one or both parents, than of drug use itself.
Advocates maintain that legalization or decriminalization will not
result in dramatic increases in addiction or addiction-related crime be-
cause the available data suggests that social factors, rather than the phar-
macological qualities of the drugs themselves, are more accurate
predictors of addiction and drug-related crime:
This point can be illustrated by a thought experiment. If
a hundred nuns and a hundred congressmen smoked
crack, how many would become violent and murder
someone? Most reasonable people would answer none.
In fact, there is a dearth of evidence that wealthy persons
or physicians become violent after using cocaine,
although many thousands of them have used the
drug .... As Stanton Peele writes, "it is a mark of na-
ivete-not science-to mistake the behavior of some
drug users with the pharmacological effects of the drug,
as though the addictive loss of control and crime were
somehow chemical properties of the substance. '53
50 Id. at 728 (citations omitted). Van Vliet also writes that some studies indicate that the
number of Dutch heroin addicts would actually be decreasing, but for a constant dribble of
immigrant addicts, who have fled to the Netherlands to escape harsh drug laws in their home
countries, such as Germany and Surinam. See id. at 742.
51 See id. at 737 (quoting from Ruter, The Pragmatic Dutch Approach to Drug Control:
Does it Work (1988), at 521 (transcript of lecture sponsored by The Drug Policy Foundation,
May 25, 1998, Washington, D.C.) (citation omitted)).
52 Id. (citing W. Da ZwART, ALCOHOL, TABAK EN DRUGS IN CUFERS [ALCOHOL, To-
BACCO AND DRUGS N FIGURES] 50 (1989)).
53 Ostrowski, supra note 14, at 621 (quoting from Stanton Peele, Does Drug Addiction
Excuse Thieves and Killers from Criminal Responsibility? in DRUG POLICY 1989-1990: A
REFORMER'S CATALOGUE 204 (A. Trebach & K. Zeese eds., 1989)).
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One could argue that even the data presented by opponents of legal-
ization support this conclusion. In their article entitled Legal Cocaine
and Kids: The Very Bitterness of Shame, legalization opponents Gregory
A. Loken and James Kennedy offered the following information, based
upon their experience with Covenant House, a nationwide shelter for
abused, homeless and runaway youth:
In the seven North American cities where Covenant
House currently operates shelter programs, 61% of our
clients are male, 54% are aged eighteen to twenty, and
62% are black, [H]ispanic or Native American. Their
families are rarely intact and only a small minority can
realistically return home. Indeed, many have long histo-
ries in foster care.... [I]n 1984, a study of runaway and
homeless youth in New York City revealed that 82% ...
could be considered to have a "significant psychiatric
disability" and that three in ten had previously attempted
suicide.... The invention of "crack" in 1985 brought
the street price of a powerful dose of cocaine to $10 or
less, well within the reach of street kids. As a result,
abuse of cocaine has soared among Covenant House
clients. 54
(c) There is no concrete proof that use of "soft" drugs leads to
the use of "harder" drugs.
As a preliminary matter, some legalization advocates resurrect the
"hypocrisy" argument, pointing to studies that claim that alcohol and to-
bacco could be construed as "gateway" drugs as much as marijuana
could be.55 Secondly, they emphasize that no studies have definitively
shown that use of hard drugs is initiated by the use of "softer" ones;
instead, they maintain that other factors contribute to a person's desire
for mood-altering substances with stronger pleasurable effects.56
54 Loken & Kennedy, supra note 14, at 572-74 (citations omitted).
55 See, e.g., Jonas, supra note 14, at 771 (citing Casement, Alcohol and Cocaine, 11
ALCOHOL HEALTH & REs. WORLD 18 (1987); ARNOLD TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR 82
(1987)).
56 See id. ("[Mt is only logical to assume that persons who derive one kind of a pleasant
mood-alteration from a given drug, may it in the first instance be alcohol or tobacco, will be
interested in trying other drugs to experience their different pleasurable effects.") (citations
omitted).
19981
776 CORNELL JouRNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIc PoLicY [Vol. 7:757
8. Legalization Rationale Number 8: Drug Users Who Do
Become Addicted Are Suffering From a Disease.
Medical and psychological professionals have known for nearly a
century that addiction is a physical problem-a disease.57 Therefore, it
seems absurdly cruel, not to mention ineffectual, to treat drug addiction
as if it were a law enforcement problem, instead of a public health prob-
lem. To treat drug addiction as a law enforcement problem is to assume
that refusing to use drugs is a matter of will, and that government-im-
posed sanctions can strengthen one's will. Reports of the American
Medical Association refute the assumption that a fear of punishment can
deter drug use.58
Advocates of legalization therefore insist that faith in government
prohibition is not borne out, either by medical science or practical reality.
For drug users who are physically addicted, it is not a simple matter of
"will" to discontinue use of drugs. Furthermore, the current high level
of experimentation with illegal drugs suggests that imprisonment and the
prospect of becoming addicted do not provide a powerful disincentive for
those who are trying drugs for the first time.
In light of medical realities, pro-legalization writers protest that the
proper societal response is to ignore casual use, to treat addiction as the
medical problem that it is and to cease diverting billions of dollars to-
wards ineffective law enforcement. 59 The funds would be much better
spent, they argue, in the prevention and prosecution of crimes that are
matters of will-such as murder, rape, robbery, and the like-and that
will, presumably, be deterred by threat of government punishment. 60
57 In fact, even the federal government recognizes that addiction is a disease. See The
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1) (1988), which defines an "addict" as "... an
individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health,
safety or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the
power of self-control with reference to his addiction." (emphasis added).
58 See Schmoke, supra note 14, at 510-11.
Our current drug policy is self-defeating and destined to fall for precisely the reasons
suggested by American Medicine in 1915. Addiction is a disease. The American
Medical Association ('AMA') stated: "it is clear that addiction is not simply the
product of a failure of individual willpower... [i]t is properly viewed as a disease,
and one that physicians can help many individuals control and overcome."
Id. (citing AMEmCAN MEDicAL Ass'N, REPORT NNN oF THE BoARD OF TRusTEES, DRUG
ABusE IN THE UNITED STATES: A POLICY REPORT 241 (1988)).
59 See Schmoke, supra note 14; Ostrowski, supra note 14; Kleiman & Saiger, supra note
14; Jonas, supra note 14.
60 See supra note 59.
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9. Legalization Rationale Number 9: Legalizing Marijuana,
Cocaine and/or Heroin Would Free Up Valuable Public
Resources.
It is difficult to calculate the cost of the War on Drugs with any
reliability, but all writers place the annual figures in the tens of billions
of dollars (including the costs of the Drug Enforcement Agency, the
courts, the police and other state and federal law enforcement efforts).
Some writers have placed their annual estimates at nearly $100 billion,
taking into account federal and state expenditures, and such intangibles
as lost lives and lost profitability. 61
Writers favoring decriminalization or legalization argue that these
expenditures have increased every year since the federal government en-
tered the business of criminalizing the use of psychoactive substances
shortly after the turn of the century. Therefore, advocates maintain, the
federal and state criminal justice systems should abandon their fruitless
and exorbitant efforts to solve the problem of drug use and abuse through
the mechanism of law enforcement, and should confine themselves to
preventing and prosecuting violent crimes. The savings, which some
writers estimate, would run into the tens of billions per year, could be
funneled into existing and new treatment programs and educational
campaigns.62
B. THE PROSPECTS FOR LEGALIZATION OR DECRIMINALIZATION OF
CURRENTLY ILLICIT DRUGS
It is impossible to predict with any certainty when, or if, any of the
currently illegal drugs will be decriminalized or legalized. As a simple
matter, those who favor maintaining the status quo argue that the conclu-
sions offered by the pro-legalization advocates are, at best, speculation.
The public recognizes that alcohol and tobacco are legal now, and that
they cause a host of problems that we seem powerless to control, so why
would we want more legal drugs on the street? Those who favor legali-
zation cannot deny that our current policy is hypocritical vis-a-vis alco-
61 See, e.g., Schmoke, supra note 14, at 503-04 (quoting from a 1989 report that esti-
mates the 1989 expenditure on drug enforcement at $7.9 billion) & 513-14 (citing a national
report from 1985, which placed the number of drug arrests nationwide at over 800,000); Klei-
man & Saiger, supra note 14, at 528 (citing that the federal government spent $636 million on
enforcement against marijuana in 1986 and $986 million in 1988); Ostrowski, supra note 14,
at 643 (calculating the government expenditures in the War on Drugs at $10 billion per year);
see id. at 611, 655-57 (estimating the total economic costs of drug prohibition at more than
$80 billion per year); Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 208 (estimating drug prohibition expendi-
tures at the federal level to have been nearly $13 billion in 1994); Luna, supra note 14, at 522
(citing a figure of between $14 and $17 billion budgeted by the federal government for drug
enforcement efforts in 1996); see id. at 523 (estimating that the total costs of the drug war,
federal and state, runs closer to $100 billion annually).
62 See Luna, supra note 14.
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hol and tobacco. And, faced with the statistics on alcohol and cigarette
addictiveness and lethality, pro-criminalization advocates argue that, yes,
alcohol and tobacco are addictive, but dose for dose, they do not appear
to be as dangerous as cocaine or heroin.63 Nor do legalization foes have
any real response to claims that the black market causes more problems
than it solves.
The arguments in favor of legalizing marijuana, cocaine and even
heroin are compelling. Advocates of drug legalization are gathering
more data in support of their position every day. The available evidence
emanating from countries like the Netherlands, which have experimented
with decriminalization, tend to strengthen the legalization advocates' po-
sition.64 Those in favor of decriminalizing illegal drugs may not yet
have public sentiment on their side, but they have past experience, they
have logic and, increasingly, they have statistics.
They also have time. Time, while billions of dollars are spent each
year in high-tech law enforcement operations that do not appear to put a
dent in either drug supply or drug demand. Time, while hundreds and
thousands of inner-city youth are lured from schoolwork and diligence
and the longer, slower road to success to the get-rich-quick guarantee of
drug dealing. Time, until the American public gets tired of the waste of
money and human capital, tired of the murders, death and destruction.
When that time comes, drugs may very well be decriminalized or
legalized.
C. THE LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASED DRUG USE SUBSEQUENT TO
LEGALIZATION
From a practical or economic standpoint, the opponents of legaliza-
tion may not have the data on their side. But what they do have is the
most burning question in the debate: Will legalization result in increased
drug use? There is really only one answer to this question: Yes. 65
63 See, e.g., William C. McAuliffe, Health Care Policy Issues in the Drug Treatment
Field, 15 J. H-ALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 361 (1990).
64 See van Vliet, supra note 14.
65 It is not at all surprising (and thus perhaps not interesting) to see that writers opposed
to decriminalizing or legalizing drugs believe that decriminalization would increase drug use.
See, e.g., Loken & Kennedy, supra note 14, at 598 ("Given the powerful addictive and rein-
forcing qualities of cocaine and crack, and what we know about alcohol and cigarettes abuse
by the young, it is impossible not to believe that legalizing cocaine for adults would lead to
massive increases in the use of cocaine by kids."); Lawn, supra note 15, at 713 ("If the United
States decides to establish a system which provides for the universal availability of drugs, the
black market of drugs would disappear, but a 'black plague' of drug addiction, overdose deaths
and crime would take its place."). What is interesting, however, is the number of pro-legaliza-
tion writers who admit that an increase in drug use would likely take place following legaliza-
tion. See, e.g., Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 14, at 543 ("From a public health standpoint,
creating a cocaine problem the size of the current alcohol problem or the current tobacco
problem would be a major disaster."); Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 209-10.
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Even the most strident advocates of legalization reluctantly admit
that it would almost certainly result in increased drug use.66 However,
this is tempered, in their view, by two factors. First, nobody can predict
how much of an increase in drug use will result from legalization of
marijuana, cocaine, or heroin. Most legalization advocates express hope
that education, negative advertising and treatment will produce the same
social awareness and reduced or responsible consumption of marijuana,
cocaine and heroin as is currently associated with alcohol and tobacco.
Thus, the most optimistic projections are for modest increases in drug
use for a relatively short period of time, followed by a leveling off and
eventual decline in drug use. Second, most legalization advocates main-
tain that they are not aspiring to solve the problem of drug use; instead,
they wish to solve the problems that the War on Drugs has caused. 67
These caveats are hardly encouraging since none of the advocates of
legalization are presenting their arguments along with detailed recom-
mendations for policies that would provide children, inner city youth, the
disadvantaged and other susceptible members of society with the protec-
tion and the socioeconomic alternatives necessary for such individuals to
resist drug abuse and addiction. The fact remains that large portions of
the population would remain vulnerable under any system of increased
access to drugs. For our purposes, however, the objection is this: any
economic model used to justify legalization on the basis of drastic sav-
ings from eradicating current expenditures on drug enforcement will be
flawed since few if any commentators have considered the economic im-
pact on employers from having more drug users and addicts in the
workforce. Given the current scholarly, legislative and judicial predilec-
tion for strict enterprise liability, the results for employers would be
catastrophic.
Although most users of alcohol... and marijuana... are able to consume these
drugs in moderation without becoming addicted, we cannot be sure that this is true
of cocaine or PCP. If assumptions about these matters turned out to be overly opti-
mistic, the public health consequences for an entire generation could turn out to be
catastrophic.
Id. (citing John Kaplan, Taking Drugs Seriously, PuB. INTEREST, Summer 1988, at 32); Moore,
supra note 14, at 17.
[O]ne can also envision that under the same legalization regime consumption would
increase, perhaps even dramatically: drugs would become cheaper and more widely
available across broader elements of the society, thereby making drug use more con-
venient; the stigma associated with drug use would disappear, thereby encouraging
more common use; and legitimate suppliers would have as much reason to en-
courage wider drug use as the illegal dealers.
Id.
66 See Ostrowski, supra note 14.
67 See id.
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II. THE THEORIES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: PRIMARY
LIABILITY, RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND STRICT
LIABILITY
As gripping as the debate over drug legalization is, its usefulness for
the purpose of this Article is that it demonstrates the precarious position
that employers find themselves in today, with or without increased use of
psychoactive substances by their employees, as a result of the current
state of affairs in enterprise liability,68 the body of law that imposes lia-
bility upon the enterprise (or employer) for the torts or other actions of
its employees. Traditionally, enterprise liability has been divided into
approximately three categories: primary liability (which tended to in-
volve negligent hiring, supervision or retention of employees), respon-
deat superior (non-fault based or vicarious liability) and strict liability
(also non-fault based). The early English and American theories in sup-
port of enterprise liability indicate why prevailing justifications for im-
posing strict liability on employers completely break down in the face of
drug use by employees, especially the increased drug use that is likely to
follow legalization.
A. ENTERPRISE LABurrY IN EARLY ENGLAND
The notion of an employer's liability for certain acts of its employ-
ees dates back in the common law tradition to the early English law of
"master and servant" (and, according to some commentators, as far back
as the Roman civil code). 69 In the English legal tradition, this concept
originated by holding the master liable only for injury to third parties
caused by acts of the servant that were specifically commanded by the
master. This was more in the nature of primary liability; that is, the
master was liable for the torts or other wrongs that he ordered committed
through his servant, just as if he had done them himself.70
68 I have used the term "enterprise liability" to refer to all current theories that hold the
enterprise (or employer) liable for the actions of its agents (or employees), including respon-
deat superior, the concept of negligent hiring, strict liability and other more recent bases of
vicarious liability (such as liability for sexual harassment committed by an employee). I also
use the term "enterprise liability" generally, applying to corporations, partnerships and sole
proprietorships.
69 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 1, 4 HARV. L. REv. 345, 348-50 (1891)
(arguing that the idea of a master's liability for the wrongs of a servant originated in Roman
law). However, Holmes acknowledges the notion of respondeat superior in Roman law was
more limited than the English concepts. In early English law, only innkeepers and shipowners
were answerable for the wrongdoing of their servants. See id.
70 See id. at 355 (finding a basis for the concept of respondeat superior in English law as
far back as the Norman Conquest); see also John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious
Acts: Its History, 1, 7 HAJv. L. REV. 315, 335 (1894) ("[W]e are safe in concluding that by the
end of the 1200s... the master could pretty generally exonerate himself by pleading that he
had not commanded or consented to the act .... ) (citation omitted).
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Eventually, however, the courts expanded enterprise liability to
cover the negligent acts of the servant, even if such acts were forbidden,
as long as they were incidental to, or foreseeable in light of, the nature of
the servant's work.7' English scholars and jurists struggled with this new
sort of vicarious liability since there was little precedent in English, Ro-
man, or even Germanic law for imposing liability on one who had no
legal or moral fault in the action. Nevertheless, a number of theoretical
bases developed that were offered in support of imposing the evolved
form of respondeat superior: that the master and servant were "one per-
son," e.g., the act of the servant was the act of the master; 72 that policy
reasons justified imposition of vicarious liability because of the master's
position of special trust within the community;73 that because the master
benefits from the servant's acts, he should also suffer the consequences
of those acts;74 and that "[i]t is more reasonable that he [the master]
should suffer for the cheats of his servant than strangers.175
Increasing commerce at the beginning of the nineteenth century in
England introduced the modem notion of "employment." English cases
began to make reference to the master's liability for acts of the servant
that were committed in the servant's "scope of employment." 76 Indeed,
the "scope of employment" test was used initially to impose liability
71 See Holmes, supra note 69, at 362 (citing Lord Holt's opinion in Turberville v. Stampe
(1698)); see also Wigmore, supra note 70, at 391-92 (dating the concept of a master's liability
for the acts done by the servant within the servant's implied authority from Lord Holt's time
(early eighteenth century)).
As for those things which a servant may do on behalf of his master, they all seem to
proceed upon this principle, that the master is answerable for the act of the servant, if
done by his command, either expressly given or implied: nam qui facit per alium
facitper se. Therefore.... [i]f the drawer at a tavern sells a man bad wine, whereby
his health is injured, he may bring an action against the master; for although the
master did not expressly order the servant to sell it to that person in particular, yet
his permitting him to draw and sell it at all is impliedly a general command.
Id. at 396 (quoting from Blackstone's Commentaries).
72 See Holmes, supra note 69, at 350 (arguing that this particular justification arose from
the imposition of liability on the head of the household for the acts of a slave or wife, both of
which were considered possessions, or chattels, of the master, and not free persons); see also
Wigmore, supra note 70, at 317 ('CThe doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted inno-
cently or inadvertently, because he was the doer ... the owner of an animal, the master of a
slave, was responsible because he was associated with it as owner, as master.").
73 See Holmes, supra note 69, at 351 (using the example of innkeepers).
74 See id.
75 Wigmore, supra note 70, at 398 (citing Lord Holt in Sir Robert Wayland's Case, 91
Eng. Rep. 797 (1701)).
76 Wigmore traces the idea of a master being liable for the wrongs of the servant commit-
ted within the servant's "scope of employment" to the opinions of Lord Kenyon (late eight-
eenth century). See id. at 400. Thomas Baty, like Holmes, ascribes the use of this phrase to
Lord Holt, in the case of Hem v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289 (1709). See THoMAs BATY, Vic¢Muous
LLALrry 9 (1916).
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even upon one who hired what we now refer to as an "independent
contractor."
In 1799, Bush v. Steinman enunciated the principle that an entrepre-
neur was liable for all torts committed in the course of services per-
formed for him even where the actor was what later became known as an
independent contractor, and "[n]ot until twenty-seven years later
[, Laugher v. Pointer (1826),] were the judges able to devise the rule of
the independent contractor's immunity. '77
However, early English law stopped short of imposing liability on
the master (or employer) for the intentional, willful or malicious actions
of those who worked for him.78
B. ENTERPRISE LIABIITY IN AMERICA THROUGH 1900
In early American law, jurists and scholars took essentially the same
approach toward enterprise liability as their counterparts in England: a
master (or employer) would be liable if his fault was primary, i.e., if he
was negligent in hiring, retaining or supervising the servant (or em-
ployee), or if he specifically commanded the acts in question.79 The
master would also be liable for the negligent torts committed by the ser-
vant in the scope of the servant's employment. 80 The general principle
of the master's liability for the servant's negligence is typified by the
77 MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A His.
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 133 (1989) (quoting Fowler Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an
Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494, 497 (1935)).
78 See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 69, at 358-59.
It must be remembered, however, that the cases in which the modem doctrines could
have been applied in the time of the Year Books were exceedingly few. The torts
dealt with by the early law were almost invariably willful. They were either
prompted by actual malevolence, or at least were committed with full foresight of
the ensuing damage. And as the judges from an early day were familiar with the
distinction between acts done by a man on his own behalf and those done in the
capacity of servant, it is obvious that they could not have held masters generally
answerable for such torts unless they were prepared to go much beyond the point at
which their successors have stopped.
Id. (citations omitted).
79 At least one early twentieth century American commentator distinguished between use
of the terms "principal" and "agent," which he reserved for contractual matters, and "master"
and "servant," which he viewed as the more appropriate terminology if the case sounded in
tort. See ERNE.ST W. HuFFCuT, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 148 (2d ed. 1901). Presumably, this
difference in terminology was intended to reflect the older English tort cases, all of which used
the "master" and "servant" terms, reserving "principal" and "agent" for more modem commer-
cial notions of employment, in which an "agent," unlike a mere "servant," had the authority to
bind the principal to new contractual obligations. See id. § 4-6.
80 See, e.g., id. § 149; FRANCpS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
AND AGENTS (1876) §§ 474, 475. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American scholars
had as much difficulty with the notion of one being liable for a tort he did not actually commit
as had the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English jurists. See, e.g., Hu*cuT, supra note
79, § 149.
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Massachusetts case of Farwell v. Boston R.R. Co.: "This rule is obvi-
ously founded on the great principle of social duty, that every man in the
management of his own affairs, whether by himself or by his agents or
servants, shall so conduct them as not to injure another; and if he does
not, and another thereby sustains damage, he shall answer for it .... 81
Beyond the servant's negligence, the concept of vicarious liability
in the United States had begun to change. For the first one hundred years
or so of this country's existence, courts had not held the master liable for
the servant's willful or intentional torts, including acts of fraud or deceit,
unless the master specifically commanded them,82 ratified them after the
fact8 3 or profited from them in some way.84 By the end of the nineteenth
century, however, courts (both in England and the United States) were
increasingly receptive to the imposition of liability on the master for the
"willful or malicious" torts of the servant, as long as the acts were "com-
mitted within the course of the employment and in furtherance of it."185
Cases which imposed such vicarious liability on the master included
those involving a servant's having committed assault, false imprison-
ment, libel, malicious prosecution, fraud or deceit and even patent in-
fringement. 86 Yet even in these cases, imposition of vicarious liability
was conditioned on the servant having acted primarily for the master's
benefit in committing the intentional or willful tort. 87
But as to why he [the master] is liable for a tort which he neither commanded nor
ratified, it is difficult to explain. The whole matter must be referred to grounds of
social utility. A master is answerable because the servant is about the master's busi-
ness, and it is, on the whole, better that the master should suffer for defaults in the
conduct of the business, than that innocent third persons should bear the losses that
such defaults cast upon them.
IE (citations omitted).
81 49 Mass. (4 Met.); see also HuFFcuT, supra note 79, at 148.
82 See, e.g.,WHA1 roN, supra note 80, § 474; Hurcutr, supra note 79, § 246.
83 See, e.g., WHARTON, supra note 80, § 477; HuFFctur, supra note 79, § 247.
84 WHARTON, supra note 80, § 478. However, as regards actions of deceit, Wharton
remarks in 1876 that the Queen's Bench, in England, was inclined to hold the employer liable
for its employee's unauthorized fraudulent representations, seemingly on the grounds that "the
signature of the [employee] to such representations was the signature of the [employer]." Id.
(citing Swift v. Winterbotham, L.R. 8 Q.B. 244 (1873)). Wharton also cites several American
cases (though still a minority of jurisdictions in 1876) which were willing to impose liability
on the employer for the fraud or deceit of the employee, even where there was no subsequent
ratification by or benefit to the employer. See id.
85 HutFcutr, supra note 79, § 252 (citations omitted). Professor Huffcut's observations
from the cases of his day were that imposition of liability on the master for intentional torts
committed by the servant typically involved acts which were authorized by the master, but in
furtherance of which the servant used excessive force. See-id.
86 See id. (citations omitted).
87 See id. § 253 ("This doctrine has not met with universal approval, and other.., cases
have been decided upon a strict application of the doctrine that the master is liable for a willful
or malicious act only when the servant does the act for the master in the course of employ-
ment.") (citations omitted).
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Additionally, as in England, the distinction between "servants" and
"independent contractors" was well established in the United States at
the opening of the twentieth century. Thus, while the master would be
liable for the negligent torts of his servants, he would in theory not be
liable for any torts committed by an independent contractor. 88 But this
rule, too, was peppered with numerous exceptions: where the employer
had retained an incompetent contractor or had specifically contracted for
an unsafe result;89 where the acts contracted for were per se a nuisance 90
or ultrahazardous; 9 1 where there was a non-delegable statutory duty to
conduct certain tasks safely; 92 and where the employer had assumed a
non--assignable contractual duty to conduct work safely.93 Furthermore,
notwithstanding the "general principle" that an employer was not liable
for the torts of an independent contractor, American law still imposed a
duty upon the employer to maintain safe premises, 94 and imposed liabil-
ity upon the employer if he interfered in (i.e., took control of) the con-
tractor's work.95
It appears, then, that at the commencement of the twentieth century,
Anglo-American law had certain rules that were fairly consistently ap-
plied with respect to enterprise liability. The master (now also referred
to simply as the "principal" or "employer") would be liable:
(a) for his own negligence and intentional torts, and for those which
he commanded his servant ("agent" or "employee") to do;
(b) for the negligence of his servant, as long as the servant was
acting within the scope of his employment; and
(c) for the intentional torts of his servant, if in committing the torts
the servant was acting primarily for the master's benefit.
These myriad forms of enterprise liability were justified by the fol-
lowing rationales:
(a) the master's control over the servant or contractor;
(b) his ability to benefit from the work of others;
(c) his duty to society;
(d) and a pinch of risk-spreading thrown in for good measure.
88 See, e.g., id. § 218.
89 See id. §§ 219, 221. It must be noted, however, that these are more in the nature of
primary liability; that is, the employer himself has been negligent in the selection of an in-
dependent contractor who is not competent to do the work requested safely, or has specifically
requested "improper materials or an unsafe plan," and cannot hide behind the contractor. Id.
90 See id. § 220.
91 See id. § 224.
92 See id. § 222.
93 See id. § 223.
94 See id. § 225.
95 See id. § 226.
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But this predictability would not last long. The twentieth century
would usher in new approaches to enterprise liability law that were
grounded in political philosophies which had their birth in the nineteenth
century: socialism and communism. Many of the ideas contained within
these philosophies would transform American law, including tort law in
general and respondeat superior in particular.
C. ENTERPRISE LIABirrY IN TwENTmTH CENTURY AMERICAN LAW:
THE CORONATION OF "DEEP POCKET" AS THE HEIR TO FAULT
If writers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries balked at the
philosophical inconsistencies inherent in imposing liability without fault
on the enterprise, early twentieth century American legal scholars
showed no such equivocation, and the rationales for imposing strict vica-
rious liability upon the enterprise were becoming fixed in the legal
firmament.
In 1916, Professor Harold I. Laski of Harvard University wrote
what has come to be regarded as a primary essay in support of the mod-
em notions of respondeat superior. In this essay, entitled "The Basis of
Vicarious Liability," 96 Laski praised the yeoman efforts of earlier schol-
ars to justify respondeat superior (including Lord Brougham,97 Justice
Willes, 98 Pothier,99 and particularly Sir Frederick Pollock).1°° Although
Laski was willing to accept their proffered rationales, he dismissed the
difficulties faced by his predecessors in conforming the idea of vicarious
liability to preexisting law as being simply a function of their quaint,
outdated view that the law ought to be consistent with precedent.' 0 '
With enthusiastic abandon, Laski then praised his contemporaries-
early twentieth century scholars and jurists-for their willingness to dis-
96 Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
97 "[Bly employing him [the servant], I set the whole thing in motion, and what he does,
being done for my benefit, and under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of
doing it." Id. at 109 (quoting from Lord Brougham's opinion in Duncan v. Finlater, Cl. & F.
894, 910 (1839)).
98 "inhere ought to be a remedy against some person capable of paying damages to
those injured." ld. (quoting from Justice Wiles opinion in Limpus v. Gen. Omnibus Company,
1 H. & C. 526 (1867)).
99 Laski paraphrases Pothier's idea that respondeat superior is intended to make "men
careful in the selection of their servants." Id. at 110 (citing an English translation of Pothier's
Obligations). Yet Laski acknowledges that most cases involving enterprise liability do not
involve the negligent selection of servants; i.e., they are not cases of primary, or fault-based
liability. See id.
100 "Sir Frederick Pollock-with far more reason-urges that as all business is a danger-
ous enterprise, boldness must pay its price." Id. (citing Pollock's paper on Employer's Liabil-
ity from his book, Essays on Jurisprudence and Ethics).
101 See id. at 107 ("We shall be less pessimistic. Our skepticism is the consequence of too
great reliance upon the historic method. We have laid insistence rather upon the origins of law
than the ends it is to serve.") (paraphrasing Justice Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HAv. L. Rv. 457 passim (1897) (emphasis added).
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pense with precedent and create legal fictions (such as "implied author-
ity") in order to hold the enterprise liable, and to embrace a more flexible
idea of law based upon modem notions of the benevolent state's control
over commerce. Thus, Laski wrote:
[t]he basis of our principles is to be found in the eco-
nomic conditions of the time. Business has ceased to be
mere matter of private concern. A man who embarks
upon commercial enterprise is something more-even in
the eyes of the law-than a gay adventurer in search of a
fortune. The results of his speculation are bound to af-
fect the public; and the state, as the guardian of its inter-
ests, is compelled to lay down conditions upon which he
may pursue his profession. l02
Professor Laski grounded his new and improved justifications for
respondeat superior in the popular socialist philosophy of his day, pro-
claiming a "social interpretation of negligence" 10 3 and a "frankly com-
munal application of the law," with the "promotion of social solidarity"
as its end.1°4
Laski did not contemplate serious problems associated with holding
the employer liable for the crimes of its employees, an innovation which
he also called for.10 5 All of this was justified, in his mind, if one simply
took the view that:
[T]he state has the right, on grounds of public policy, to
condition the industrial process . . .[I]t [thus] becomes
102 Id. at 111.
103 Id. at 119.
104 Id. at 121.
105 "There seems no valid a priori reason why the operation of our principles should
cease at that border where tort becomes crime." Id. at 130. Laski does anticipate some
problems with the mens rea component of some crimes, but happily suggests that perhaps we
could dispense with the mens rea requirement altogether, by simply imposing a sort of crimi-
nal liability per se by statute. "The point at issue in this class of crime is simply and surely the
enforcement of the law, and it may generally be suggested that the necessities of the case do
not admit of our enquiring too closely into the delicate niceties of the situation." Id. at 131;
see also id. at 132-33.
Nor ought the corporation to avoid responsibility on the ground that it is mindless.
Such a view has long been regarded as untenable. No one would dream of accusing
a corporation of adultery, but there are offenses clearly to be attributed to it where
the act is directly performed by its servants. 'We think,' said a strong court, 'that a
corporation may be criminally liable for certain offenses of which a specific intent
may be a necessary element .... A corporation cannot be arrested and impris-
oned.., but its property may be taken either in compensation for a private wrong, or
as punishment for a public wrong.' Those people would agree that common sense is
on the side of such an attitude. It would be intolerable if corporate enterprise did not
imply corporate responsibility.
Id. (citing Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294 (1899)).
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apparent that the basis of the vicarious liability is not
tortious at all; nor, since it is withdrawn from the area of
agreement, is it contractual. It is simply a statutory pro-
tection the state chooses to offer its workers. Whether,
as such, it so discriminates against the employing class,
as to come within the scope of measures contemplated
by the Fourteenth Amendment, is another and a very dif-
ferent question. If we believe that it is not an infringe-
ment of liberty to read its meaning in its social context,
we shall perhaps be in no doubt as to the rightness of a
negative response.10 6
Thus, in Professor Laski's view, having dispensed with the requirement
of intent by fiat, employers should be liable not only for the torts, but
also for the crimes of their employees because the state says so, and it
does not matter what common law dictates.
In response to critics who warned of the increasing encroachment
upon individual liberties by a government unconstrained by the Rule of
Law, or of the dangers of a "law" that is internally inconsistent, that
deviates markedly from precedent, or that twists unpredictably in the
shifting winds of public policy, Laski made the following admonishment:
[S]uch an attitude [mistrust of so-called 'public policy']
is, in truth, but the prophetic anticipation of the Victo-
rian distrust of governmental interference. It is becom-
ing more and more clear that we may not be content with
an individualistic commercial law. Just as that individu-
alism was the natural reaction from the too strict and lo-
cal paternalism of mediaeval policy-perhaps aided by
the inherent self-centeredness of Puritan thought-so we
are compelled to turn away from every conception of the
business relation which does not see the public as an ef-
fective, if silent, partner in every enterprise.... That, at
which we industrially aim, is the maximum public good
as we see it. In that respect, the employer is himself no
more than a public servant, to whom, for special pur-
poses, a certain additional freedom of action, and there-
fore a greater measure of responsibility has been
vouchsafed. If that employer is compelled to bear the
burden of his servant's torts even when he is himself
personally without fault, it is because in a social distribu-
106 Id at 130.
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tion of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance
seems thereby best to be obtained.10 7
...We are beyond that stage of strict law where
men are bound by an empty formalism. 10 8
There would be no room in Comrade Laski's ideal modem govern-
mental system for persons whose definitions of "liberty," "property," or
"due process" were not flexible enough to vary, depending upon their
"social context." For example, in Laski's system, the role of the judici-
ary would be to provide case-by-case amorphous jurisprudence that
would convert them into quasi-arbitrators and de facto legislators.
Professor Laski was not alone, in his advocacy of the newest social-
ist trends in vicarious liability. Also writing in 1916, Dean Ezra R.
Thayer weighed in on the controversy. Dean Thayer foresaw that the
United States was entering an era when legislation would become the
dominant form of lawmaking, and when the prevailing attitudes, as re-
flected by the new Workmen's Compensation Acts, would play an im-
portant part in imposing liability per se on the enterprise.10 9
107 Id. at 112.
108 Id. at 118.
109 "This is a period of legislation, when it is alike inevitable and desirable that industry
be subjected to detailed regulations of many kinds.... The imposition of liability without fault
will be a constant characteristic of such legislation." Ezra R. Thayer, Liability Without Fault,
29 HARV. L. REv. 801, 814 (1916). One may rightly question Dean Thayer's evident love of
government regulation, but at least his assessment of future trends was more consistent with
the traditional American idea of separation of powers-he left the responsibility for codifying
public policy with elected officials. It is interesting to note that not all of Laski's contemporar-
ies shared his unbounded enthusiasm for the new justifications of respondeat superior. In his
book entitled Vicarious Liability, Professor Thomas Baty argues that the two English cases
most often cited for the origin of the "modern" notion of respondeat superior-Turberville v.
Stampe, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1697), and Hem v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709)-were
misinterpreted. THoMAs BATY, VIcAmous LIA~nry 21-22 (1916). Baty maintains that
Turberville v. Stampe was not a respondeat superior case at all, but a case of absolute liabil-
ity-the non-delegable duty to safely maintain the use of fire on one's premises. See id. at 19-
20. He also points out that Hem v. Nichols sounded not in tort, but in contract, and that the
buyer of nonconforming goods in that case would have had recourse against the seller in any
event. See id. at 11-12. Baty insists that later judges relied not upon the actual principles of
law in those cases, but upon Lord Holt's dicta: "These two cases of contract and of absolute
public duty are irrelevant .... What one would like to know is the precise process by which
Holt's dicta acquired the force of law between, say, 1698 and 1725." Id. at 28. Having estab-
lished that to his satisfaction, Baty concludes that respondeat superior is "a principle dubious
in origin and unjust in operation ..." and that; "it will, I think, be clear to most students that
the doctrine of the employer's responsibility was due to no considered theory of civil liability,
and to no survival of early mediaeval notions, but was derived from an inconsiderate use of
precedents and a blind reliance on the slightest word of an eminent judge." Id. at 29. Evi-
dently it was not as clear to everyone else as it was to Baty, and he ultimately lost the argu-
ment-at least for the time being.
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Scholars continued to write essays in support of an expanded re-
spondeat superior into the 1920s and 1930s.110 Professor Warren Sea-
vey, writing in 1934, bemoaned that some still considered vicarious
liability unfair, and praised Laski's "brilliant" defense some eighteen
years earlier."' Professor Seavey, like Dean Thayer, predicted that there
would be an increase in legislation, and that courts would "tend more and
more to impose liability upon the one who employs others to do work for
him.''1" 2 Seavey also predicted that there would be a decrease in depen-
dence upon the notions of legal or moral fault. He concluded that "until
we have an entirely changed form of political organization, the principles
of respondeat superior will not disappear.""u 3
Seavey continued to toe the party line on respondeat superior, as-
serting that expansion was defensible because:
(a) principals benefit from agents' wrongful acts, even in cases
where neither they nor society know it;114
(b) liability without fault fosters proper supervision of the
workplace;"15
(c) liability without fault encourages the principal to hire responsi-
ble agents;" 6
(d) liability without fault makes it unnecessary to prove negligence,
an often difficult task;'1 7 and
(e) the employer has the "long purse" (or "deep pocket"). 18
The last justification- the notion that because the employer can
pay, the employer should pay- has come to trump all the others accord-
ing to the socialist theories that underlie the Twentieth Century American
law on enterprise liability. Until Seavey's day, even the most avid pro-
ponents of respondeat superior tiptoed around this basis for imposition of
strict vicarious liability. 19 However, Professor Seavey was astonish-
ingly straightforward, stating:
110 See, e.g., WARREN A. SEAVEY, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior, " in SrUamns
IN AGENCY 129 (1916) (excerpted from Harvard Legal Essays at 433 (1934)).
111 See id.
112 Id. at 158.
113 lId at 159.
114 Id at 147. ("[Tlhere are doubtless numerous frauds perpetrated by agents to the ad-
vantage of their principals for which their principals are not required to respond in damages.")
115 Id ("[O]ne who is responsible for all consequences is more apt to take precautions to
prevent injurious consequences from arising.")
116 Id. at 148. ("Without further investigation, our self-questioning inevitably leads us to
believe that respondeat superior results in greater care in the selection and instruction of
servants ....")
117 See idl at 149.
118 Id. at 150.
119 See, e.g., Laski, supra note 96, at 124 ('The reason is not that companies are well able
to pay; for it is not the business of law to see that a debtor is solvent, but to provide a remedy
for admitted wrong.").
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The bald statement that the master should pay because
he can pay may have little more than class appeal,
although it is in conformity with the spirit of our times to
believe that if one is successful enough either to operate
a business or to employ servants, in addition to the in-
come taxes taking off the upper layers of soft living, he
should pay for the misfortunes caused others by his busi-
ness or household. This, of itself, may not be a suffi-
ciently strong reason; . . . To-day, however, we realize
that the loss from accident usually falls upon the com-
munity as a whole, ... The business enterprise, until it
becomes insolvent, can shift losses imposed upon it be-
cause of harm to third persons to the consumers who ul-
timately pay, . . . It is this which is leading to the
extension of absolute liability.120
D. A Word About Strict Liability in America
An in-depth analysis of strict liability is beyond the purview of this
Article. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that many of the ideas ex-
pressed by commentators above underlie the development of strict liabil-
ity, and arose at the same time. Thus, briefly discussing some of the
theoretical underpinnings of strict liability will inform our understanding
of the current theories of enterprise liability.
Strict liability is probably best known in its incarnation within prod-
ucts liability, but is also applicable outside of it, inherent in such con-
cepts as liability for abnormally dangerous activities, res ipsa loquitur
and negligence per se. 121 As regards products liability specifically, the
eighteenth century view in England and America required privity of con-
tract in order to recover for injuries associated with a defective or dan-
gerous product. 122 At the beginning of the twentieth century, however,
American courts grew increasingly disenchanted with the ill-fitting, in-
flexible strictures of commercial law as applied to personal injury cases.
Courts utilized the concepts of fraud and express and implied warranties
to mitigate the privity of contract requirement, thus allowing consumers
to sue and collect from the manufacturer or purveyors of products in
commerce. 123 In 1913, a Washington court used implied warranty to
120 SEAVEY, supra note 110, at 150-51 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Seavey, in
this portion of Speculations, is also calling for universal insurance against such accidents. Id.
121 See, e.g., FRANK J. VANDALL, SnRcr LtABurY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsIs 7
(1989).
122 See, e.g., id. at 7 (citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. P. 1842)).
123 See, e.g., id.
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hold the defendant liable in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., a food products
case. 124 Later, in 1916, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., another
court held that negligence was a valid legal basis upon which the plaintiff
could recover, and no privity was required. 125 The court observed that
the former rule of privity of contract had been so eroded by exceptions
that it had been effectively abolished. With the addition of negligence as
a basis for recovery, products liability moved out of the commercial law
of contracts and into the law of torts.
Even these exceptions to privity were met with judicial dissatisfac-
tion. In the California case, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Justice
Traynor called for the abolition of the requirement of proving fault or
negligence and argued for the imposition of an absolute liability stan-
dard.'2 6 Although the California Supreme Court declined to adopt Jus-
tice Traynor's recommendation in Escola, it did so nearly twenty years
later in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.127 Also, in the case of
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,128 the court explicitly distinguished abso-
lute liability from negligence. The Cronin court stated that the plaintiff
need only prove that a product had a defect, not that it was "unreasonablyi
dangerous."129
The courts continued to advance arguments of "social policy," "so-
cial justice," and loss-spreading in support of the growth of strict prod-
ucts liability in the U.S.13o Professor Frank A. Vandall of Emory
University writes that strict liability developed in America for a number
of reasons: dissatisfaction with results under commercial law;' 3 ' difficul-
ties for plaintiffs of proving negligence; 132 and concern for policies of
social justice and loss-spreading. 133 Vandall also offers the interesting
124 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913).
125 Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
126 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
127 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
128 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
129 See id.
130 See, e.g., Mazetti, 135 P. at 635-36 ("The obligation of the manufacturer should not be
based alone on privity of contract. It should rest.., upon 'the demands of social justice."');
Escola, 150 P.2d at 901 ("[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distrib-
uted among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public.") (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
131 See VANDALL, supra note 121, at 17.
Warranty is a case in point. This was fashioned to serve commercial needs in a
commercial context, and however well or ill adapted it is to that end today, its tech-
nicalities and limitations reflect those needs. If it occasionally happens to fit the
needs of accident law, that is pure coincidence.
IL (quoting Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. Rv. 192, 227-28 (1955)).
132 See iL at 19-20.
133 See id. at 20-22.
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hypothesis that strict liability was created by the American judiciary as
an alternative to socialized medicine.134
As with the evolution of respondeat superior, the concept of strict
liability arose because of the inability of existing (commercial) law to
deal with new situations; here, personal injuries suffered by an increasing
number of consumers exposed to an increasing number of products. 135
Nineteenth century commercial law did not translate well to twentieth
century economic realities. Requiring proof of a designer's or manufac-
turer's negligence seemed unfair, as plaintiffs were often unable to show
that another design was "better." Courts and commentators raised the
familiar policy arguments: that manufacturers and purveyors were better
able to absorb losses associated with injuries and damages and pass them
along to their (increasingly larger) consumer base; 136 that the manufac-
turers should be strongly encouraged by threat of financial loss to protect
the public safety and were in the best position to do so; 137 that manufac-
turers and designers, rather than the consuming public, were experts in
their fields and thus had superior knowledge about the safety of their
products; 138 and that the availability of insurance tended to protect the
manufacturers from catastrophic losses, and thus enabled the manufac-
turers to protect individuals from the same. 139
Thus, we see that the enterprise liability theories advanced in the
last one hundred years-primary liability (negligent hiring, supervision
and retention), respondeat superior and strict liability in all its forms-
have marched inexorably toward imposing more liability upon the enter-
prise. Also, regardless of the fact pattern in question-an employee's
tort committed against a third party, or a design defect or abnormally
dangerous activity causing injury to another-the commentators have
consistently offered the same justifications for imposition of liability
134 Vandall states:
One of the important conclusions reached from comparing the British and American
legal systems is that the American preference for strict liability much earlier grows
out of the nature of the American society. Britain provides for injured persons
through the National Health Care system. Personal injury litigation constitutes a
backup. Despite the Judeo-Christian ethic in America, which supports the notion
that injured persons should not be left to bear losses caused by others, there is no
American national health care system.... These factors have led American courts to
endorse an expansion of strict liability because it leads to compensation of injured
persons who would otherwise receive 'free' medical treatment under a system com-
parable to the British system. Strict liability enables injured persons to purchase
expensive medical care in the market.
Id. at 38.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
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upon the enterprise. It is time to ask if the policies underlying enterprise
liability are still valid as applied to the current version of enterprise lia-
bility. Further, we should consider the possibility that another motive
behind enterprise liability has been at work all along.
No one wishes to return to a time where the injured worker or con-
sumer was left on his or her own, without recourse. Nevertheless, even
the most sensible and just principle of law eventually reaches a point at
which its application, far from promoting justice, begins to work hard-
ship. Early twentieth century writers recognized this when discussing
then-current limits upon an enterprise's liability.14 If the expansion of
respondeat superior was intended to make the enterprise more responsi-
ble, then we have long since reached that goal. What we are now ap-
proaching is nearly limitless enterprise liability, a policy that eventually
discourages the enterprise from acting responsibly because taking pre-
cautions would not prevent their being found liable for most of their em-
ployees' unfavorable acts. So why do scholars continue to press for
more enterprise liability?
Because the foundations for the modem notion of enterprise liability
were laid at a different time, and under different economic and social
conditions, the views expressed by writers like Laski, Thayer and Seavey
are instructive. Both Laski's and Thayer's essays were published in
1916, the year before the communist Russian Revolution of 1917. Pro-
fessor Seavey's Speculations was published in 1934. Professors Laski
and Seavey, in particular, represented the views of a significant segment
of academia, flushed with excitement about what were then the hottest
trends in legal thought: legal realism and socialist/communist economic
and political theories.
However, we have since discarded communism and socialism as
sound political theories.14' Legal scholars, eighty years later, having wit-
nessed firsthand the devastating political and economic results of these
140 See id.
141 That is, most of us have. There continue to be writers in academia who cleave to
socialist political and economic theories. For example, Professor Englard was concerned
about scholarly calls in the late 1970s and 1980s for judicial restraint and more emphasis upon
economic efficiency in legal theories (which he referred to as "legal formalism"):
Legal formalism bestows upon the rules of law an appearance of being self-con-
tained, apolitical and logical. The conceptual framework with its inherent preestab-
lished value decisions tends to exclude new policy discussions by reducing the
judicial process to a mere rule application. Legal formalism thus may become a tool
for legal conservatism in preventing the instrumental use of the law for attaining
redistributional goals.
Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9
J. LEoAL SrUD. 27, 31-32 (1980) (emphasis added) (cited in VANDALL, supra note 121, at 80).
In all fairness to Professor Englard, his article was written several years before the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is unfair to expect an American academician to reject socialist
redistributionist theories before the Soviets themselves had.
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now thoroughly debunked philosophies, ought to be inclined to have less
enthusiasm for "social" or "frankly communal" theories of the law.
It is time we also reconsider the outdated vestiges of these discarded
theories that remain in the modem legal system, beginning with the im-
position of vicarious liability on the enterprise for the intentional torts
and crimes of its employees. In addition to a legitimate aversion to
abuses by industry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
original justifications for imposition of vicarious liability also contained
well-intentioned but misguided socialist manifestos, founded upon class
envy and mistrust of the corporate form. Such views were sympathetic
and arguably justified in the class-locked society of Georgian, Edwardian
and Victorian England, and in the American industrial environment of
the early twentieth century. However, the creation of Workers' Compen-
sation schemes, the advent of products liability, the availability of insur-
ance and the wealth distribution associated with the democratization of
incorporation in the latter half of this century suggest that the philoso-
phies of the early twentieth century writers have reached the limits of
their effectiveness.
Continued insistence upon placing liability upon the enterprise for
any and all acts of its employees will produce absurd, unjust, and eco-
nomically disastrous results. This is evidenced by the latest incarnations
of enterprise liability: liability for employee crimes, liability for certain
types of employee sexual harassment and the recent characterization of
addiction as a protected disability. Obviously, this attitude has become
the prevailing, if unspoken, force driving the development of enterprise
liability law in the United States in the latter half of this century.
III. MORE RECENT EXPANSIONS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
A. ENTERPRISE LIABILIry FOR EMPLOYEES' CRIMES
1. The Majority's "Scope of Employment" Test: Furthering the
Employer's Purpose
Given the modem jurists' and scholars' rationales for imposing vi-
carious liability for intentional torts, there is no meaningful delimitation
between those and employees' crimes. This is proof that the current con-
cept of "enterprise liability" has strayed too far beyond fault, or even
economically effective allocation of risks and resources.
Vicarious enterprise liability began with liability for the negligence
of employees in performing certain appointed tasks. From there, jurists
expanded the theory to include negligent acts that were not commanded,
or perhaps were even forbidden, by the employer. The courts reasoned
that certain accidents were bound to happen in the ordinary course of the
employer's business, and the employer, rather than the "innocent" third
[Vol. 7:757
LEGAL DRUGS?
party, was in the best position to control the acts of the employees, to
insure against the loss and to absorb the cost of the third party's injury
and spread it along to his customers in the form of higher prices for his
goods and/or services. This was not, courts kept insisting, a mere "deep
pocket" analysis. 142
The persuasiveness of these assertions weakens when one observes
their extension to the area of intentional torts, many of which also consti-
tute crimes. The early cases involving intentional torts (excluding fraud)
were often assault and battery cases involving physical violence commit-
ted by an employee against a co-employee, a customer, or another third
party in the context of performing duties specifically required by the po-
sition (such as a bouncer forcibly ejecting a patron from a local pub). 143
On the other hand, in cases where the employee's intentional acts
were particularly brutal, or where the damage suffered was unusual, it
was no longer possible for the courts or commentators to rest their ratio-
nales for vicarious liability on the notion that "accidents will happen."
Rather, the courts began to expand the definition of "scope of employ-
ment" by finding that such events were somehow inherent in the nature
of the defendant employer's activities. For example, in the California
case of Fields v. Sanders,144 the court held an employer liable for the
plaintiffs injuries caused when, during a fight following a traffic acci-
dent, an employee hit the plaintiff on the head with a metal wrench. 145
Perhaps the most important case in this area is Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc. v. United States.146 In the Bushey case, the plaintiff, a drydock
owner, sued the United States after a seaman from the U.S. Coast Guard
vessel Tamaroa returned to the ship from shore leave and, in a drunken
stupor, turned the valves that controlled the water flow into the drydock
where the Tamaroa was docked. The resulting flood caused the ship to
list, slide off its blocks and fall against the wall, partially sinking both the
ship and the drydock. 147 The Government maintained that it should not
be liable because the seaman's actions in turning the drydock valves
were not within the scope of his employment. In support of its position
the Government cited Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 228(1), which
142 See e.g., Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 (1975).
143 See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET A., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.7, at 25 (2d ed. 1986) (The
master will be liable for an intentional tort committed by the servant if the "act was not unex-
pected in view of the duties of the servant.") (quoting REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 245 (1958)); see also Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc., 827 P.2d 859 (1992)).
144 180 P.2d 684 (Cal. 1947).
145 See HARPER ET A., supra note 143, § 26.7, at 28 (The court's rationale was that,
"association between the driver and other men on the highway and the friction that such as-
sociations might in fallible human beings together with the conduct that the friction might lead
to were all 'risk[s] of the business.'") (quoting from Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal. 2d at 842).
146 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
147 See id. at 168.
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indicates that the appropriate test for "scope of employment" is whether
or not the employee is- motivated, at least in part, by a desire to further
the employer's purpose. 148
Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, acknowledged the
ubiquitous "motive test," but concluded that its application in the case at
bar would be "highly artificial."1 49 Rather than emphasize the em-
ployee's motive, Friendly wrote, the proper basis for imposing vicarious
liability on the employer is the "deeply rooted sentiment that a business
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may
fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities."15 0 In order to con-
clude that the inebriated seaman's turning the water intake valves was
"characteristic" of the U.S. Coast Guard's business, Judge Friendly rede-
fined "foreseeability" in an infamous passage which has since been
quoted in hundreds of cases:
Put another way, Lane's [the seaman's] conduct was not
so "unforeseeable" as to make it unfair to charge the
government with responsibility. We agree with a lead-
ing treatise that "what is reasonably foreseeable in this
context [of respondeat superior] ... is quite a different
thing from the foreseeably unreasonable risk of harm
that spells negligence ... The proper test here bears far
more resemblance to that which limits liability to work-
men's compensation than to the test for negligence. The
employer should be held to expect risks, to the public
also, which arise 'out of and in the course of' his em-
ployment of labor." Here it was foreseeable that crew
members crossing the drydock might do damage, negli-
gently or even intentionally, such as pushing a Bushey
employee or kicking property into the water. Moreover,
the proclivity of seamen to find solace for solitude by
copious resort to the bottle while ashore has been noted
in opinions too numerous to warrant citation. Once all
this is granted, it is immaterial that Lane's precise action
was not to be foreseen.151
Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the United
States was vicariously liable for the seaman's actions. This was the re-
sult even though Judge Friendly, in his opinion, also acknowledged that
the other common justifications for applying respondeat superior were
148 See id. at 170.
149 See id.
150 Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
151 Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted).
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not present in the Bushey case. Specifically, Friendly found that impos-
ing liability upon the United States would probably not result in efficient
allocation of resources since the drydock owners, and not the United
States (or other ship owners), were in the best position to avoid such
disasters by simply installing locks on drydock valves. 152 Nor was
Friendly persuaded that imposing liability on the United States would
result in "more intensive screening" of its employees under those
circumstances. 15 3
Judge Friendly's insistence to the contrary notwithstanding, 154 it is
hard to see the Bushey case as anything other than a pure "deep pocket"
approach to respondeat superior. Friendly's new respondeat superior
definition of "foreseeability" made it synonymous with mere possibility,
thus making vicarious liability irrefutable for all practical purposes by
converting the inquiry into a backward-looking determination, as fol-
lows: the fact that an injurious event occurred is de facto proof that it was
possible; if it was possible, it was therefore foreseeable; if it was foresee-
able, it was therefore "incidental to" or "characteristic of' the employer's
business; if it was characteristic of the employer's business, then the em-
ployee was acting within the scope of his employment, and voila! The
employer is liable under the new permutation of vicarious liability. With
this end-oriented approach clearly understood, it is not difficult to see
how the courts could come, in subsequent years, to impose liability upon
the enterprise for violent crimes committed by its employees.
In spite of Judge Friendly's approach in Bushey, however, most
other jurisdictions have adhered to the traditional "motive" or "primary
purpose" test in determining whether an employee is acting within the
scope of his or her employment. In other words, most states have re-
quired that, in order to hold the employer liable for an employee's vio-
lent intentional tort or crime, the employee be acting, at least in part,
with the motivation to be about the employer's business.'5 5 Since vio-
152 As, apparently, most other drydocks already had.
153 Bushey, 398 F.2d at 170.
154 See id at 171 ("But the fact that the defendant is better able to afford damages is not
alone sufficient to justify legal responsibility .... ").
155 See, e.g., McIntosh v. Becker, 314 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. 1981) (using the "furthering
the master's purpose" test, court found that school district was not vicariously liable for
teacher's alleged racial and sexual slurs, but that other verbal abuse and physical assault might
be within the "scope of employment"); State v. Beaudry, 365 N.W.2d 593 (Wis. 1986) (The
court found the defendant employer was vicariously liable for employee's serving alcohol to
friends after closing hours. However, this appeal was decided on a "manifest weight of the
evidence" standard applied to the jury's finding that the employee, while serving alcohol to his
friends in an otherwise locked bar, was acting within the "scope of his employment." There
was a strongly worded dissent.); G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Inc., 757 P.2d 1347 (Or. 1988)
(The court found that the hospital was not liable for employee's sexual assault on plaintiff, an
unconscious patient at the time, under theories of negligent hiring, respondeat superior, strict
liability and breach of implied contract. Plaintiff's respondeat superior argument was unsuc-
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lent intentional torts and crimes are almost never motivated by a desire to
serve the employer, it is still difficult, in most jurisdictions, to impose
liability on the employer for violent intentional torts or crimes committed
by its employees. 156
2. The California Test: "Foreseeability" and "Job-Related
Authority"
California, however, has followed the Bushey rationale. If one
wishes to predict the erratic and unfair results that would obtain if this
were the majority approach, a review of California jurisprudence is en-
cessful because sexual assault was not committed with the employer's purpose in mind, and
thus not within the employee's scope of employment); Bryant v. Brannen, 446 N.W.2d 847
(Mich. 1989) (holding that landlord was not vicariously liable for building manager's shooting
of tenant, since the employee was not acting to further any purpose of his employer); McLaren
v. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co., 767 F. Supp. 1364 (Tex. 1991) (holding that the "wrongful
act" indemnification provisions of a professional liability policy issued to police officers did
not extend to liability for claims of sexual assault since it was not within the officer's scope of
employment); Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo. 1992) (recognizing
the tort of negligent hiring, but declining to hold that an employer is "an insurer for violent
acts committed by an employee against a third person."); C.C. v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc.,
823 F. Supp. 913 (Utah 1993) (holding that Interstate Commerce Commission certificate on
truck did not signify that federal law imposed strict liability upon carrier for alleged rape
committed by its employee. The court, interpreting Utah law, held that no action for respon-
deat superior would lie because alleged rape was clearly outside of driver's scope of employ-
ment); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993) (using the "furthering the
employer's interest" test, held that although grounds for negligent hiring might exist, Episco-
pal priest's sexual relations with parishioner were not within the scope of his employment, and
thus the diocese could not be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability); Sebastian v.
District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994) (holding that the District of Columbia was not
vicariously liable for sexual assault committed by ambulance attendant as it was outside the
scope of his employment); D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1994)
(holding freight company not vicariously liable for sexual assault committed by employee
against plaintiff at Christmas party because Utah law requires that the acts be "closely con-
nected to what the servant is employed to do."); Lourim v. Swensen, 936 P.2d 1011 (Or. 1997)
(holding that, as a matter of law, sexual assault by a Boy Scout troop leader was outside the
scope of his employment). But cf. Weinberg v. Johnson, 518 A.2d 985 (D.C. 1986) (using the
"furthering the interest of the employer" test, court found that laundromat employee who shot
a patron was acting within the scope of his employment); Floyd-Mayers v. American Cab Co.,
732 F. Supp. 243 (D.C. 1990) (using the "furthering the employer's business" test to hold that
summary judgment was not appropriate since there was a question of fact as to whether cab
drivers were acting within the "scope of their employment" in failing to pick up black passen-
gers, subjecting the cab company to vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Doe v. Samar-
itan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990) (holding that summary judgment in favor of
defendant employer was not appropriate where finder of fact could reasonably find that psy-
chotherapist's sexual intercourse with patient, off-premises and one month after counseling
concluded, was based upon "motivation to serve" the employer and thus within the therapist's
"scope of employment." There was a strongly worded dissent in this case.); Oelschlager v.
Magnuson, 528 N.W.2d 895 (Minn. 1995) (holding that under Minnesota law church could be
vicariously liable for sexual abuse committed by pastor because "scope of employment" is not
defined by "furthering the master's business" test, but rather by a foreseeability test (em-
ployee's acts are foreseeable in light of his or her duties)).
156 See id.
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lightening. The first California case to explicitly adopt the Bushey defi-
nition of "scope of employment" was Rodgers v. Kemper Construction
Co.157 In Rodgers, a subcontractor was held vicariously liable for the
brutal beating received by two of the general contractor's employees at
the hands of two of the subcontractor's employees. The subcontractor/
employer tried unsuccessfully to argue that the presence of alcohol and
the extraordinarily violent nature of the attack had taken the employees'
acts outside of the scope of their employment. 158 The California court
disagreed. Citing the Bushey case (among others), the court held that the
employees' violent behavior was "foreseeable," not as that term is used
in negligence, but in the sense that it was "not so unusual or startling that
it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other
costs of an employer's business."'159 Phrasing the proposition differently,
the court stated that vicarious liability would attach for an employee's
violent intentional torts where the risk was one "'that may fairly be re-
garded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken by
the employer."'160
Using a modified Bushey approach, the California courts have de-
veloped an alternative test for imposition of vicarious liability for an em-
ployee's intentional torts: either the act had to be required or "incidental"
to an employee's other duties, or it had to be "foreseeable," as that term
was defined by Judge Friendly in the Bushey case.' 61 California's adop-
tion of the Bushey definition of "foreseeability" for purposes of deter-
mining "scope of employment" has had an unstable record. For
example, in Hinman v. Westinghouse Electric Co.,162 the California
Supreme Court extended "scope of employment" to include an em-
ployee's going to and coming from the workplace "where the trip in-
volves an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to commuting
trips by ordinary members of the workforce."' 163 But in Golden West
Broadcasters v. Superior Court of Riverside County,164 the California
appellate court found that a TV station's employee was not acting within
the scope of his employment when he got into a brawl in a bar's parking
lot, even though he was on location and being paid a per diem by his
employer.165
157 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975).
158 See idJ at 147.
159 Id. at 148-49.
160 Id. at 149 (citations omitted).
161 See Clark Equip. Co. v. Wheat, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874, 882 (1979).
162 88 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1970).
163 1d at 191.
164 171 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Ct. App. 1981).
165 See id. at 101.
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The most erratic and inconsistent results have occurred in the Cali-
fornia cases dealing with an employer's liability for an employee's crimi-
nal sexual assault or rape. When confronted with such shocking and
deviant behavior, the California courts' initial approach was to conclude
that, unlike a workplace scuffle or fistfight, criminal sexual conduct was
so unrelated to an employee's position and so "unusual" and "startling"
that it could not be the basis for vicarious liability. Thus, in Alma W. v.
Oakland Unified School District, a California appellate court held that
the school district could not be held vicariously liable for a sexual assault
committed by a school janitor upon a grade school child. 166 In Alma, the
appellate court stated strongly that the janitor's act of molesting the
plaintiff was in no way "incidental to [his] duties," nor was it foresee-
able, even using the "broad foreseeability test articulated in Rodgers v.
Kemper Construction Co."'167 Although the plaintiff attempted to argue
that the Bushey "foreseeability" test adopted by a California court in
Rodgers required only that the possibility of such an attack was conceiv-
able, the appellate court refused to acknowledge such an interpretation,
saying, "[w]e believe that appellant's argument stretches the Rodgers
foreseeability standard far beyond its logical limits.' 68 Nor was the
court willing to accept a pure "deep pocket" argument, saying:
Distilled to its essence, appellant's argument is little
more than that the risk of loss from an employee's sex-
ual assault should fall on the school district as a means
of spreading the risk to the community at large. Appel-
lant is leaning on a slender reed. The "spread the risk"
concept underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not mean that attribution of liability to an employer
is merely a legal artifice invoked to reach a deep pocket
or that it is based on an elaborate theory of optimal re-
source allocation.' 69
Contrary to the Alma court's insistence, however, the Bushey/Rod-
gers definition of "foreseeability" and "scope of employment" had no
inherent limits, and within a few years, the California courts were begin-
ning to split on the issue of whether an employee's criminal sexual con-
duct could be the basis for imposing vicarious liability upon the
employer. By 1988, when the case Mary M. vs. City of Los Angeles170
reached a California appellate court, the inherent limitlessness of the
166 176 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1981).
167 Id. at 291.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
170 246 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Ct. App. 1988).
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BusheyRodgers rationale manifest itself in the split among the judges of
the court.
Mary M. involved an intoxicated motorist who was stopped by a
Los Angeles police officer, tested for sobriety, and, upon failing the test,
was taken to her home by the officer, where he raped her. The officer
was subsequently convicted of rape and sentenced to imprisonment, and
the plaintiff, Mary M., sued the Los Angeles Police Department alleging
that the department should be vicariously liable under the theory of re-
spondeat superior.17 1 Using California's two-part alternative test, and
resting its opinion on previous cases, including Alma, 172 the majority of a
California appellate court concluded that the L.A.P.D. was not vicari-
ously liable for the officer's criminal behavior because he had "radically
deviated from his duties as a law enforcement officer."'173 The court, in
very strong language, insisted that rape by a policeman was not inciden-
tal to the officer's ordinary duties, and was so "startling" and "unusual"
that it could not have been foreseen.174 However, in a long and impas-
sioned dissent, Judge Spencer (the Presiding Justice) argued that a new
test had arisen in California for imposing vicarious liability on an em-
ployer for an employee's violent or criminal behavior, and that this new
test should have been applied in Mary M. 175
The test to which Judge Spencer referred had come to be known as
the "job-related authority" test, and had been created by a sister court in
California in the case of White v. County of Orange.176 The White case
involved similar facts: an Orange County police officer stopped a female
motorist, forced her into his patrol car, drove her around over a period of
several hours and threatened to rape and murder her. The plaintiff in
White sued the police department for false imprisonment and kidnapping
under a theory of vicarious liability.177 Although the trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant police department, 178 a Cal-
ifornia appellate court reversed, finding that the police officer had been
vested, by virtue of his position, with "a great deal of authority," and that
171 See id at 489.
172 176 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1981).
173 Mary M., 246 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
174 Id. at 495, 497.
175 Id. at 505. In actuality, the first state court to hold a police department vicariously
liable for rape was a Louisiana court in the case of Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380
So.2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 1979). But a novel change in the law often draws more attention in
highly populated states like California or New York. Judge Spencer's dissent also devoted a
great deal of time to discussing society's changed viewpoint with respect to rape. Citing nu-
merous feminist and sociological studies, Judge Spencer concluded that rape is an act of vio-
lence and should be treated (for vicarious liability purposes) as any other intentional tort or
crime. See 246 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
176 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1985).
177 See id at 494.
178 See iL
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the "employer/government must be responsible for acts done during the
exercise of this authority." 179 It was this "job-related authority" test that
Judge Spencer argued should have been used to impose vicarious liabil-
ity on the L.A.P.D. in the Mary M. case. 180
Spencer's colleagues in the appellate majority in Mary M. had ex-
plicitly declined to follow the "job-related authority" test from White v.
County of Orange, saying:
First, because it emanates from a court of equal jurisdic-
tion, White does not bind this court. Second, White fails
to follow and apply well-established principles of deci-
sional law. Third, White creates by judicial fiat a new
theory for vicarious liability (elsewhere referred to as
"job-related authority") under respondeat superior,
which is tantamount (under many factual situations) to
making governmental entities strictly liable for its em-
ployee's wrongful acts.18'
The "job-created authority" test obviously did not carry the day at the
intermediate appellate level in 1988, but the Mary M. case would eventu-
ally get to the California Supreme Court.182
In the meantime, John R. v. Oakland Unified School District, an-
other sexual assault case, had made its way through the California court
system and to the California Supreme Court.183 In the John R. case, a
former student sued the Oakland school district, alleging that it was vi-
cariously liable for a sexual assault (including oral and anal intercourse)
committed on him by a male teacher.184 As with the Mary M. case in the
intermediate appellate court, the California Supreme Court justices split
on the issue of the school district's vicarious liability for the criminal
179 Id. at 496.
180 See 246 Cal. Rptr. at 505. Perhaps even more disturbingly, Judge Spencer argued that
the officer's rape of the plaintiff, Mary M., was "foreseeable" because the Los Angeles County
Police Department had drafted very strict internal procedures for situations involving a one-
man vehicle transporting a female passenger, including notifying the dispatcher (which the
officer did not do), and handcuffing the passenger and placing her in the back seat (the officer
in Mary M. placed the plaintiff in the front seat). Regulations also required a report to be filed
on all motorist stops (which the officer did not prepare) and forbade transporting motorists
anywhere other than to the police station. In a classic example of "damned-if-you-do-and-
damned-if-you-don't," these very procedural protections, all of which were deliberately and
flagrantly disregarded by the officer, were proof, in Judge Spencer's mind, that the Police
Department "foresaw" the possibility of rape, thus subjecting themselves to vicarious liability
when it occurred. Id. at 506.
181 Id. at 493.
182 See infra Part mI.B.2.
183 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989).
184 See id. at 768.
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sexual behavior of the teacher.' 8 5 However, a majority in John R. held
that the school district could not be held vicariously liable for the
teacher's sexual molestation of the student. The court declined to apply
the "job-related authority" test utilized in White v. County of Orange, and
distinguished that case, stating that a police officer's authority over the
public is dramatically more substantial than that of a teacher over his
students. 186 The court concluded that a teacher's act of sodomy on a
student is so far removed from the performance of his duties that it could
not be held to be "incidental to" those duties or "foreseeable" by the
employer/school district. 18 7 The majority was apparently not content to
let its ruling rest only on those grounds. In addition, the court empha-
sized that none of the other public policy rationales traditionally offered
in support of vicarious liability would be met by imposing it on the
school district in the John R. case. Specifically, the court stated that "the
imposition of vicarious liability on school districts for the sexual torts of
their employees would tend to make insurance, already a scarce resource,
even harder to obtain, and could lead to the diversion of needed funds
from the classroom to cover claims."'81 8 The court also felt that the risk
of criminal sexual conduct by teachers was not appropriately spread
among the beneficiaries of the school district's services or the commu-
nity at large.189
The split among the lower California appellate courts and among
the California Supreme Court justices themselves suggested that a
change was brewing. The watershed came when the Supreme Court of
California agreed to hear the Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles appeal in
1991.190
When Mary M. reached the California Supreme Court, the Court
reversed the lower court of appeals, and explicitly adopted the 'job-re-
185 Justice Mosk, in his dissent, argued that the "job-related authority" test from the White
case was just as applicable in the relationship between teacher and student. See id. at 776.
And Justice Kaufman maintained, in his dissent, that increased public awareness of the fre-
quency of sexual assault meant that it was no longer "unusual" or "startling." See id at 782.
186 See i&t at 772.
187 See iL at 773. It is amusing to watch the California judges struggle to find limits to
the Bushey/Rodgers "foreseeability" test-a test which this Article maintains (and proves, I
believe) has no inherent limits. Writing for the majority, Justice Arguelles, in a footnote,
addresses the dissent's contention that sexual misconduct is 'foreseeable" anytime a teacher
and a student are alone in a room together. See id. at 955 n.9. In addition to chastising the
dissent for its "unduly pessimistic" view of humanity, Justice Arguelles says, "Given the facts
of this case and the benefit of hindsight, all would have to agree that the prospect of such
misconduct is conceivable, but that is a far cry from foreseeability, even under the meaning
that concept is given in the respondeat superior context." Id. As the reader of this Article
knows by now, the Bushey/Rodgers definition of "foreseeable" is nothing more than a syno-
nym for "conceivable," easily established with the benefit of hindsight.
188 Id. at 774.
189 See it
190 285 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1991).
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lated authority" test, imposing vicarious liability on the L.A.P.D. for the
rape committed by one of its officers. In an opinion written by Justice
Kennard, the court held that, in light of the powerful authority conferred
upon a police officer by the state, it was neither "unusual" nor "startling"
that an officer might abuse such authority, even to the extent of criminal
sexual conduct. 191 The majority was confident that imposing vicarious
liability in this case would encourage preventive measures without com-
promising the effectiveness of law enforcement activities.' 9 2 Justice
Kennard also expressed the view that the police department was in the
best position to insure against such losses and spread the risk of loss
among the beneficiaries of its services. 193 The future import of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion in Mary M. was unclear. Two justices
concurred in the judgment, one on entirely different grounds,194 and Jus-
tice Kennard herself seemed to be limiting her opinion to on-duty police
officers (although her reasoning did not lend itself to such limitations). 95
The test for the California Supreme Court's commitment to the
"job-related authority" test came four years later with the case Lisa M. v.
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital. 96 In Lisa M., the plaintiff
sued the hospital, alleging that it was vicariously liable for the sexual
assault committed on the plaintiff by one of its ultrasound technicians
191 See id. at 105.
192 Justice Kennard's remarks reflect, at best, a conflicted and internally inconsistent ap-
proach to respondeat superior. On the one hand, she justifies the imposition of vicarious liabil-
ity by asserting that it will promote more caution on the part of police departments. See id. at
106. But Justice Baxter had raised the objection in his concurring opinion that the Los Ange-
les Police Department already had elaborate, detailed proscriptions and procedures, all in-
tended to prevent this sort of conduct. See id. at 121. Baxter had written, "no matter what the
City does, it may be held liable for a police officer's criminal conduct including offenses such
as this rape." Id. In spite of her earlier admonition that vicarious liability promotes caution in
the employer, Kennard treats this as irrelevant. That Justice Kennard actually views respon-
deat superior as merely another term for strict liability is evident in her response: "These
objections are misplaced, as they are directed at the doctrine of respondeat superior itself,
rather than its application to the facts of this case." Id. at 106.
193 This conclusion has been roundly criticized by commentators who claim that an
agency of the government (particularly law enforcement), unlike a private corporation, is not
in a position to choose another line of products or services, or simply raise the prices for its
goods and/or servies. The only alternative is to raise taxes, and this would be particularly
burdensome where, as here, the taxes would be imposed only on the local community. See,
e.g., Christopher E. Krueger, Note, Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles: Should a City be Held
Liable Under Respondeat Superior for a Rape by a Police Officer?, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 419
(1994). One could perhaps argue that passing the increased cost along to the "consumers" in
the form of higher taxes (as opposed to prices) is an even better way of testing the public's
commitment to the "social view" of the law that scholars and jurists have now been espousing
for the better part of this century.
194 Justice Baxter felt that the rule of invited error should bar the City of Los Angeles'
attempt to attack the jury verdict. He disagreed vehemently with Kennard's characterization of
respondeat superior. See Mary M., 285 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
195 285 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
196 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (1995).
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during an examination. 197 The plaintiff, relying upon the Mary M. case,
argued that the hospital should be liable because the employee's assault
had taken place as a result of the authority inherent in his position.' 98
The Court backed off from its sweeping language in Mary M. and held
that while the ultrasound technician may have had a position of trust, that
was not similar to the authority conferred by the state in a police of-
ficer.' 99 In an opinion written by Justice Werdegar, the Supreme Court
of California held that Henry Mayo Memorial Hospital was not liable for
the sexual assault committed by the ultrasound technician. Justice
Werdegar cited Justice Kennard's language in Mary M.:
We expressly limited our holding: "We stress that our
conclusion in this case flows from the unique authority,
vested in police officers. Employees who do not have
this authority and who commit sexual assaults may be
acting outside the scope of their employment as a matter
of law. ''2°°
The Lisa M. Court evidently attempted to revert to the pre-Mary M.
definition of respondeat superior.201 Nonetheless, the future of Califor-
nia law in this area seems unclear since both Justices Mosk and Kennard
wrote strongly worded dissents.202
3. The Future of the "Scope of Employment" Test If Currently
Illicit Drugs Become Legal
It is not a recent development to hold the employer liable for acts
committed by an employee under the influence of an intoxicating sub-
stance. Casebooks, treatises and reporters are replete with historical in-
stances of companies found liable because their employees were driving
vehicles, operating heavy equipment or otherwise performing tasks made
more dangerous by their being under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
What is new is the willingness of the courts to cofisider bizarre and un-
197 The technician's sexual assault included improperly inserting the ultrasound wand into
the plaintiff's vagina (an ultrasound examination is external), and digitally fondling and cares-
sing her genitals, while telling plaintiff that it was necessary to "excite her to get a good
[ultrasound] view of the baby." Id. at 512.
198 See id. at 517.
199 See id. at 518.
200 Id at 518 (citing Mary M., 285 Cal. Rptr. at 108).
201 In fact, Justice George concurred, saying that he would have gone further and over-
ruled the Court's decision in Mary M. See id. at 519 (George, J., concurring).
202 See id. at 519-24. Both Justices Mosk and Kennard maintained that summary judg-
ment was inappropriate in this case, since the trier of fact could have found that the technician
was acting within the scope of his employment when he molested the plaintiff. See id. at 523-
24. Interestingly, neither Justice Mosk nor Justice Kennard used 'job-related authority" per
se; rather, they both emphasized the intimate nature of an ultrasound examination, and con-
cluded that a sexual assault therein was "foreseeable." See id. at 520-21.
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foreseeable acts or brutal, violent and sexual crimes as being within the
"scope of employment" for respondeat superior purposes. As the last
thirty years of cases (since Ira S. Bushey v. United States was decided in
1968) have shown, many courts now simply decide ab initio that an em-
ployer should be liable, and then set about redefining terms like "scope
of employment" and "foreseeability"-concepts which traditionally pro-
tected the employer from liability for an employee's egregious behav-
ior-such that they now cover any act by an employee, no matter how
forbidden, how depraved, or how unrelated to the duties of the job.
For all the courts' protests to the contrary, it is clear that the most
recent incarnations of respondeat superior in the area of an employee's
intentional torts and criminal conduct are nothing more than applications
of the principle of strict liability, and they are motivated by no public
policy or purpose other than to reach the "deep pocket" (real or per-
ceived) of the employer. If the past is any indication, California may
well lead the way for the rest of the state courts in the United States.
And as the previous section of this Article demonstrates, the California
definition of "foreseeability" is a frightening prospect for the American
enterprise.
In fact, although some observers protest the extension of vicarious
liability to the area of violent crimes and sexual assaults,20 3 others are
arguing that the "job-related authority" test should be expanded to in-
clude "job-related power" and "job-related access" within the "scope of
employment," such that all employers (not just police departments) are
liable for sexual assaults committed by their employees. 204 The exist-
203 See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 193.
204 See Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, "Scope of Employment" Redefined: Holding Em-
ployers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by their Employees, 76 MaN. L.
REv. 1513 (1992). Weber maintains that "a reasoned approach" to vicarious liability requires
that the "job-related authority" standard be expanded to include any situation where the em-
ployer "creates the situation where the employee can commit a tort." Id. at 1533. Her defini-
tion of "creating the situation" is a simple "but for" type of causation-having hired the
employee in the first place. Her application of the standard would be universal: "Once a court
has decided to use the job-created power standard, the standard should be applied to all situa-
tions involving sexual assaults by employees." Id. at 1538-39. And it would encompass more
than just authority or positions of trust; she would also include situations where, by virtue of
the employee's job, he or she has "access" or "power":
If job-created power is defined in this way, the test differs from the approach taken
by a number of courts because it is applicable to a broad range of employment
situations, not just to police officers or therapists. For example, it would apply to
plumbers or electricians who gain access to a person's home through their
employment.
Id. at 1540 (emphasis added). Like so many of her counterparts, Ms. Weber conflates strict
liability and negligence policies in her justification for expanded applications of respondeat
superior. On the one hand, she is not advocating a "negligent hiring and supervision" stan-
dard-no amount of preventative action will exonerate the employer if its employee commits
sexual assault according to her "job-created power" standard; on the other hand, she recites the
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ence and prominence of these arguments should be enough to spur cor-
porate America to action. To make things worse for employers, it is no
coincidence that two of the primary opinions in the area of enterprise
liability for violent crimes or sexual harassment- Ira S. Bushey v.
United States and Rodgers v. Kemper Construction Co.-both involved
employees who committed extraordinarily damaging or violent acts
while under the influence of alcohol.20 5 When one combines the current
trends in judicial and scholarly thought with the prospect of legalized
drug use by greater numbers of employees, the potential for economic
disaster is evident.
B. ENTERPRisE LiAuirry FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY EMPLOYEES
1. The Evolution of Enterprise Liability for Sexual Harassment
Many of the cases that arise in a discussion of enterprise liability for
employees' intentional and criminal acts involve criminal sexual con-
duct-conduct which now also forms the basis of many sexual harass-
ment claims. In this case of enterprise liability, like in the area of
intentional torts, there are varying definitions of the offensive em-
ployee's "scope of employment." Given the judicial confusion over the
definition of "scope of employment" in other contexts, it is not surprising
that the sexual harassment cases are all over the map as well.
As an initial matter, with regard to sexual harassment, the employer
liability issue is slightly different than that which we have examined thus
far. Most cases addressing primary liability or respondeat superior deal
with a third party who has been injured by an employee; with sexual
harassment, most of the cases involve wrongful conduct by an employee
against another employee. Because the employer (master) was typically
insulated from such liability under the "fellow-servant" rule at common-
law, liability for sexual harassment has its roots in statutes, not case
law.20 6 It is an outgrowth of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which provides that an employer must not "fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise ... discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.' '207 Early Title VII cases decided by the EEOC were
largely racial and ethnic harassment cases in which the EEOC held that
employers had an obligation to provide a workplace free of the taint of
correspondingly obsolete (but rote) justification that, "imposing liability upon the employer
creates a strong incentive for the employer to exercise care in training and supervising employ-
ees." Id- at 1533.
205 See Bushey, 398 F.2d at 168; Rodgers, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
206 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 474-491 (1958).
207 Now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1972).
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racial intimidation. This obligation included a duty to prevent such har-
assment by creating a culture which discouraged it, as well as taking
appropriate action when it did occur.20 8 The early cases made no refer-
ences to specific agency principles, such as breach of an employer's duty
of care, or vicarious liability for the acts of its employees. Rather, the
cases simply insisted that the employer had a statutory duty to its em-
ployees to ensure a safe and productive workplace free of
discrimination. 20 9
However, it was inevitable that courts would begin to fine-tune their
reasoning as more harassment cases found their way into the dockets,
and courts struggled with increasingly complicated issues such as the
nature of the employer's liability, and the difference between harassment
occurring between co-employees and that occurring between an em-
ployee and a supervisor.2 10 The courts found it necessary to import
agency principles into Title VII law. The difficulty faced by courts in
attempting to apply vicarious liability to sexual harassment cases would
not have been hard to predict for anyone familiar with the evolution of
respondeat superior in other contexts. For example, if the courts con-
cluded only that an employer has a non-delegable statutory duty to pro-
vide a discrimination-free work environment, then in theory it would not
208 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability
of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 66,
100 & nn.157-160 (1995) (citing EEOC Dec. No. YSF 9-108, 1 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS.
(BNA) 922 (1969); EEOC Dec. No. 71-909, 3 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. (BNA) 269 (1970);
EEOC Dec. No. 72-0779, 4 FAIR. EMPL. PRAc. CAS. (BNA) 317 (1971); EEOC Dec. No. 72-
1561, 4 FAm. EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 852 (1972); EEOC Dec. No. 74-05, 6 FAIR EMPL.
PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 834 (1973); EEOC Dec. No. CL 68-12-431EU, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS.
(BNA) 295 (1969)).
209 See id. at 100-01.
These EEOC decisions make no reference to the theories of vicarious or direct liabil-
ity, but the reasoning in each case is consistent with both doctrines. For example,
the employer's obligation is cast as a special duty, imposed by statute, to protect
employees from harassment.... Upon breach of this duty, an employer might find
itself vicariously liable, based on its responsibility for the acts of its servants or the
breach of a non-delegable duty owed to its employees, or directly liable, based on
the breach of its own duty of care.
Id.; see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). Rogers was the first federal
circuit court of appeals decision to address workplace harassment. In Rogers, plaintiff had
been told by her employer that she was being fired because, being Hispanic, her presence in
the workplace had provoked hostile and abusive behavior by the white employees, which had
created an unpleasant atmosphere. She sued and lost at the district court level, but the Fifth
Circuit reversed, saying:
[Title VII] sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.... One can read-
ily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to de-
stroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers, and... Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.
Id. at 238.
210 See infra Part mI.B.1-3.
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matter whether the offensive sexual behavior was committed by a co-
employee or a supervisor: the employer's vicarious liability would be
strict in either case. If, however, the court chose to utilize agency princi-
ples, then liability could be imposed under at least two different theories:
an employer could be negligent in its hiring or supervision of particular
personnel, in which case it could be held primarily (or directly) liable for
the ensuing harassment; or, an employer could be held vicariously liable
for the harassment of its employees.
While imposition of primary liability could be based on a relatively
simple inquiry, vicarious liability under a theory of respondeat superior
invoked all of the issues we have previously addressed in this Article,
most notably whether the employee doing the harassing was acting in the
"scope of his employment" when he committed the wrongful acts or
made the offensive statements. Bringing "scope of employment" into the
Title VII arena of workplace harassment has created judicial inconsis-
tency. Throughout the 1970s courts "began to distinguish between cases
involving harassment by supervisors and those involving harassment by
nonsupervisory co-employees."' 211 This distinction was vital, in the
courts' view, since supervisory employees could be construed as
"agents" of the employer, with the employer being held liable for acts
which were within the supervisor's "scope of employment," including, as
has been seen before, wrongful acts that were not authorized, but were
"foreseeable," "broadly incidental" to the supervisor's authority, or that
were motivated, at least partially, by a motive to further the employer's
business.212 As a result of the application of these agency principles to
Title VII discrimination cases, courts held employers liable for harass-
ment by supervisors under "authority" and "scope of employment" anal-
yses of respondeat superior, but did not hold employers liable for
harassment by non-supervisory employees unless the employer either
knew or should have known of the pervasively discriminatory environ-
ment and failed to address it. In other words, employers would be liable
only if a factual basis could be found for holding the employer primarily
liable.213
211 Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 102.
212 Oppenheimer provides a concise description of the evolution of the incorporation of
agency principles into Title VII harassment cases. See id. at 103-08.
213 See id (citing Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(holding that the employer could not be held vicariously liable for harassment by co-employ-
ees unless the company had negligently allowed the harassment to occur, or ratified it after the
fact); Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (holding that
company was not liable for racial harassment of plaintiff by co-workers where company
warned and disciplined co-workers following each event); Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co., 425 F.
Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (holding that employer was not liable for racial intimidation of
plaintiff by co-workers where plaintiff complained to supervisors, who properly responded to
each complaint and disseminated company policy prohibiting harassment); Friend v. Leid-
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Cases involving sexual harassment arrived not long after the courts
had begun to grapple with the application of agency principles in Title
VII racial and ethnic harassment cases. Many of the early decisions con-
cluded that sexual harassment fell entirely outside the purview of Title
VII.214 The debate heated up when the academic community weighed in
on the issue, arguing that sexual harassment should be covered by Title
VII.215 Not long afterwards, the federal circuit Courts of Appeals began
to reverse the district courts on the question of whether sexual harass-
ment by supervisors was discriminatory behavior prohibited by Title
VII.216 These courts utilized the agency analyses to ascertain if the em-
ployers were vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of their supervi-
sory employees. 217
inger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding employer properly responded after each complaint
and was not liable for isolated acts which did not constitute a pattern of discrimination); Silver
v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer not liable for racial harassment where it
could not have known about isolated instance of racial epithet, and thus could not have re-
sponded). But cf EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381 (D. Minn. 1980)
(holding employer was directly, not vicariously, liable for failing to take appropriate action
after being notified of harassment by co-employees); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796 (1st
Cir. 1980) (holding that Navy supervisors had known of racial harassment of plaintiff and had
failed to remedy the situation, thus rendering the Navy liable under a theory of primary
liability)).
214 See id. at 109-13 (describing the following cases: Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc.,
390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a supervi-
sor's sexual advances were due to his "personal proclivity" or "peculiarity," and not to a
company policy, and that such behavior was not covered by Title VII); Barnes v. Train, 13
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating, "[r]egardless of how inexcuseable the conduct of the plain-
tiff's supervisor might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier to continued em-
ployment based on plaintiff's sex"); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal.
1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover
against employer, notwithstanding her termination for refusing to accede to supervisor's de-
mands for sexual intercourse, since she did not take advantage of intracorporate grievance
policy); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding employer was not liable for plaintiffs transfer, layoff,
threats of demotion, pay cuts and termination at hands of supervisor whose sexual advances
she rebuffed)). Having the benefit of twenty years' hindsight, it is amusing to note a comment
by one federal judge, who remarked that if a supervisor's sexual invitations were actionable, it
would prompt a "potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually
oriented advances toward another." Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
215 See Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 111 & n.237 (citing numerous law review arti-
cles written between 1976 and 1981).
216 See id. at 111-12 (describing the following cases: Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing lower court); Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032
(4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that "an employer's policy or acquiescence in a practice
of compelling female employees to submit to the sexual advances of their male supervisors"
was a violation of Title VII); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reversing lower
court, holding that the condition of being subjected to a supervisor's sexual demands was
"gender specific" and thus violative of Title VII); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co.,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing lower court)).
217 See cases cited supra note 216.
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In November of 1980, the EEOC promulgated new regulations in an
attempt to clarify the emerging law of sexual harassment. 218 The new
Guidelines described two types of sexual harassment which were action-
able under Title VII: conditioning a tangible benefit of employment or
loss thereof (including initial employment, subsequent pay and promo-
tion decisions) upon a supervisor's sexual demands,219 and workplace
behavior that created an offensive environment. 220 The former became
known as "quid pro quo" form of sexual harassment;221 the latter as
"hostile environment. '222
According to the EEOC's Final Guidelines, an employer was liable
for sexual harassment by a non-supervisory employee only in situations
where it was negligent: "those situations in which the employer, includ-
ing its agents and supervisory employees, knew or should have known of
the harassment, yet failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action."223 However, the EEOC recommended strict vicarious liability in
sexual harassment cases involving supervisory employees.224
218 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995).
219 See id. § 1604.11(a)(1).
220 See id. § 1604.11(a)(2).
221 See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 115. Oppenheimer attributes the first
scholarly use of this term to Catharine MacKinnon. See SExuAL HARAssMENT oF WoRaNG
Wom 32-40 (1979). He also attributes the first judicial recognition of the term to the cases
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (lth Cir. 1982), and Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
254-55 (4th Cir. 1983). The United States Supreme Court explicitly identified the separate
forms of sexual harassment in the landmark case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
65 (1986).
222 See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 115.
[T]o formulate its third form of harassment, the EEOC followed the lead of feminist
scholars like Catharine MacKinnon and Nadine Taub and of courts in cases involv-
ing racial, religious, and ethnic harassment. The EEOC's third form of harassment
encompassed the type of conduct described in this Article's Introduction-unwel-
come sexual conduct that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment."
Id. (quoting from 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1995)) (citations omitted).
223 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995).
224 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1995) (stating that the employer will be strictly vicariously
liable "for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment..., regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their
occurrence."). Although the EEOC's Final Guidelines utilized the terms "agent" and "supervi-
sor," they did not define them. Title VII does not even contain the term "supervisor." David
Benjamin Oppenheimer suggests reference to the National Labor Relations Act, which defines
"supervisor" as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other em-
ployees, or responsibility to direct them, or to. adjust their grievances, or to effec-
tively recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
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In spite of the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII,225 courts did not
hold employers vicariously liable for all sexually offensive behavior by
supervisors. Instead, the courts began to distinguish between "quid pro
quo" and "hostile environment" supervisor harassment cases. Even
those courts that held employers liable for supervisor harassment did so
only under a primary liability standard, not a vicarious liability
standard. 226
2. The United States Supreme Court's standard in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,22 7 the U.S. Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify the law governing sexual harassment cases brought
under Title VII.228 Mechelle Vinson sued her employer, Meritor Savings
Bank, alleging that her supervisor coerced her into an involuntary sexual
relationship by threatening her position with the bank.229 The supervisor
denied the acts alleged by Vinson, and the bank maintained that it was
Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 118 (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 152(11) (1988)).
225 Oppenheimer suggests that much of the confusion is attributable to the fact that the
EEOC's Final Guidelines on sexual harassment were adopted under the direction of Eleanor
Holmes Norton on November 3, 1980- "one day before Ronald Reagan's election as Presi-
dent." Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 114. The purpose for Oppenheimer's odd insertion of
this seemingly unrelated event becomes more understandable somewhat later in his article,
when he explains that Ronald Reagan's new Director of the EEOC, Clarence Thomas, dis-
avowed the Guidelines in the position taken by the EEOC on subsequent cases, including the
Meritor case in 1986. See id. at 126. Oppenheimer obviously believes that Anita Hill's testi-
mony about being subjected to sexual harassment under Clarence Thomas at the EEOC is
truthful, and not-so-subtly suggests that Thomas' reasons for opposing the EEOC Guidelines
as drafted under Norton were therefore personal. See id. at 148-49 & n.435. In fact, Anita
Hill's account of Thomas's alleged behavior toward her forms the basis for the "hypothetical"
harassment scenarios Oppenheimer offers throughout his article. For one familiar with the
gaps in Hill's 1991 testimony and the specifics of her allegations, Oppenheimer's inclusion of
this material further undercuts his persuasiveness.
226 See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that em-
ployer was liable since the manager to whom plaintiff complained of her own supervisor's
harassment said, "[Any man in his right mind would want to rape you," and then made his
own sexual advances. But dicta in this case suggested that an employer might not be liable if
it responded properly, after the fact, to a supervisor's harassing behavior.); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (1lth Cir. 1982) (holding that in order for the plaintiff to hold
employer liable for a hostile environment created by supervisor's sexual advances, she must
prove that "employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to
take prompt remedial action."); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding
employer liable for "extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets addressed to and
employed about Katz by supervisory personnel" because the harassment was so pervasive that
the employer either must have known or should have known about it, and failed to remedy it).
227 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
228 See Vinson v. Taylor, 1980 WL 100 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
reh. denied, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
229 Some of Ms. Vinson's complaints included that Mr. Taylor had "assaulted and raped
her on numerous occasions, that he frequently fondled her breasts and buttocks in public, and
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not liable since Ms. Vinson had not taken advantage of internal grievance
procedures. The district court held that the conduct alleged by Vinson
may constitute sexual harassment under Title VII, but that Vinson's par-
ticipation was either voluntary or, in any case, that the events did not
affect the continuation of her employment at the bank.230 The court,
holding the bank to a negligence standard of liability, concluded that the
bank was not liable since it did not have reason to know of the alleged
acts. 231 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed, holding that the district court misapplied the test for sexual har-
assment and failed to consider both quid pro quo and hostile environment
forms of sexual harassment.2 32 In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit expressly
adopted the standards set forth in the EEOC's 1980 Final Guidelines. 233
The court held that an employer would be liable for a non-supervisory
employee's harassing behavior only if it either knew or should have
known (the primary liability standard) about the pervasively discrimina-
tory environment and neglected to remedy it; however, an employer
would be vicariously liable for a supervisory employee's harassment of a
subordinate, regardless of the employer's fault (the strict liability
standard). 234
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Meritor definitively
established sexual harassment as prohibited behavior within the ambit of
Title VII. It also identified "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" as
that he would enter the ladies' restroom of the bank to expose himself to her." See Vinson,
1980 WL 100 at *6.
230 See id at *7.
231 See idl at *6.
232 See Vinson, 753 F.2d at 145.
233 See Ud at 150.
234 See id. However, David Oppenheimer opines that the D.C. Circuit misinterpreted the
EEOC Guidelines as being a higher standard of responsibility than that imposed by the com-
mon law definition of "scope of employment." Oppenheimer characterized the court's opin-
ion, that "scope of employment" in common law tort cases was limited to only those acts
which were authorized, as mistaken. See Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 124. With all due
respect to Professor Oppenheimer's prodigious research, "scope of employment" was not a
strict liability inquiry, even in 1985. As we have seen, the "scope of employment" inquiry was
originally intended to insulate the employer from the outrageous or unforeseen acts of the
employee. Nevertheless, from a very early day, an employee's intentional tort would be con-
sidered within the scope of his or her employment if it was done, at least in part, with the
intent to serve the employer. Since extraordinary and utterly unrelated acts such as violent
assaults or criminal sexual conduct were never done with the intent to "be about the em-
ployer's business," the traditional rule was that these acts were not within the scope of an
employee's employment. Indeed, even at present, a majority of courts use the "motive to serve
the master" test to assess "scope of employment" inquiries, and few (California, Louisiana,
Minnesota) find criminal sexual conduct a basis for imposition of vicarious liability upon the
employer. Thus, it is perfectly logical that in 1985 the D.C. Circuit could have concluded that
Sidney Taylor's rape of Mechelle Vinson, if it did occur, would not have been within the
"scope of his employment" at common law, and that Title VII's extension of vicarious liability
in this circumstance was a dramatic departure from the traditional rule. See infra Parts II and
III.
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separately actionable forms of harassment. But the Court did not resolve
the dilemma over the proper standard to be applied in supervisory versus
non-supervisory harassment cases, saying:
[W]e do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted
courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this
area. While such common-law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Con-
gress' decision to define "employer" to include any
"agent" of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely
evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of em-
ployees for which employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court
of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are al-
ways automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors. See generally Restatement (Second) of
Agency §§ 219-237 (1958). For the same reason, ab-
sence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insu-
late that employer from liability. . . . As to employer
liability, we conclude that the Court of Appeals was
wrong to entirely disregard agency principles and im-
pose absolute liability on employers for the acts of their
supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particu-
lar case.235
3. Enterprise Liability for Sexual Harassment Since Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson: Federal and State Decisions
a. Federal Decisions
Alas, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Meritor case did not
clarify the law. The Supreme Court's convenient reliance on other
courts' interpretations of agency principles has now placed sexual har-
assment on the same footing as outrageous acts of employees-like vio-
lent intentional torts and criminal sexual conduct. In other words, the
employer may be vicariously liable for sexual harassment, depending
upon the jurisdiction, its definition of concepts like "scope of employ-
ment" and "foreseeability," its prevailing judicial and scholarly philoso-
phies about "cost-shifting" and "loss-spreading" and its willingness
(implicitly or explicitly) to adopt "deep pocket" rationales.
Sexual harassment cases decided since 1986 bear this out. In the
eleven years since Meritor was decided, the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have struggled with the proper application of agency principles to
235 Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 72-73.
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sexual harassment cases. 236 Two very recent 1997 cases, Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton2 37 and the consolidated appeals of Jansen v. Packag-
ing Corporation of America and Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 238
indicate that the difficulty is nowhere near resolution.
In Faragher, two lifeguards sued the City of Boca Raton and their
supervisors for sexual harassment, battery and negligent hiring and su-
pervision.239 The women claimed that their male supervisors engaged
them in offensive touching and vulgar language. The district court en-
236 See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that employer was not strictly vicariously liable; rather, liability was imposed on the
theory that employee was "aided in accomplishing the tort by existence of the agency relation-
ship."); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th.Cir. 1987) (holding that supervisor's
grabbing of plaintiff's breasts and buttocks was "boorish" behavior, but not sexual harassment
within the meaning of Title VI); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311 (1 lth
Cir. 1989) (holding that corporate officer's sexual advances were not within the scope of his
authority, thus exonerating the employer from liability); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d
100 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that harassing
supervisor was an "agent" and thus an "employer" in his own right under Title VII; but further
holding that Unisys could escape liability by taking prompt and appropriate action upon find-
ing out about the harassment); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that in a "hostile environment" case involving both supervisory and non-super-
visory co-employee harassment, the plaintiff was required to show that management had actual
or constructive knowledge of sexually hostile environment and failed to take prompt and ade-
quate remedial action); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992) (distin-
guishing between "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" cases and holding that in order
for plaintiff to obtain judgment against employer in "hostile environment" case, she must show
not only that supervisor's sexually harassing behavior was within the scope of his employ-
ment, but also that employer knew (or should have known) of the harassment and failed to
properly address the situation); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that district court's summary judgment in favor of defendant of company was
error, since plaintiff could prevail if she could show that employer knew of harassment and
failed to address it); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming district
court's imposition of vicarious liability, but on grounds that supervisor's constant demands for
oral sex from plaintiff constituted "quid pro quo" and not "hostile environment" sexual harass-
ment. The court also stated that a "management-level employee" must be aware of the envi-
ronment in order to hold employer liable for "hostile environment," and plaintiffs supervisor
was not "management-level"); Bouton v. BMW of North America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding "that an effective grievance procedure-one that is known to the victim
and that timely stops the harassment-shields the employer from Title VII liability for a hos-
tile environment"). It must be noted that there is no such dilemma with "quid pro quo" cases.
Co-employees do not have the ability to demand sexual favors in exchange for promotion, job
benefits or pay increases, or to threaten their denial for refusal. By contrast, a supervisor, who
can condition a subordinate's pay raise, promotion or other benefit upon submitting to his
sexual advances, or who threatens to withhold same if the subordinate refuses is clearly utiliz-
ing his conferred authority and position to harass the subordinate employee. See supra note
255; see generally Oppenheimer, supra note 208.
237 111 F.3d 1530 (1lth Cir. 1997).
238 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (addressing for the first time the appropriate use of
agency principles in Title VII sexual harassment cases).
239 Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1534 n.2. Plaintiff Faragher sued under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as assert-
ing pendent state law claims for battery and negligent retention and supervision. See id.
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tered judgment for plaintiff Faragher on her Title VII claim against the
City, and awarded her $1 in nominal damages. 240 Citing Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, and acknowledging differences between the circuits, a
divided Eleventh Circuit reversed (in part), holding that the City of Boca
Raton was neither primarily nor vicariously liable for the offensive con-
duct engaged in by plaintiffs' supervisors. 241 As to the City's vicarious
liability, the court said:
This Circuit has concluded that in a pure hostile environ-
ment case, a supervisor's harassing conduct is typically
outside the scope of his employment. [In Steele v. Off-
shore Building, Inc.], [w]e noted that, "Strict liability is
illogical in a pure hostile environment setting. In a hos-
tile environment case, no quid pro quo exists. The su-
pervisor does not act as the company; the supervisor acts
outside 'the scope of actual or apparent authority to hire,
fire, discipline or promote."'242
The court concluded that the lifeguards were acting to promote their
own personal ends and not in furtherance of the city's business.243 The
court did not find any evidence that the city had been negligent in its
hiring, retention or supervision of the lifeguard supervisors since there
was no proof that the city had been notified, either explicitly or construc-
tively, or given an opportunity to rectify the situation.244  In short,
although the supervisors themselves were liable for their offensive con-
duct, the City of Boca Raton was not.
As divided as it was, the Eleventh Circuit was at least able to assem-
ble a majority in the Faragher case. There was no such agreement in the
Seventh Circuit when it heard the consolidated appeals of Jansen v.
Packaging Corporation of America and Ellerth v. Burlington Industries,
240 The district court also awarded Faragher $10,000 in compensatory damages on her
§ 1983 claim against her supervisors and $500 in punitive damages for her battery claims
against one of her supervisors. The court awarded plaintiff Ewanchew $35,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $2000 punitive damages for her battery claim. See id.
241 Judges Hatchett, Kravitch, and Barkett dissented in part, as did Judges Tjoflat and
Anderson. All four judges disagreed with the majority's interpretation of vicarious liability
principles applied in supervisor "hostile environment" cases. See id. at 1539-48.
242 Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1535 (quoting from Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867
F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th
Cir. 1982))).
243 See id. at 1536.
244 See id. at 1538-39. In fact, the court pointed out that the City of Boca Raton had not
been informed of the supervisors' offensive behavior until after both plaintiffs left the city's
employ-one to take a better job elsewhere and the other to attend law school-and plaintiff
Ewanchew sent the city a letter complaining of their treatment at the hands of their supervi-
sors. At that point, the city investigated plaintiffs' complaints and reprimanded and disciplined
both supervisors. See id. at 1533.
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Inc..245 Rather than producing a majority opinion, the Seventh Circuit
was forced to write a brief per curiam opinion, setting forth the facts and
announcing the holding, while virtually every judge wrote a separate
opinion expressing his or her interpretation of how agency principles
should and should not be applied in Title VII sexual harassment cases.
In the Jansen and Ellerth cases, both plaintiffs asserted "quid pro
quo" and "hostile environment" claims in their complaints.246 A major-
ity of the judges were able to agree that the standard for imposing vicari-
ous liability for "hostile environm ent" sexual harassment committed by a
supervisor was negligence, but that an employer would be strictly liable
for "quid pro quo" sexual harassment by any supervisor, whether or not
the employer knew of the supervisor's acts or had the opportunity to
remedy the situation.' 7 Beyond these three cases, the federal courts'
opinions constitute a morass of competing approaches, too long and too
detailed to set forth concisely here.? 8
245 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
246 See id. at 492.
247 See &L at 493.
248 Jansen, 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997). The entire opinion is nearly one hundred pages
long, not including the judge's footnotes. To give the reader a taste of the conflict among the
judges in this circuit, an excerpt from the three page per curiam opinion follows.
All the judges with the exception of Judges Easterbrook, Rovner and Wood believe
that negligence is the only proper standard of employer liability in cases of hostile-
environment sexual harassment even if as here the harasser was a supervisor rather
than a co-worker of the plaintiff. The view of these judges is set forth in Judge
Flaum's opinion, which is joined by Judges Cummings, Bauer (as to [plaintiff El-
lerth]), Cudahy (as to [plaintiff Jansen])(with the reservations indicated in Judge
Cudahy's separate opinion), Kanne (with the reservations indicated in Judge
Kanne's separate opinion), and Evans; in Chief Judge Posner's opinion, which is
joined by Judge Manion; in Judge Manion's opinion, which is joined by Chief Judge
Posner, and in Judge Coffey's opinion. Judges Easterbrook, Rovner and Wood, as
explained in Judge Easterbrook's and Judge Wood's opinions, believe that the
proper standard of employer liability in all cases of sexual harassment by a supervi-
sor is respondeat superior, provided, however, that the harassment was committed by
the supervisor in the course of exercising his actual or apparent supervisory responsi-
bilities, was foreseeable, and subjects the employer to liability under the principles
of the applicable state law.... Judge Flaum's opinion concludes that Jansen has a
viable quid pro quo claim, as do Judges Easterbrook, Rovner and Wood, though their
route to this conclusion is different, as they do not believe that there should be any
different standard for an employer's liability for supervisors' harassment depending
on whether it is hostile-environment harassment or quid pro quo harassment. Chief
Judge Posner and Judges Coffey and Manion disagree that Jansen has a viable quid
pro quo claim, Chief Judge Posner and Judge Manion because they believe that strict
liability for quid pro quo harassment should be limited to 'company acts' (such as
firing or demoting), as distinct from mere threats, and Judge Coffey because he re-
jects strict liability in quid pro quo cases and also because he deems Jansen to have
waived her quid pro quo claims. In Ellerth's case.. . [a]ll the judges except Judges
Easterbrook, Rovner and Wood believe that the hostile-environment claim was ex-
pressly waived by Ellerth in her briefs to the panel.... All the judges except Chief
Judge Posner and Judges Coffey and Manion believe that Elierth's evidence of quid
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b. State Decisions
The opinions of the state courts are no easier to reconcile. In New
York, for example, the courts have interpreted their state's law on sexual
harassment and have held employers to a negligence standard. For a
plaintiff to ensure that her employer is held liable, she must demonstrate
that her employer "had knowledge of and acquiesced in the discrimina-
tory conduct of its employee."2 49
Arizona has taken an even more limited view, one which incorpo-
rates the traditional basis for vicarious liability. In Smith v. American
Express Travel Related Services, Inc., the plaintiff sued her employer for
sexual harassment on the basis of common law tort and contract princi-
ples, alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, breach of contract and breach of a covenant of fair dealing.250 In
Smith, the plaintiff was subjected to gross and offensive behavior by Ed-
win Nally, a manager at American Express who was not Smith's direct
supervisor. 251 The trial court granted American Express's motion for
summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peals of Arizona affirmed. The appellate court utilized the "in further-
ance of the employer's business" test, and concluded that "under
common law principles, an employee's sexual harassment of another em-
ployee is not within the scope of employment," and thus American Ex-
press was not vicariously liable under respondeat superior.252
There were a number of notable points in the court's opinion. First,
the court stated in its holding that it was following the majority view. 253
pro quo harassment was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, thus
precluding summary judgment, although the routes to this conclusion are different.
As noted earlier, Chief Judge Posner and Judge Manion believe that an employer's
liability for quid pro quo harassment should be limited to company acts, as explained
in their opinions, as opposed to mere threats by the supervisor, and there were no
company acts here. Judge Coffey believes, as also noted earlier, that there is no
strict liability in a quid pro quo case and that there is no proof of negligence on the
part of Burlington Industries with respect to [the supervisor's] harassment of Ellerth.
Id. at 2-3.
249 Spoon v. American Agriculturalist, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1986) (citing Matter of
Totem Taxi v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 480 N.E.2d 1075 (1985); Hart v.
Sullivan, 444 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1981), aff'd 434 N.E.2d 717; In re SUNY Albany v. State Human
Rights Appeal Bd., 438 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1981), aff'd 433 N.E.2d 1277 (1982)).
250 876 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. 1994).
251 According to the court's opinion, Nally's behavior began innocuously, and became
progressively more offensive and intimidating, including grabbing and touching Smith's
breasts, throwing a condom on her desk, tossing candy down her shirt and forcibly carrying
her out of the building, all in front of her co-workers. Eventually he forced her to have sex
with him several times at the office, which Smith said she did because she was afraid of Nally.
See id. at 1169.
252 Id. at 1170.
253 See id; see also id. at 1171 ("Our conclusion is supported by reported cases in other
jurisdictions. Most courts that have considered the question have held that, as a matter of law,
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Although the plaintiff had not brought her claim under Title VII, the
court further noted that an employer's Title VII liability for sexual har-
assment is broader than its liability under the common law. 254 An Ari-
zona appellate court declined to follow cases like Johnson v.
Weinberg,25 5 in which the court held the employer liable for the criminal
act of one of its employees. In rejecting the Bushey "foreseeability" test
for "scope of employment," the court stated: "because we are not con-
vinced that Johnson was properly decided, we decline to follow it. ''256
Like California, Minnesota's standard for imposing of vicarious lia-
bility is notoriously more generous to plaintiffs than that of other states.
Yet some Minnesota opinions reflect a confusing amalgam of traditional
principles of respondeat superior and more current "strict liability" inter-
pretations. For example, in the case of Oslin v. State of Minnesota,257 the
plaintiff sued the state (her employer) for the offensive sexual conduct of
her supervisor, Gary Grimm. The plaintiff's theories of recovery in-
cluded battery, defamation and negligent supervision and retention.258
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and
plaintiff appealed. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
stated that sexual harassment of employees was "foreseeable" (using the
Bushey rationale).259 This would suggest that Grimm's acts would be
deemed to be within the scope of his employment, but the court went on
to state that while negligent supervision was a basis for vicarious liability
an employee's sexual harassment of another employee is not within the scope of employ-
ment.") (citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions).
254 We first observe that this appeal involves common law tort and contract claims
rather than sexual harassment claims brought under either Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.... or Arizona's Civil Rights Act,... Title VII liability is much
broader than common law tort liability.... One reason is that in Title VII actions,
employer liability is based on a statutory scheme that broadly defines "employer," to
include "agents" of the employer.
Id. at 1170 (citations omitted).
255 434 A.2d 404 (D.C. App. 1981). For more about Johnson v. Weinberg, see supra note
159.
256 Smith, 876 P.2d at 1171-72. Finally, the court also held that American Express had
not ratified Nally's tortious conduct after the fact, nor was an occasional supervisor's knowl-
edge of Nally's behavior imputed to American Express, since the supervisor did not "acquire"
the knowledge of Nally's harassing conduct while acting within the scope of his authority as
supervisor. See id. at 1172-73.
257 543 N.W.2d 408 (1996).
258 At a Christmas party off-premises, plaintiff's supervisor had grabbed plaintiff, stroked
her breasts, said, "You are one hell of a woman," and kissed her. She pushed him away.
Some time later, he again approached her, grabbed her leg, slid his hand up and clutched at her
crotch. Plaintiff prosecuted him for criminal assault, and he pleaded guilty to two lesser counts
of disorderly conduct. See id. at 411.
259 The court said, "[slexual harassment of an employee can be, to a degree, foreseeable."
Id. at 413; P.L v. Aubert, 527 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Minn. App. 1995) (noting that sexual abuse
of students by teachers has become a well-known hazard; thus holding that whether a teacher's
sexual abuse was "foreseeable, related to and connected with acts otherwise within the scope
of employment" was a factual question.).
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in the employer, negligent retention was a basis for direct, or primary
liability. Thus, it would be difficult for the plaintiff to prevail on the
theory of negligent retention since the supervisor's behavior was inten-
tionally tortious and the theory of negligent retention requires proof that
the employer either knew or should have known of the supervisor's
behavior.260
Perhaps most interestingly, two recent cases from California suggest
that that state may be backing away from the strict vicarious liability
approach it heralded in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles.261 Farmers In-
surance Group v. County of Santa Clara262 and Doe v. Capital Cities263
were decided in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Farmers Insurance was a
California Supreme Court case in which the plaintiff insurance carrier
sued the County of Santa Clara for indemnity, requesting that the county
repay sums that the insurance company spent in defense of their insured,
Craig Nelson, a Santa Clara deputy sheriff who was sued (successfully)
for sexual harassment by two female deputies. 264 The plaintiffs sued
under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964265 and California's
Fair Employment and Housing Act.266 Farmers Insurance maintained
that it should be indemnified because deputy Nelson was entitled to have
his defense paid by the County, not by the insurance company, if the
acts or omissions for which he was sued were within the scope of his
employment.267 The trial court found for the County of Santa Clara.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Mary M. case required a
finding that "Nelson's conduct was not so unusual or startling that it
would be unfair to include the loss as a cost of the employer's doing
business. 2 68 The California Supreme Court subsequently reversed the
Court of Appeals, concluding that Farmers Insurance was not entitled to
reimbursement from the County of Santa Clara. The Court stated that
the burden was on the public employee to show that the actions for
260 See Oslin, 543 N.W.2d at 414-15. There had been previous complaints by several
female employees against Gary Grimm. Additionally, it is of particular note that Grimm evi-
dently had a drinking problem, and a number of his co-workers had reported him smelling of
alcohol during work hours. Indeed, he was drinking when he harassed the plaintiff Smith at
the Christmas party. Nevertheless, the court was compelled to hold that the employer was
immune from liability under Minnesota's Tort Claims Act. See id. at 416.
261 285 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1991); see infra note 173 and accompanying text.
262 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 478 (1995).
263 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 122 (1996).
264 See 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 484.
265 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1991).
266 CAL. Gov'T CODE, § 12940(h) (West 1991).
267 See Farmers Insurance, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 483 (citing applicable provisions of the
California Government Code).
268 Id. at 484. The California Court of Appeals must have an incredibly high threshold
for "startling" behavior. For those interested in reading some of the gorier details of deputy
Nelson's disgusting invitations to his female co-workers, see id. at 482-83.
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which he was sued were within the scope of his employment.269
Although it was forced by its own precedent to acknowledge that "scope
of employment" is a loose standard in California, the Court resurrected
language from some of its earlier (pre-Mary M.) cases, insisting that the
employer is "strictly liable for all actions of its employees during work-
ing hours."270 Nor was the Court comfortable with the Bushey "foresee-
ability" test as a framework for determining whether the deputy's acts
were within the scope of his employment.2 71
The majority's argument to the contrary notwithstanding, there is
simply no way to reconcile the Farmers Insurance holding with the stan-
dards the Court set forth in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, just four
years earlier. Justice Baxter, who wrote the majority opinion in Farmers
Insurance, even went so far as to cite courts from other states that have
held that sexual harassment is outside the scope of employment.272
Thus, Farmers Insurance seems to take a step back from the strict vicari-
ous liability standard that the California Supreme Court had previously
adopted.27 3
The case of Doe v. Capital Cities, decided one year after Farmers
Insurance, indicates that the lower California courts have interpreted
Farmers Insurance the same way. Capital Cities involved an aspiring
actor who sued ABC (and its parent company, Capital Cities) under stat-
utory and common law tort theories of sexual harassment and negligent
hiring. The plaintiff was working with one of ABC's casting directors
and, at the director's invitation, arrived at the director's home early one
Sunday morning, where he was told he would meet various ABC execu-
tives over brunch. After arriving at the casting director's home, he was
drugged and gang-raped by the director and four other men, and taken to
a remote location, where he was abandoned until the police found him.274
269 See ia at 485.
270 Id. at 487.
271 "While it is no doubt true that sexual harassment is a pervasive problem and that many
workers in many different fields of employment have experienced some form of uninvited and
unwanted sexual attention, this argument stretches the respondeat superior foreseeability con-
cept beyond its logical limits." Id. at 489-90.
272 Id. at 495-96 (citing cases from New York, Ohio, Arizona, North Carolina, Oregon,
Illinois, Texas, Georgia, Louisiana and South Carolina, acknowledging that they are not con-
trolling, but saying that "they nonetheless demonstrate that Justice Mosk's contrary conclusion
is not in sync with the national trend."). Recall that Justice Baxter had objected strongly to
Justice Kennard's views on respondeat superior in the Mary M. case. See supra note 192 and
accompanying text.
273 Justices Mosk and Kennard obviously would agree, as their vehement dissents indi-
cate. See Farmers Insurance, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 501-08, 509-16. That Farmers Insurance
stops just short of overruling Mary M. is indicated by the concurring opinion of Justice
George, who writes, "I write separately because, in addition to distinguishing the decision in
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, I would go further and overrule Mary M. because I believe
that case was wrongly decided." l at 497.
274 See Doe, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 125.
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Some time later the plaintiff was assaulted outside his home and stabbed
by the same casting director and his accomplices.275 A California appel-
late court ultimately held that ABC could feasibly be held liable for the
director's wrongful conduct, and reversed the trial court's earlier deci-
sion on that issue.276
Because of the intervening decision by the California Supreme
Court in Farmers Insurance, Capital Cities involved only theories of pri-
mary liability. At the outset of its opinion, the Court of Appeals of Cali-
fornia stated:
We begin our discussion by noting the theory of liability
this case does not expressly involve-vicarious liability
or respondeat superior. Plaintiffs second amended com-
plaint had alleged that ABC was vicariously liable for
the common-law intentional torts (assault, battery, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress) committed by [the director]. . . . During the
pendency of this case, our Supreme Court clarified the
law governing an employer's vicarious liability for sex-
ual assaults. As a result of those holdings, . . . plaintiff
has abandoned his claims based upon vicarious
liability. 277
4. The Future of Enterprise Liability for Sexual Harassment if
Currently Illicit Drugs Become Legal
It seems clear that scholarly proponents of strict enterprise liability
hoped that sexual harassment litigation under Title VII would strengthen
many courts' recent predisposition to extend the concept of respondeat
superior to the egregiously wrongful acts of their employees. Much to
the scholars' chagrin, most of the federal and state courts have applied a
negligence (i.e., fault-based) standard-at least in "hostile environment"
cases. In other words, the courts have given employers an opportunity to
respond to an employee's complaints of a sexually offensive work at-
mosphere and to discipline the wrongdoer(s) before imposing liability on
the enterprise.
Consistent with their positions over the past century, however,
scholars in this area are not satisfied, and they find what they view as
275 See id.
276 See id. at 124.
277 Id. at 126 (citations omitted). Note that in addition to the Farmers Insurance case, the
California Supreme Court had also recently decided Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Hospital,
another post-Mary M. case, in which the court retreated from the earlier Mary M. approach.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals cited the Lisa M. case as
well as Farmers Insurance.
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judicial intransigence baffling, or worse.278 Some conclude that none of
the federal courts understand the law of agency.279 As this Article has
demonstrated, the most recent versions of that inquiry are little more
than stabs at "but for" causation; specifically, considering the current
"mere possibility" version of "foreseeability" and the latest "job-related
authority" interpretation of "scope of employment," the plaintiff will, if
the commentators have their way, only need prove that her supervisor
was in fact employed by her employer. This would then trigger strict
vicarious liability in the employer for all "hostile environment" harass-
ment committed by the supervisor.
Indeed, Professor David Oppenheimer suggests this very result.
Citing Bushey v. United States, Oppenheimer argues that employers
should be strictly liable for sexual harassment because it is "foresee-
able."'280 He further insists that, "[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, employers are vicariously liable for the wrongs of their
employees, if committed while in the scope of their employment." 281 As
with many modem scholars, his definition of "scope of employment" is
278 See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 131 (citing a myriad of scholarly articles
critical of the result in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson and subsequent cases). Oppenheimer
does approve of California's approach. California has enacted a statute, the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA), which follows the EEOC's 1980 Final Guidelines, thus holding
California employers strictly liable for all harassment-quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment-committed by supervisory employees. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-1433 (West 1989),
repealed by 1980 CAL. STAT. 992 § 11, reenacted CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West.
1992 & Supp. 1995).
279 For example, Professor Oppenheimer, a proponent of strict vicarious liability for all
supervisory harassment, said, "Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Vinson errone-
ously distinguished between agency liability and vicarious liability for harassment committed
by supervisors. The circuit courts compounded this error as they attempted to apply Vinson,
leaving the area in chaos, especially in light of the contrary dictates of the 1980 EEOC Guide-
lines." Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 142. "The array of federal court decisions addressing
the problem between agency law and sexual harassment by supervisors reveals an exasperating
problem. Federal Courts routinely misapply the law of agency." Id. at 73. The court went on
to find that:
The preceding discussion established that the federal courts have misapplied the law
of agency in Title VII sexual harassment cases. Why did such fundamental errors
occur? ... One possibility is that counsel have failed to correctly and convincingly
explain the operation of respondeat superior. Without proper guidance from the par-
ties, courts may easily substitute an incorrect, albeit common-sense, understanding
of an agent's authority, for the more exacting requirements imposed by the law of
agency.
Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
280 See id. at 91 CWith respect to vicarious liability for sexual harassment, it cannot
seriously be argued that sexual harassment in employment is unforeseeable conduct."). How-
ever, it would seem to me that, using the Bushey "foreseeability" test as a rationale, strict
vicarious liability could be imposed on the employer for a hostile environment created by non-
supervisory employees as well; after all, in Bushey, seaman Lane, the wrongdoer, was a lowly
sailor, not an officer or higher-ranking serviceman. Ergo my prediction. See infra note 285.
281 Oppenheimer, supra note 208, at 142.
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such that no act of a supervisor would ever be outside of the scope of his
employment, no matter how heinous, offensive or proscribed:
Should we ever conclude that a harasser-supervisor is
acting so far outside his role as a supervisory employee
that his on-the-job harassment is not the responsibility of
his employer? . . .I conclude that the answer to this
question must be "no.".. . The application of respondeat
superior recognizes the supervisor's effect on the work
environment, which is so closely connected with the au-
thority he exercises as a supervisor that his acts of har-
assment within the workplace can almost never be
independent of his authority as an agent of the
employer.28 2
It is a mark of how far we have departed from traditional respondeat
superior that Professor Oppenheimer can also say that his proffered inter-
pretation would "result in the proper application of common-law respon-
deat superior. '28 3
Nothing could be further from the truth. And this, not the courts'
seeming ignorance of agency law, is the source of the current dilemma in
applying agency principles to Title VII sexual harassment cases. Ac-
cording to traditional principles of respondeat superior, an employer
would be liable for acts which it authorized, or for an employee's negli-
gent acts which were reasonably foreseeable given the nature of the en-
terprise. In exceptional cases, the employer would also be liable for an
employee's intentional or willful misconduct, but only if the employer
was negligent in hiring or supervising the employee, or if the intentional
act was committed at least partially in furtherance of the employer's pur-
pose.28 4 Traditionally, crimes, violent assaults, and disgusting or vulgar
sexual behavior would never have been construed as "in furtherance of
the employer's purpose," and thus would not have been deemed to be
within a supervisor's "scope of employment."
It is only within the past thirty years that scholars and some courts
have overextended and confused traditional agency principles to accom-
plish their actual goal of imposing strict liability upon an employer for
every act of its employees. It is Professor Oppenheimer and his ilk, both
in academia and the judiciary, that have found it difficult to accept tradi-
tional notions of common-law respondeat superior. On the other hand,
judges and a handful of other scholars are legitimately opposed to fitting
282 Id. at 76.
283 Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
284 See supra Part Il.A. & B.
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a strict liability square peg into a respondeat superior round hole.285 For
this, the American enterprise can be grateful. Yet they cannot rest easy.
In the area of sexual harassment, as with tort law in general, the prospect
of a strict liability approach taken by the judiciary, coupled with in-
creased drug use after legalization, poses an incalculable economic
threat.
IV. LIMITS ON THE ENTERPRISE'S ABILITY TO SHIELD
ITSELF FROM LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEES' DRUG-RELATED,
INTENTIONAL TORTS OR CRIMES
A. RESTRICIONS ON DRUG TESTING OF EMPLOYEES UNDER STATE
LAW
The previous two sections of this Article have identified trends in
enterprise liability over the past 100 years, and focused in particular upon
recent incarnations of enterprise liability that seek to hold the employer
liable for intentional torts, crimes, sexual harassment and sexual assault
by employees. Although not a factor in every case, it is ominous and
instructive that in some of the most prominent cases, such as Ira S.
Bushey & Sons v. United States286 and Rodgers v. Kemper Construction
Co.,2 87 the bizarre, violent or grotesquely offensive acts for which the
employers were held liable were committed by employees while they
were intoxicated.288
If, as this Article posits (and the experts seem to admit), legalization
of currently illicit drugs would result in a significant increase in their use,
it stands to reason that more negligent torts will certainly be committed
by employees. But even more disturbing is the fact that more intentional
torts-violent assaults, battery, offensive sexual conduct and even crimi-
nal sexual conduct-will also be committed by employees under the in-
fluence of psychoactive substances. The logical response for any self-
protective enterprise is to institute and implement policies that screen and
weed out applicants and employees who abuse alcohol or drugs. In fact,
285 It is encouraging to see that so many federal judges insist upon giving the employer
the opportunity to address a sexually offensive workplace, and to discipline the offenders, prior
to imposing liability upon the enterprise. And perhaps one could take heart that at least two
scholarly commentators oppose uniform application of strict liability principles. See, e.g.,
Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The
Case Against "Tortification" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. Rv. 387 (1994); L
Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. Rv. 273
(1995). Despite Professor Oppenheimer's expressed fear that we might be returning to a time
of more limited, fault-based enterprise liability, my prediction is that the next call will be for
an extension of strict vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases to the acts of non-supervi-
sory employees as well.
286 See Bushey, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
287 Rodgers, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 143 (1975).
288 See Bushey, 398 F.2d at 168; Rodgers, 124 Cal.Rptr. at 146.
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the number of employers who utilize drug testing has risen dramatically
within the last fifteen years or SO. 2 8 9 However, there are limits, both
legal and practical, on an employer's ability to test for employee drug
use, and on the effectiveness of such programs.
The process of testing for the presence of illegal drugs is a highly
invasive procedure, usually involving employee urine samples taken
under supervised and controlled conditions, which are then subjected to
urinalysis in a laboratory environment.290 Because of the embarrassing
nature of a urine test and the highly personal information it reveals, there
are employee privacy concerns associated with drug testing. As regards
government employees, it has been held that urine tests are Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures that are subject to scrutiny by the
courts for their reasonableness. 291 Private employers are also con-
289 See, e.g., William Andrew Hamilton, Note, Drug Testing of Florida's Public Employ-
ees: When May a Public Employer Require Urinalysis?, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 101, 102
(1987) ("One-fourth of the Fortune 500 companies now screen employees for drugs.");
Michelle Lynn O'Brien, Comment, Webster v. Motorola: Employees Reclaiming the Right to
Privacy; Random Drug Testing for Safety Sensitive Employees Only, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv.
547 n.2 (1996) ("While fewer than 5 percent of Fortune 500 companies participated in drug
testing programs in 1982, by 1988, more than 50 percent of them did."); Chon & Jacob, supra
note 4, at F8.
Employee drug and alcohol testing in many groups is expanding at a rapid pace, not
only in the athletic area but also in public and private employment settings, particu-
larly because of recent attention to the issue. More and more employers are looking
at substance abuse screening programs as an effective risk management tool. Ac-
cording to survey results published in national newspapers, 90 percent of the Fortune
500 companies were considering substance abuse screening programs, with half of
the firms planning to implement the program before the end of the year.
Id. Richard Alaniz, Drug Testing Programs: Tough Test for Employers, ELECTRIC LiGHT AND
POWER, Sep. 1990, at 24 ("[I]n 1982, less than 3 percent of the nation's largest firms used any
form of drug testing. Today, according to a recent survey, 50 percent do.").
290 Urinalysis is used to detect the presence of cocaine, marijuana, opiates, PCP, amphet-
amines and barbiturates. For testing the presence of alcohol, the preferred method is blood and
serum testing, rather than urine. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 4, at 31 ("Common drug assay
methods currently include thin-layer chromatography, immunoassay, and gas chromatography/
mass spectrometry."); Chon & Jacob, supra note 4, at F8 ("A number of different techniques
are available for determining the presence of drugs in urine, the most widely used being the
testing technique called immunoassay testing. It can detect the use of most illicit drugs, in-
cluding cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates, heroin, methaqualone, and PCP.").
291 The courts which have considered this issue have likened urine tests to blood tests and
analogized to the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), which held that a blood sample taken from a motorist suspected of driving
under the influence of alcohol was a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified,
809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Allen
v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Railway Labor Executives Assn. v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 651 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); American Fed'n Gov't Employees
v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986). This is not to say that drug testing will be
thrown out, just that the employer must be reasonable in the justification and implementation
of the drug testing program. See, e.g,. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986); National Treasury Em-
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strained by law even though they are not acting on behalf of the state
when they subject their employees to drug tests.292 Nearly every state
has enacted statutes that either designate specific industries for mandated
drug testing, provide limits to permissible grounds for drug testing, or
regulate its methods and procedures. 293 Additionally, state unemploy-
ment compensation statutes (and cases interpreting them) often address
the issue of drug testing or illegal drug use in conjunction with dismissal
ployees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman,
475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1985). "Reasonableness" has tended to be a function of the
nature of the employees' jobs (for example, being in so-called "safety-sensitive positions"),
after an accident or where other external indicia suggest the possibility of substance abuse.
This standard is referred to in the cases as the "reasonable suspicion" standard, somewhat less
strict than the "probable cause" standard. "Reasonable suspicion" is generally considered to
be less comprehensive, less arbitrary and thus less potentially violative than random testing.
292 But see, e.g., Kelley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41 (Ist Cir. 1988) (inter-
preting Article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution, holding that it protects persons from
invasions of privacy that "negligently" inflict foreseeable "emotional injuries"); MAss. GaN.
LAws ANN., ch. 214, § IB (West 1989) (creating a statutory prohibition of unreasonable, sub-
stantial or serious interference with the privacy of Massachusetts citizens).
293 For an excellent breakdown of the (primarily) statutory law governing drug testing,
state by state, see Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, P.C., Drug Testing in the Workplace: State-by-
State Drug and Alcohol Testing Survey, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1991). See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-12 through 31-57 (b) (1987 & Supp. 1991) (requiring "reasonable
suspicion" before implementing drug test; requiring written consent to drug test by prospective
employee; limiting employer's ability to condition job benefits (promotion, pay raise, etc.) on
basis of drug test results; requiring employer to submit employee to at least two drug tests by
urinalysis, and results of second urinalysis to be confirmed by a third test, utilizing gas chro-
matography or mass spectrometry methods); HAW. Rav. STAT. § 378-26.5(5) (Supp. 1990)
(outlawing the use of any bodily intrusive device for purposes of truth verification; arguably
applies to use of drug or alcohol tests for verification after asking employee about substance
use). See Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, supra, at 202; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-112, 6356-3
(1990) (authorizing the Department of Public Health to isgue guidelines for private employers
instituting drug testing programs); IOWA CODE § 730.5 (Supp. 1989) (prohibiting drug tests
except in case of probable cause to suspect drug use by an employee in a safety-sensitive
position); 26 ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 681-690 (West Supp. 1990) (comprehensively regulat-
ing all matters relating to drug and alcohol testing procedures in the workplace; also requiring
an employee assistance program prior to instituting substance testing, in all companies with
more than twenty employees). Id. at § 683; MD. CODE ANN., [FIALTH-GEN] § 17-214.1
(1990) (generally permitting drug testing in private employment and setting forth procedures);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950-181.957 (comprehensively regulating drug and alcohol testing
in the workplace); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1989) (comprehensively regulating drug
testing of prospective and current employees); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-1901 through 48-1910
(1988) (comprehensively regulating the collection and utilization procedures in drug testing);
New York State Division of Human Rights, Rulings on Inquiries § 11(B) (1988) (limiting drug
and alcohol testing for prospective employees); OR. REv. STAT. § 438.435 (providing compre-
hensive regulation for drug testing procedures); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.5-1 (Supp. 1990) (re-
quiring "reasonable suspicion before drug test); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-38-1 through 34-38-
15 (1988) (comprehensively regulating drug testing procedures for private employers); 21 VT.
STAT. ANN. §§ 511-520 (1987) (strictly regulating all drug testing procedures by private em-
ployers; requiring the higher "probable cause" standard to justify testing, rather than the lesser
"reasonable cause" test); WASH. Rv. CODE § 49.44.120 (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting drug test as
a condition of employment, but certain professions are excepted).
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or denial of unemployment benefits. 294 Finally, employees of private
companies may have recourse to common law tort remedies for invasion
of privacy,2 95 intentional infliction of emotional distress, 296 or defama-
tion,297 in an appropriate case. 298 In enterprises with unionized employ-
ees, existence of drug testing programs can present conflicts with the
unions, including disputes over claims of unfair trade practices or viola-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement. 299
There are four types of typical drug testing schemes: pre-employ-
ment, post-accident, "reasonable suspicion," and random drug testing.
Courts generally uphold pre-employment drug screening since prospec-
tive employees are deemed to have less of an interest in obtaining a job
than current employees have in keeping one.300 Post-accident testing is
almost never successfully challenged because it is prompted by safety
concerns evidenced by the accident itself.301 The test enjoying the most
support under state law is the "reasonable suspicion," standard, which
permits an employer to test certain individual employees for drugs if ex-
ternal behaviors indicate that an employee is impaired, under the influ-
294 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-10-514(b) (Supp. 1990) (stating that an employee
discharged from work for being under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance is
disqualified from receiving benefits); Dock v. M & G. Convoy, No. 88A-FE-5, 1988 Del.
Super. LEXIS 453 (Dec. 27, 1988) (holding that employee who refused to submit to alcohol
test could be denied unemployment benefits under certain conditions); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 440.01 et. seq. (outlining procedures and limits on employee drug testing); Fowler v. Un-
employment Appeals Comm'n, 537 So.2d 162 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that refusal to
submit to drug test is misconduct justifying denial of unemployment benefits); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 23:1601 (10)(a) (West. Supp. 1991) (permitting denial of unemployment benefits for
discharge on grounds of using illegal drugs on or off the job, subject to certain conditions);
Fremont Hotel and Casino v. Esposito, 760 P.2d 122 (Nev. 1988) (holding that refusal to
submit to drug test violated collective bargaining agreement and justified denial of benefits);
Barkley v. Peninsula Transp. Dist. Comm'n, 398 S.E.2d 94 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
employee misconduct justifying denial of benefits must be based upon clear violation of em-
ployer policy).
295 See, e.g., Hill v. N.C.A.A., 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1990) (involving drug tests
for student athletes); O'Brien v. Papa Gino's, 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that
coercive techniques used by employer supported award for invasion of privacy).
296 See, e.g., 1987 Op. of Ariz. Att'y. Gen. 251 (1987) (advising that "medical testing by
private employers will be allowed unless there is intentional infliction of emotional distress by
means of extreme and outrageous conduct.").
297 See, e.g., Bratt v. IBM, Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 1984) (stating employer's dis-
closure of employee's personal medical facts may provide grounds for defamation, subject to
conditional privilege).
298 See, e.g., Edward M. Chen et al., Common Law Privacy: A Limit on an Employer's
Power to Test for Drugs, 12 GEo. MASON L. REv. 651 (1990).
299 See, e.g., Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that
analysis of plaintiff employee's privacy claim required interpretation of company's collective
bargaining agreement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.954(5) (providing that parties' collective bar-
gaining agreement may meet or exceed minimum protections provided by statute).
300 See, e.g., Gillian Flynn, Will Drug Testing Pass or Fail in Court?, 75 PERSONNEL,
Apr. 1996, at 141 (interview with attorney Larry Michaels).
301 See, e.g., Coil & Rice, supra note 4, at 103.
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ence at work or has a substance abuse problem.302 Many employers
would prefer random drug testing to testing upon "reasonable suspicion"
because of the surprise factor and the increased likelihood of catching
employees impaired by drug use on or off the job. However, random
drug testing is consistently subjected to the toughest judicial scrutiny,
and in some states is even prohibited by statute. 303
Notwithstanding the increasing frequency of their use, drug tests
have practical problems as well. There are some serious questions as to
their reliability.304 Positive results do not necessarily indicate impair-
ment, or even druguse, because other extraneous factors may produce a
positive test result.30 5 Some commentators also complain that while
urinalysis reveals traces of illegal drugs, it cannot determine if an em-
ployee is specifically impaired while working because in some cases
(e.g., cases of marijuana use) the test can identify drug use which pre-
dates the test by two weeks or more.306Additionally, urinalysis reveals
much more about an employee than is necessary to ascertain if he or she
is using illegal drugs. This highly confidential information must remain
private, at the employer's peril.307 Furthermore, drug testing is expen-
sive, often prohibitively so. 30 8 In other words, screening employees for
drug use is a fairly complicated endeavor.309
302 See supra note 293 for a list of state statutes; see also O'Brien, supra note 289, at 554,
566. O'Brien notes, however, that "reasonable suspicion" is fraught with peril as well, since
there are other factors, such as fatigue, stress, or depression which can cause an employee to
exhibit symptoms easily mistaken for substance abuse. See id. at 566.
303 See O'Brien, supra note 289, at 554-55 (citing law from Alaska, California, Massa-
chusetts, and West Virginia, which prohibits random drug testing for all but employees in
safety sensitive positions).
304 One of the most frequent challenges is to collection procedures, "chain of custody"
and the procedures of the lab selected to perform the test. See Collins, supra note 4, at 31;
Verespej, supra note 4, at 20; see also Chon & Jacob, supra note 4, at F1O ('Experts in the
area say that the problem [of false positive results in drug tests] is due to unskilled laboratories
entering the business as drug testing is booming. At present, no certification program is avail-
able for substance-screening laboratories, and that fact deteriorates the quality of drug-testing
laboratories.").
305 See Collins, supra note 4, at 33-34. Some of the typical factors which can result in a
false positive are consumption of certain foods, such as poppy seeds, or passive ingestion of
marijuana smoke at a social event, both of which can produce a false positive for marijuana.
See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 20.
306 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 4, at 20 (reporting that the urine tests for marijuana
can detect marijuana ingestion as far back as a few weeks).
307 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 56.20(a) (West 1989) (imposing upon employers who
receive medical information about their employees a duty to establish procedures to keep that
information absolutely confidential); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601(10)(e), (f) (strictly limit-
ing use of confidential information obtained through drug test).
308 See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 289, at 551 (quoting Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.).
who estimated that drug tests could run as high as $100 per employee).
309 "A drug test does not a policy make. A lot of people don't understand what a test will
tell them and what it won't." Westbrook, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting Lee Dogoloff, Execu-
tive Director of the American Council for Drug Education in Rockville, Maryland).
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Finally, the prospect of testing employees to identify drug use can
trigger yet another impediment to disciplining or terminating employees
with substance abuse problems. Employees who assert that their drug (or
alcohol) use is a result of an addiction can claim that they are disabled
within the meaning of recent laws that characterize addiction as a disabil-
ity protected against discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 is an example of such a law, and most states have similar
laws. 310
B. ADDICTION AS A PROTECTED DISABmITY UNDER
ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") prohibits
employers31 ' from discriminating against a "qualified individual with a
disability. ' 312 The statute sets forth a long list of employer actions that
can be construed as discrimination, including decisions regarding hiring,
promotion, compensation, job training and other conditions of employ-
ment.3 13 The ADA, like its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
seeks to "level the playing field" in employment opportunities for dis-
abled persons by dispelling unfounded stereotypes of persons with handi-
caps. 31 4 The ADA extends the Rehabilitation Act's protection by
applying the prohibition against discrimination by private employers. 3 15
In order to have the benefit of ADA protection, the employee must
show that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability, who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, could perform the tasks associ-
ated with the job. Once a current or prospective employee demonstrates
that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability, the ADA requires
the employer to provide "reasonable accommodation" to the em-
310 See infra Part IV.B.
311 The term "covered entity" is actually used in the statute, meaning, "employer, employ-
ment agency, labor organization or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(2) (1990).
312 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). "Qualified individual with a disability" is defined as an
"individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42
U.S.C. §12111(8) (1990). "Disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such
an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102
(2)(a),(b) & (c) (1990).
313 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1990).
314 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1990); see also Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65
F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1995).
315 Subchapter I of the ADA applies to private entities; Subchapter II applies to public
entities. Compare with Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified as 29 U.S.C. § 701-797 et seq.
(1994); see also Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1993).
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ployee.316 Although there are already hundreds of cases interpreting the
ADA, what is significant for this Article's purposes is that addiction is
considered to be a "disability" which must be "accommodated" under the
ADA.317 As ominous as this might initially sound, language in Section
12114 of the ADA explicitly exempts from the definition of "qualified
individual with a disability" anyone who is "currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs. ' 318 This section authorizes an employer to insist
upon and to take steps to ensure an alcohol- and drug-free workplace
(including use of drug testing), and to hold even persons addicted to
drugs or alcohol to the same standard of work conduct as non-addicted
employees. 319 Thus, in Flynn v. Raytheon,320 the District Court of Mas-
sachusetts held that an employee could be terminated for showing up to
work intoxicated, in violation of the company's policy, without violating
the ADA. The court explained that "[r]easonable accommodation does
not extend to accommodating an alcoholic employee's showing up for
work under the influence of alcohol or drinking alcohol on the job."32'
The ADA also permits the employer to defend an allegation of disa-
bility discrimination by showing that the employment decision or action
taken was "job-related" and "consistent with business necessity. '322 For
example, in the case of Thomas v. Mississippi State Department of
Health,323 the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that his status as a
drug addict prohibited his employer from asking legitimate questions
316 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1990). But the employer may show that accommodating
the disabled employee is an "undue hardship" under the circumstances, taking into account the
nature and cost of the accommodation requested, the financial resources of the employer, the
size of the enterprise and the type of business conducted by the enterprise. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(10) (1990). This is very much a case-by-case determination.
317 Addiction is also considered to be a disability under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Courts interpreting the statute have held that alcoholism was protected within the Act. See,
e.g., Little v. F.B.I., 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that alcoholism is protected disability
under the Rehabilitation Act, but nonetheless justifying employee's termination for intoxica-
tion on duty). More recent cases interpreting the ADA have followed their lead in finding that
alcoholism and drug addiction are protected disabilities. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc.,
864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994). But cf Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that alcoholism is not a "per se" disability under the ADA: "Unlike HIV infec-
tion, the EEOC has not attempted to classify alcoholism as a per se disability, and we decline
to adopt such a questionable position.").
318 See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (1990); see also Scott v. Beverly Enters.-Kan., Inc., 968 F.
Supp. 1430 (D. Kan. 1997). In Scott, the court found that plaintiff was not entitled to ADA
protection, since he was "currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs," and thus not a "quali-
fied individual with a disability" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 1441; see also Lewis
v. Sheraton Soc'y Hill, 1997 WL 397490, at * 4 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that plaintiff is "still
a drug user," and thus "not an individual with a disability as contemplated under the ADA.").
319 See 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c), (d) & (e) (1990).
320 868 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mass. 1994).
321 Id. at 387.
322 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1990).
323 934 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
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about his previous termination for absenteeism, a problem caused by his
addiction to crack cocaine.324 The court held that the employer was not
prohibited by the ADA from asking legitimate questions that were
"shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. '3 5
In cases involving disciplinary action against or termination of ad-
dicted employees, courts have interpreted sections of the ADA as pro-
tecting employers whose decisions were made on the basis of the
addicted employee's potential threat to the health or safety of others.
Two recent cases involving doctors amply demonstrate this point. In Alt-
man v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,326 the plaintiff, a
recovering alcoholic, sued his employer to demand reinstatement as
Chief of Internal Medicine, a position which he held until he was discov-
ered treating a patient while drunk.327 Three months after his removal
from that position, the plaintiff completed a one-month alcohol rehabili-
tation program and insisted that he be reinstated to his prior position.
When the hospital refused to reinstate him, he sued, claiming that he was
being discriminated against because of his disability, in violation of the
ADA.328 Quoting from § 12111(3) of the ADA and the related regula-
tions, the court held that reinstatement of the plaintiff as Chief of Internal
Medicine would have posed a "direct threat to the health or safety" of the
hospital's patients, a "significant risk of substantial harm" that could not
be monitored by any reasonable means.329
Similarly, in Judice v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1,330 the plaintiff
sued seeking reinstatement to his position as a surgeon, from which he
had been removed after it was discovered that he was preparing for sur-
gery under the influence of alcohol. Although Dr. Judice successfully
completed a rehabilitation program, his employment history contained
previous bouts with alcohol abuse, rehabilitation and relapse, and the
hospital sought at least two professional opinions prior to reinstating the
324 See id. at 773. Plaintiff had previously worked for the Department of Health as a
Disease Intervention Specialist, and had developed an addiction to crack cocaine, which
prompted two administrative leaves, one for involuntary commitment in a rehabilitation facil-
ity and one for voluntary commitment to another program. He was eventually fired. Two
years later, plaintiff applied for another DIS position. During his interview, he was asked
questions about his addiction problems. The court characterized plaintiffs contention as fol-
lows: "According to plaintiff, since his drug addiction caused these circumstances, defendants
were prohibited from considering them." Id. at 771.
325 Id. at 773.
326 903 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y 1995).
327 See id. at 504.
328 See id. at 507-08. Dr. Altman also sued under N.Y. Exac. LAw, § 296. Id.
329 Id. at 508, 513. The court found it significant that plaintiff had had problems with
alcohol abuse before, had successfully completed rehabilitation programs and had relapsed.
See id. at 509.
330 919 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1996).
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plaintiff.331 The plaintiff objected to the necessity of a second opinion
about his fitness for reinstatement, and he sued under the ADA.332 The
district court in Judice, like the court in Altman, pointed to the "direct
threat" language in the ADA, concluding that the possibility of plaintiff s
relapse was sufficiently high to warrant the hospital's prudence, and its
procedural safeguards were not disability discrimination in violation of
the ADA.333
Reassuringly, many courts have developed a common-sense ap-
proach to the characterization of "addiction" as a protected "disability,"
and have shielded employers from ADA liability by distinguishing be-
tween an employee's "status" as an addict, and his or her "conduct."
According to this distinction, while an employee's mere status as an al-
coholic or drug addict cannot be the basis of denial of a job or job bene-
fits, or of disciplinary action or termination, an employee's conduct-
even that which is related to current abuse of alcohol or illicit drugs- is
considered by many courts as not protected by the ADA.
Thus, in Davis v. Safeway, Inc.,334 the court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff was terminated be-
cause of his physically and verbally abusive behavior (including sexually
offensive behavior) toward Safeway employees and guests at a company-
sponsored fundraising event, even though the plaintiff claimed that his
behavior was caused by alcoholism. 335
Also, in Adamczyk v. Baltimore County Police Department,336 the
court refused to hold an employer liable for violation of the ADA where
it had demoted a police officer from lieutenant to corporal following a
series of explicit and obscene comments which he made to and about
lower-ranking female officers over a period of time.337 Plaintiff
Adamczyk argued that his status as an alcoholic was the basis of his
demotion, but the court disagreed, distinguishing his addiction from his
misconduct, which violated the police department's internal standards of
331 See id. at 980.
332 See id.
333 See id. at 982-83.
334 1996 WL 266128 (N.D. Cal.).
335 See id. at *2 (plaintiffs behavior is set forth on this page of this unreported opinion).
The court ultimately said, "Consistent with [42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4)], courts have consistently
failed to find ADA violations where the reason for an employee's termination is the em-
ployee's misconduct, not alcoholism, even where the misconduct is tied to the alcoholism."
L at *7.
336 952 F. Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1997).
337 Often in sexual harassment cases, the courts discreetly edit the offensive comments
with "expletive deleted" and typographical symbols used in place of letters to avoid spelling
out some particularly offensive words. The Court in Adamczyk, however, perhaps to drive
home the correctness of its result, described Adamczyk's conduct and quoted his comments in
all their disgusting detail. See id. at 260-62.
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conduct. 338 Indeed, the court concluded that Adamczyk's proffered in-
terpretation of the ADA's protection of his conduct was absurd in light of
the police department's potential vicarious liability for his behavior,
saying:
The BCPD [Baltimore County Police Department] was
entirely justified in treating plaintiff s offensive behavior
as evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisory em-
ployee. Had defendants not taken prompt remedial ac-
tion by disciplining plaintiff, the BCPD itself might well
have faced female officers' claims that the department
condoned a hostile or abusive work environment. A po-
lice department like the BCPD must be allowed to le-
gally demote even police officers suffering from
alcoholism who egregiously offend female officers and
disregard rules and standards which Baltimore County
has established to regulate the conduct of its police
force.339
Some courts have even extended this protection to employers in
cases where employees were disciplined or terminated for improper or
illegal conduct (involving alcohol and drug use) during off-hours. For
example, in Maddox v. University of Tennessee,34° the district court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee held that the University of Tennessee's
decision to fire the plaintiff, an assistant football coach, after his very
public arrest for driving while intoxicated, was not violative of the ADA
even though the plaintiff employee was not on duty at the time of his
arrest. The Maddox court relied upon Taub v. Frank,341 a First Circuit
case, and also distinguished between the disability of addiction itself,
which is protected, and misconduct related to it, which the court held is
not protected. 342
Fortunately, the ADA contains language which explicitly excludes
current illegal drug use from the definition of a "qualified person with a
disability." Nevertheless, the ADA still creates the perverse incentive for
an employee to claim that his or her problem is worse than it really is;
338 See id. at 264.
339 Id. at 266.
340 907 F. Supp 1144 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
341 957 F.2d 8, 11 (st Cir. 1992).
342 See Maddox, 907 F. Supp. at 1150. In Taub, plaintiff employee had been caught in
possession of heroin which he intended to sell to his fellow employees. See Taub, 957 F.2d at
9. After being advised of his impending termination for that conduct, plaintiff sued, claiming
to be addicted to heroin and thus protected from disciplinary action by the ADA. See id. The
district court granted defendant employer's motion for summary judgment, and the First Cir-
cuit affirmed, holding that the employer had discharged the employee for criminal conduct, not
solely because of any addiction which he might have had. See id. at 9-10.
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that is, if employee X is just stoned at work one day, she can be fired; but
if she claims to be stoned every day, federal law protects her. Indeed, in
reading the cases, it becomes clear that many employees, disgruntled af-
ter being disciplined or terminated for on-the-job alcohol or drug use, file
frivolous ADA actions.343 These actions have to be defended, at no
small cost to the employer, even if the employer ultimately prevails.344
2. State Law
State disability or handicap protection laws follow the same basic
structure of the ADA. The states which have enacted handicap protec-
tion statutes tend to fall into one of three groups:
(1) states whose statutes explicitly exclude current alcohol or drug
use from disability protection; 345
343 See, e.g., Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995). In the Collings
case, the employer, Longview Fibre Company, terminated eight former employees who had
been caught buying, selling and using marijuana at work in an investigation which took several
months. Several of the plaintiff employees were proven to have lied during the investigation,
and some were arrested for possession thereafter in unrelated events. The court's view of the
dubious nature of the employees' claims of being protected by the ADA is clear from the
opinion: "Even assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiffs had such a disability .. ." and
"[e]ven assuming that the plaintiffs had a drug addiction problem. . ." Id. at 832, 835. The
District Court properly saw through the terminated employees' scam. But the inevitable fact is
that these cases are litigated by the hundreds each year.
344 In fact, a surprising number of ADA addiction cases are successful summary judgment
cases for the defendant employers. See, e.g., Maddox v. University of Tennesee, 907 F. Supp.
1144 (1994); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995); Altman v. N.Y.
City Health and Hosps. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Judice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist.
No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1996); Davis v. Safeway, Inc., 1996 WL 266128 (N.D.
Cal.); Adamczyk v. Baltimore County Police Dep't, 952 F. Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1997); Wil-
liams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Scott v. Beverly Enters.-
Kan., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1430 (D. Kan. 1997); Lewis v. Sheraton Society Hill, 1997 WL
397490 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
345 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1461 (explicitly excluding impairment caused
by "current or recent use of alcohol or drugs") and 41-1463 (prohibiting handicap discrimina-
tion in employment) (West 1997); CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 12940 (West 1991) (broadly prohibit-
ing discrimination against the handicapped) and 2 CAL. CODE REGS. Trr. § 7293.6(a)(4)
(1991) (explicitly providing that drug or alcohol addiction is not a handicap). 19 DEL. CODE
ANN. §§ 720-728 (Supp. 1990) (protecting handicapped persons from discrimination in em-
ployment, and specifically excluding persons whose "current use of alcohol or drugs" impedes
their ability to perform the job or poses a direct threat to the safety of others. Id. at
§ 722(4)(c)(5)); GA. CODE Arm. §§ 34-6A-1 through 43-6A-6 (1995) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion against handicapped individuals in public and private employment; specifically excludes
from definition of "handicapped individual" any person addicted to federally-controlled drugs
or alcohol); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.130-.260 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (prohibits
discrimination against disabled individuals in employment; specifically permits employer to
reject prospective applicant with drug or alcohol addiction); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2253-
2254 (West 1982) (prohibiting discrimination in employment against qualified handicapped
person; gives employers discretion not to include alcoholism or drug addiction within meaning
of "handicapped"); NEa. REv. STAT. §§ 48-1101-1126 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of disability, but specifically excusing current use of drugs or alcohol); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-422.1 to -422.3 (1990), and §§ 168A-1 to A-12 (1987) (prohibiting discrimina-
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(2) states whose statutes are silent on the matter 346 (in some of these
states, the courts have interpreted the handicap protection statutes as in-
tion against handicapped persons or those with "handicapping condition," current use of alco-
hol specifically excluded. Id. at § 168A-3(4)(a)(iii)(B)); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, §§ 1101-1901
(Supp. 1991) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals; explicitly excludes drug
and alcohol use which threatens safety of other employees); TEx. Hum. REs. CODE ANN.
§ 121.003 (West 1990) and Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 5221k, § 2.01 (West Supp. 1991)
(prohibiting employment discrimination against persons with disabilities, broadly defined; ex-
plicitly excluding addiction to alcohol or drugs); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-714 to -725 (Michie
1987) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals; current alcohol use and drug
addiction specifically excluded); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1990) (forbidding discrimi-
nation against "able and competent" disabled individuals; current use of or addiction to alcohol
or drugs explicitly excluded).
346 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 21-7-8 (1990) (prohibiting handicap discrimination in public
employment; no mention of addiction or alcoholism); ALAsg- STAT. § 18.80.210 (1990)
(prohibiting disability discrimination by private employers; no mention of drug or alcohol
addiction); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-14-301(a) (1990) (prohibiting handicap discrimination in
employment; applies only to state or state-funded entities); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-34-402(a)
(1989) (prohibiting handicap discrimination unless employer cannot "reasonably accommo-
date" handicap") and CoLo. CODE REGS. § 60.1 (1980) (defining "handicap" without reference
to drug or alcohol abuse or addiction); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(a) (1986) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation against the physically or mentally disabled by private employers of more than three
employees; no reference to addiction as a physical disorder); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, 1-
2502 (1990) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "physical handicap"; no mention of
drug or alcohol addiction); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-.10 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting
handicap discrimination by private employers; no mention of drug or alcohol addiction);
IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (1990) (prohibiting handicap discrimination; no mention of drug or
alcohol addiction); ILL. CONST., art. I, § 19 (prohibiting discrimination against physically or
mentally handicapped persons who can perform the tasks required for the position; applies to
public employers only); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-1 through 22-9-1-13 (Burns 1986) (prohib-
iting handicap discrimination; no mention of drug or alcohol addiction); IOWA CODE
§§ 601A.1-.19 (Supp. 1989) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals; no men-
tion of drug or alcohol addiction); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to 44-1004 (1986) (prohibit-
ing discrimination against the physically handicapped; no mention of drug or alcohol
addiction); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4551-4665 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990) (prohibiting
discrimination against physically or mentally handicapped except for bona fide occupational
qualification; no mention of drug or alcohol addiction); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 1-28
(1991) (prohibiting private discrimination against physically or mentally handicapped; no
mention of drug or alcohol addiction); MrcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.1101-.1606 (1991) (prohibit-
ing discrimination against qualified disabled persons in all employment matters; no mention of
drug or alcohol addiction); MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.15 (West 1991) (prohibiting discrim-
ination against disabled individuals; no mention of alcoholism or drug addiction); Mrss. CODE
ANN. §§ 25-9-103, 25-9-149 (Supp. 1990) and § 43-6-15 (1981) (handicap discrimination stat-
ute applies only to public entities); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-.126 (Vernon Supp. 1991)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap, explaining that current use of alcohol or
drugs is not a "handicap," but persons currently undergoing rehabilitation without use and
persons who have completed rehabilitation are considered "handicapped"); MoNT. CODE ANN.
§§ 49-2-303, 49-2-308 (1989) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical handicap;
no mention of drug or alcohol addiction although Montana Commission on Human Rights has
concluded that alcoholism is a protected disability). See In re Am. Indian Action Council,
Case No. 288, Findings, Conclusion and Order (Montana Commission of Human Rights (Oct.
1976))); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 613.630 (Michie Supp. 1989) (prohibiting discrimination
based upon "physical, aural or visual" disabilities; no mention of drug or alcohol addiction);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1 to 354-A:14 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (prohibiting employers
of six or more employees from discriminating against the physically or mentally handicapped;
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cluding alcohol and drug addiction); 347 and
(3) states whose statutes explicitly include alcohol and drug use
within their protection.348 (These are overwhelmingly in the minority.)
bona fide occupational qualification is a defense; no mention of drug or alcohol addiction);
N.J. Rnv. STAT. § 10:5-4.1 (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting discrimination against handicapped un-
less disability precludes performance of job duties); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-15
(1987) (prohibiting discrimination against physically or mentally handicapped persons; no
mention of drug abuse or alcoholism); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (Consol. 1983 & Supp.
1990) (prohibiting discrimination against handicapped individuals; alcohol and drug addiction
not mentioned); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to -21 (1989) (requiring "reasonable accom-
modation" for persons with physical or mental handicap; drug and alcohol addiction not men-
tioned); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.99 (Anderson 1991) (prohibiting discrimination
against persons with disability; drug and alcohol addiction not included); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.425(1)(a)-(c) (1989) (requiring "reasonable accommodation" of disabled individuals; no
mention of drug or alcohol addiction); 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. Ae. § 955 (1964 & Supp. 1990)
(prohibiting discrimination against persons with "non-job related handicap"; drug and alcohol
addiction not expressly addressed); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to 28-5-40 (1986 & Supp. 1990)
(requiring employers of four or more employees to "reasonably accommodate" disabled indi-
viduals' drug and alcohol addiction not mentioned); S.D. CODmD LAWS ANN. § 20-13-10
(1987) (requiring "good faith efforts" to accommodate disabled employees; drug and alcohol
addiction not mentioned); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103(a) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination
against persons with "physical, mental or visual" handicaps; drug and alcohol addiction not
mentioned); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34A-5-106 (1989 & Supp. 1990) (prohibiting discrimination
against handicapped persons; drug and alcohol addiction not mentioned); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 495 (1987) (prohibiting discrimination against "qualified handicapped individual"; drug
and alcohol addiction not mentioned); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1980) (prohibit-
ing discrimination against persons with "sensory, mental or physical handicap;" drug and alco-
hol addiction not mentioned); Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-.395 (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting
discrimination against handicapped persons; drug and alcohol addiction not mentioned); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 27-9-101 to 27-9-108 (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting discrimination against "qualified
handicapped persons;" no reference to drug or alcohol addiction).
347 See, e.g., Athanas v. Board of Educ., 28 FAIR EMPL. FPRc. CAS. (BNA) 569 (N.D. Il.
1980) (holding that employer harassed employee and wrongly discharged him based on em-
ployee's alcoholism alone); Consol. Freightways v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Comm'n, 366
N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1985) (holding alcoholism a "handicap" within meaning of Cedar Rapids
anti-discrimination ordinance); Gruening v. Pinotti, 392 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that alcoholism can meet statutory definition of "disability"); Clowes v. Terminix
Int'l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794 (N.J. 1988) (holding that alcoholism is protected disability); In re
Cahill, 585 A. 2d 977 (N.J. 1991) (extending Clowes rationale to drug addiction); Hazlett v.
Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio 1986) (holding that drug addiction and alcohol-
ism are "handicaps" within meaning of relevant statute); Squires v. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm'n, 294 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing alcoholism as a protected
handicap).
348 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1025-1027 (requiring every private employer with more
than 25 employees to "reasonably accommodate" any employee seeking alcohol or drug reha-
bilitation, to maintain the employee's privacy and to allow the employee to take sick leave);
HAW. R v. STAT § 378-2 (Supp. 1990) (prohibiting discrimination by private employers
against persons with a "disability") and § 431M-2 (Supp. 1990) (requiring all insurers and
health plan providers to cover alcohol and drug treatment); 56 ILL. ADuIN. CODE, § 2500
(1990) (prohibiting discrimination in employment against handicapped persons; explicitly in-
cludes drug and alcohol addiction unless the addiction prevents the employee from performing
the job duties); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 151(b), § 1 (West 1982 Supp. 1990) (prohibiting
discrimination against qualified handicapped persons) and 8 MASS. DIsaURINA-nON L. R..
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3. The Future of Handicap or Disability Protection for
Addiction if Currently Illicit Drugs Become Legal
Happily, both federal and state courts, for the most part, have struck
a sensible balance between protecting legitimately disabled individuals
from stereotyping and discrimination, and appreciating employers' needs
to have safe, drug-free workplaces-particularly in light of recent ten-
dencies to hold employers strictly vicariously liable for intentional torts
and crimes committed by their employees. But there are a few courts
which approach the issue differently. In spite of the clear language of the
ADA and the common sense approach taken currently by most courts,
some have chosen to disregard the "status" versus "conduct" distinction.
In Ham v. State of Nevada,349 for example, the district court refused to
apply the "status" versus "conduct" distinction, saying, "if defendant acts
on the basis of conduct caused by the handicap, it is the same as if that
,defendant acts on the basis of the handicap itself. ' 350 The court found
that the plaintiff employee's conduct was inextricably intertwined with
his status as an addict, and that therefore the distinction between status
and conduct gutted the very purpose of the ADA.351 This is a minority
view. Nevertheless, employers should not breathe easily, comforted by
the knowledge that the courts are using common sense in this area.
Legal scholars are beginning to grumble about the "status" versus "con-
duct" distinction, and at least one now argues that this distinction should
be abandoned, and that courts should compel employers under the ADA
to accommodate even current users of alcohol or illicit drugs. 352
One author writes that courts should be more "compassionate" in
their treatment of addicts on the job, saying, "[a] frigid, intolerant and
discriminatory legislative and judicial system offers little security and
encouragement to the diseased and disabled addicts whom we are legally
and morally bound to protect from discrimination." 353 Maintaining that
the current trend to distinguish the "status" of being addicted from "con-
duct" related to it defeats the clear intent of the ADA, she argues:
The "conduct-covered" [approach] discussed above
demonstrates a federal judicial trend toward intolerance
of drug and alcohol addiction, making protection for
those suffering from the disability of addiction more dif-
2003 (Sept. 30, 1986) (commission guidelines stating that substance abusers qualify as "handi-
capped," while recreational users of alcohol or drugs do not).
349 788 F. Supp. 455 (D. Nev. 1992).
350 Id. at 460.
351 See id.
352 See Amy L. Hennen, Protecting Addicts in the Workplace: Charting a Course Toward
Tolerance, 15 LAw & INEQUITY J. 157, 189 (1997).
353 Id.
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ficult to receive under the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act.... As a first step toward reversing the intolerance
trend, federal courts should . . .. [reject] the distinction
between addiction and conduct caused by the addic-
tion.... [Tlhis rejection of the conduct/disability dis-
tinction makes it easier for employees to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act . . . . [For] courts rejecting the
disability/conduct distinction... the relevant question is
what caused the conduct the employer points to in termi-
nating the employee. If the conduct is caused solely by
the disability .... the employer has indeed improperly
relied on the disability in violation of the Rehabilitation
Act.354
This recommendation is disturbing, but it should not be surprising.
Nor should it be dismissed. As has been shown amply in the past, where
legal commentators point, courts often follow. Such an interpretation of
"protected disability" would certainly be consistent with the tendencies
of legal scholars over the past century to expand enterprise liability, but
it would be disastrous for employers, and ultimately for the American
economy in general.
Employers already contend with substantial expense in the form of
vicarious liability for negligent torts committed by their employees.
Within the last thirty years, we have seen those same respondeat superior
concepts distorted in order to justify holding the enterprise vicariously
liable, as well, for the intentional torts (trespass, false imprisonment, as-
sault, battery), crimes (assault with a deadly weapon, or with intent to do
grievous bodily harm, sexual molestation and rape) and sexually offen-
sive behavior of the most egregious sort. Employees under the influence
of alcohol or drugs are much more prone to negligent accidents, and, as
recent ADA cases show, to offensive, abusive and violent behavior. The
only logical alternative for an employer is to be able to discipline and
terminate such an employee immediately, before their alcohol or drug
use threatens the safety of the workplace, other employees or third par-
ties, exposing the employer to even greater liability. In fact, much of the
language in the respondeat superior cases justifies imposing vicarious
liability on the enterprise explicitly on the grounds that the employer is in
the best position to observe, monitor and control its employees, and thus
the threat of liability serves to encourage the employers to provide a safe
and non-hostile working environment.
354 Id. at 184.
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Forcing the employers to retain current drug users would close off
one of the few methods that modem employers have left to insulate
themselves from unlimited liability.355 A work force peppered with alco-
hol and drug abusers who are protected by federal law from discipline or
termination is an economic nightmare waiting to happen. The employer,
prevented by federal law from terminating drug users, would then be-
come strictly vicariously liable for every wrongful act committed by
these individuals. These are not costs that properly belong to the
enterprise.
V. CONCLUSION
Arguments in favor of drug legalization have substantial merit. It is
clear that gargantuan expenditures by the federal and state governments
have done little to stem either the supply or (more to the point) the de-
mand for psychoactive substances. Continued expenditures of this mag-
nitude cannot continue indefinitely because the country does not have
infinite dollars to spend on interdiction. Our courts and prisons would be
put to better use by dealing with violent predatory criminals, rather than
the odd marijuana smoker or the nonthreatening heroin addict. And the
havoc wrought in our cities by the black market created by illegal drugs
is impossible to ignore.
As a people, we have an obligation to consider all possible resolu-
tions to the problem of drug abuse-including schemes which explicitly
tolerate some drug use, such as decriminalization or legalization. Per-
haps we would be better served by a system that treats addiction as a
health problem rather than a law enforcement problem, that eliminates
the deadly chaos of the black market and that devotes its resources to
education, treatment and rehabilitation. But who will foot the bill for all
of these societal improvements? Legalization advocates maintain that all
of this will be paid for with cost savings from reduced interdiction and
misuse of judicial resources. Perhaps, but legalization of drugs would
not occur in a vacuum. In fact, any economic rationale for legalizing
drugs is inaccurate without considering the financial impact to the private
sector.
An unspoken (and perhaps unidentified) effect of any drug legaliza-
tion system is to transfer a significant portion of these social costs to the
private sector employers in the form of larger and more frequent judg-
355 Some say this policy would also insulate the substance abuser from the consequences
of his or her actions. For those truly concerned about addicts' welfare, this is no small point,
since many experts in addiction studies suggest that the most intransigent abusers must "hit
bottom" before they are willing to acknowledge their addiction and seek help. Perhaps one
could argue that sheltering drug-using employees from termination is "enabling" them. But
that is a topic for another paper.
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ments rendered and fines imposed for the torts and crimes committed by
employees under the influence of drugs, and of productivity costs of
treatment and rehabilitation efforts required under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The unquantifiable costs associated with retraining new
workers to replace those addicted to drugs, along with lost profitability
associated with the possible inability to fire addicted and unproductive
employees, should also be considered.
Our approach to the problem of drug abuse must be carefully
thought out. It must be consistent with the political philosophy and prin-
ciples upon which this country was founded-liberty, democracy, private
ownership of property and a free market. Legalization of drugs is a liber-
tarian position, but the current structure of our enterprise liability law has
a distinctly socialist tone. We cannot use libertarian philosophy to justify
gratifying our basest urges and socialist philosophy to justify asking
others to pay for it. It is just this sort of philosophical schizophrenia that
produces the inconsistent and utterly irreconcilable jurisprudence that we
have seen recently in the area of respondeat superior.
There may be no imminent risk of drugs being legalized. But the
mere prospect should bring into sharp focus the fact that our enterprise
liability law has already strayed too far from its origins. The current
legal climate seeks to make private employers insurers against any and
all bad things that happen to people. This is contrary to the basic social
and political philosophies of the United States. The problem needs to be
redressed, even in the absence of legalized drugs.
Employers should not be the only ones concerned about drug legali-
zation without tort reform. As has been shown in the past, corporations
will not just blithely absorb these increased costs; they will be passed on
to the American consumer. Before we decide to accept such costs, we
must know what they are: personally invasive employment policies, dra-
matically reduced employment opportunities for those with a past crimi-
nal record or history of substance use or abuse, reduced productivity,
expenses of defending protracted lawsuits, skyrocketing and unpredict-
able financial losses and inevitably inflated insurance costs, a greater
number of goods and services whose costs will be beyond the means of
an even greater segment of the population, bankruptcy of enterprises that
will no longer be able to afford the losses and/or insurance associated
with employee torts or crimes, and lost opportunities of innumerable
ventures that will never come into existence for fear of overwhelming
financial liability for unpredictable, uninsurable and uncontrollable em-
ployee behavior.
It is difficult to agree to pay a price when one does not know what it
is. And these costs are incalculable.
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